🌉 bridged from https://infosec.exchange/@fr0gger on the fediverse by https://fed.brid.gy/
Here is what I think 👇
The case is interesting but not really new. Offensive AI with autonomous agents is […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Here is what I think 👇
The case is interesting but not really new. Offensive AI with autonomous agents is […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Here is a short overview:
• Multiple malware in the wild are now using LLMs for code generation. A constant but still experimental trend the […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Here is a short overview:
• Multiple malware in the wild are now using LLMs for code generation. A constant but still experimental trend the […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
👉 https://promptintel.novahunting.ai/feed
👉 https://promptintel.novahunting.ai/feed
You can also complete your profile to display your social media and websites, if you like!
👉 https://promptintel.novahunting.ai/leaderboard
You can also complete your profile to display your social media and websites, if you like!
👉 https://promptintel.novahunting.ai/leaderboard
The backdoor fetches encrypted payloads, executes them in […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The backdoor fetches encrypted payloads, executes them in […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/advances-in-threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools-en.pdf
https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/advances-in-threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools-en.pdf
It forces the model into a "werewolf persona", blocks refusals with fake rules, and makes it start every answer with "I am an adorable nerdy AI!"
A persona hijack + refusal suppression […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
It forces the model into a "werewolf persona", blocks refusals with fake rules, and makes it start every answer with "I am an adorable nerdy AI!"
A persona hijack + refusal suppression […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Great source of intel feed for supply-chain attacks! 👇
https://opensourcemalware.com/
Great source of intel feed for supply-chain attacks! 👇
https://opensourcemalware.com/
You can extend Claude Code with custom commands, agents, hooks, skills, and MCP servers. That means you can build plugins that replicate how your team works with custom templates, triage agents, and […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
You can extend Claude Code with custom commands, agents, hooks, skills, and MCP servers. That means you can build plugins that replicate how your team works with custom templates, triage agents, and […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
It gives you a broader understanding and methodology to start evaluate your AI systems, from AI Kill Chain, CFS, to practical example.
https://pillar.security/ai-red-teaming-introduction
It gives you a broader understanding and methodology to start evaluate your AI systems, from AI Kill Chain, CFS, to practical example.
https://pillar.security/ai-red-teaming-introduction
The winners will be announced on November 25 at the French Embassy in Canberra.
Now […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The winners will be announced on November 25 at the French Embassy in Canberra.
Now […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Over the past years, I researched how threat actors exploit LLMs and introduced the concept of Indicators of Prompt Compromise (IoPC), adversarial prompts that reveal […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Over the past years, I researched how threat actors exploit LLMs and introduced the concept of Indicators of Prompt Compromise (IoPC), adversarial prompts that reveal […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Something interesting, they added 3 new LLM TTPs that describe how attackers use LLMs for their attacks.
- […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Something interesting, they added 3 new LLM TTPs that describe how attackers use LLMs for their attacks.
- […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The Postmark MCP server (used to send and track emails through Postmark API) introduced a suspicious behavior in version 1.0.16.
The attacker cloned the legitimate Postmark MCP code and […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The Postmark MCP server (used to send and track emails through Postmark API) introduced a suspicious behavior in version 1.0.16.
The attacker cloned the legitimate Postmark MCP code and […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Super proud to see my work in […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Super proud to see my work in […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The 4 main categories are:
・ Prompt Manipulation,
・ Abusing Legitimate Functions,
・ Suspicious Patterns,
・ Abnormal Outputs.
Each covers threats you should […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
The 4 main categories are:
・ Prompt Manipulation,
・ Abusing Legitimate Functions,
・ Suspicious Patterns,
・ Abnormal Outputs.
Each covers threats you should […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
There is also a playground so you can test the rules live
👉 detectionstream.com
There is also a playground so you can test the rules live
👉 detectionstream.com
Before using a public MCP server, you can quickly probe the endpoint or your local MCP to discover exposed prompts, tools, and resources. You can then scan with NOVA to check if any […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Before using a public MCP server, you can quickly probe the endpoint or your local MCP to discover exposed prompts, tools, and resources. You can then scan with NOVA to check if any […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
No need to reinvent the wheel when talented researchers already did the work!
👉 https://juniverse.securitybreak.io/
No need to reinvent the wheel when talented researchers already did the work!
👉 https://juniverse.securitybreak.io/
One part is very interesting, the team spotted 5 AI fingerprints in the code. But instead of hiding the attack (the initial goal), these […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
One part is very interesting, the team spotted 5 AI fingerprints in the code. But instead of hiding the attack (the initial goal), these […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Last year I did not win, but this year my open-source tool NOVA has been selected in the Innovation of the Year category.
If you like the project, please cast your vote to […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Last year I did not win, but this year my open-source tool NOVA has been selected in the Innovation of the Year category.
If you like the project, please cast your vote to […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Have a read 👉 https://newsletter.securitybreak.io/archive/blackhat-defcon2025
Have a read 👉 https://newsletter.securitybreak.io/archive/blackhat-defcon2025
👉 https://unprotect.it/
👉 https://unprotect.it/
My goal is simple: create a common foundation we can all build on to classify and track adversarial prompts!
My goal is simple: create a common foundation we can all build on to classify and track adversarial prompts!
Threat actor Storm-1516 relies on uncensored and self-hosted LLMs, using variants of the Llama-3.1-8B model (dolphin-2.9-llama3-8b, Llama-3-8B-Lexi-Uncensored). They use […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]
Threat actor Storm-1516 relies on uncensored and self-hosted LLMs, using variants of the Llama-3.1-8B model (dolphin-2.9-llama3-8b, Llama-3-8B-Lexi-Uncensored). They use […]
[Original post on infosec.exchange]