Eric Brewer
@ebrewer.bsky.social
Deputy VP at Nuclear Threat Initiative. Previously Director for Counterproliferation at the National Security Council and Deputy National Intelligence Officer for WMD at the National Intelligence Council. Personal account/views my own.
Tensions between Iran and the US are heating up. The US is flowing more forces into the region as both sides exchange threats. Direct talks appear unlikely for now, and time for a deal is short. How might Khamenei manage what is likely to be a perilous ~6 months? I see four options. 1/
April 10, 2025 at 10:29 PM
For example: Bar certain inspectors (which Iran has already done), or bar/any all inspections, which would be a major provocation? Similarly, moving materials to a secure location could be done with IAEA monitoring (not good) or without (really, really bad).
April 10, 2025 at 11:45 AM
For example: Bar certain inspectors (which Iran has already done), or bar/any all inspections, which would be a major provocation? Similarly, moving materials to a secure location could be done with IAEA monitoring (not good) or without (really, really bad).
A third question: Will maximum pressure continue while diplomacy is underway? I suspect yes, but North Korea under Trump 1.0 offers a counterexample. 3/3
April 8, 2025 at 12:15 AM
A third question: Will maximum pressure continue while diplomacy is underway? I suspect yes, but North Korea under Trump 1.0 offers a counterexample. 3/3
Sticking with the latter would be a recipe for a short negotiation. Another big Q is whether the Trump admin sees this as more of a temperature-taking session or plans to lay out early redlines and/or put something more substantive on the table (my guess is temp-taking). 2/
April 8, 2025 at 12:15 AM
Sticking with the latter would be a recipe for a short negotiation. Another big Q is whether the Trump admin sees this as more of a temperature-taking session or plans to lay out early redlines and/or put something more substantive on the table (my guess is temp-taking). 2/
So, in order of likelihood, I think we see 3 next, and if that doesn’t work, then back to 2. I think 1 is very unlikely, and remain skeptical or 4. You now have my very public predictions based on current info. I’ll revise as warranted! 12/12
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
So, in order of likelihood, I think we see 3 next, and if that doesn’t work, then back to 2. I think 1 is very unlikely, and remain skeptical or 4. You now have my very public predictions based on current info. I’ll revise as warranted! 12/12
I think this remains a risky option, and is thus unlikely unless Iran determines the US and/or Israel is determined to strike and there’s no way to prevent it (and even then, I think it’s still more likely Iran weathers the strike and uses it as justification to leave the NPT and weaponize). 11/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
I think this remains a risky option, and is thus unlikely unless Iran determines the US and/or Israel is determined to strike and there’s no way to prevent it (and even then, I think it’s still more likely Iran weathers the strike and uses it as justification to leave the NPT and weaponize). 11/
Option 4: Cross the nuclear threshold (or come really damn close). The goal would be to establish a reliable deterrent, thus preventing a strike, and strengthen Iran’s negotiation position vis-a-vis the US. Like option 1, this is a “hard exit” from the current dilemma. 10/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Option 4: Cross the nuclear threshold (or come really damn close). The goal would be to establish a reliable deterrent, thus preventing a strike, and strengthen Iran’s negotiation position vis-a-vis the US. Like option 1, this is a “hard exit” from the current dilemma. 10/
Like #2, it’s unclear whether Israel could talk the US out of it and/or would decide to strike on its own. That said, I think this is probably Iran’s preferred option assuming the status quo can’t last, and the one we’re most likely to see it try in the coming months. 9/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Like #2, it’s unclear whether Israel could talk the US out of it and/or would decide to strike on its own. That said, I think this is probably Iran’s preferred option assuming the status quo can’t last, and the one we’re most likely to see it try in the coming months. 9/
The goal would be to avoid a strike, let snapback expire, retain the key elements of the nuclear program, and keep options open for diplomacy in the future. Iran might also think it can lean on Russia and China (who also don’t want snapback or a strike) to convince the US this is a good option. 8/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
The goal would be to avoid a strike, let snapback expire, retain the key elements of the nuclear program, and keep options open for diplomacy in the future. Iran might also think it can lean on Russia and China (who also don’t want snapback or a strike) to convince the US this is a good option. 8/
Option 3: Try and sell Trump on something short of his maximum demands as a first step (like a JPOA) while promising to continue negotiations to reach a broader/bigger deal. 7/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Option 3: Try and sell Trump on something short of his maximum demands as a first step (like a JPOA) while promising to continue negotiations to reach a broader/bigger deal. 7/
If/when snapback happens, Iran might moderate its response (eg no 90%) to avoid said strike. The wildcard here is Israel, which Iran will have a much harder time deterring with this strategy. 6/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
If/when snapback happens, Iran might moderate its response (eg no 90%) to avoid said strike. The wildcard here is Israel, which Iran will have a much harder time deterring with this strategy. 6/
This is kind of where Iran is at now, though it is exploring Option 3 (below), and I suspect that’s where it might pivot to next as things heat up. 5/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
This is kind of where Iran is at now, though it is exploring Option 3 (below), and I suspect that’s where it might pivot to next as things heat up. 5/
Option 2: Don’t make a deal, keep the nuclear program more or less on cruise control, and call Trump’s bluff. This would be betting that Trump cares more about avoiding a war than he does solving the nuclear problem. 4/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Option 2: Don’t make a deal, keep the nuclear program more or less on cruise control, and call Trump’s bluff. This would be betting that Trump cares more about avoiding a war than he does solving the nuclear problem. 4/
I think this is the least likely option, and Khamenei would accept a military strike on Iran’s program over this outcome (and if that happens, use that as justification to leave the NPT and develop weapons). 3/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
I think this is the least likely option, and Khamenei would accept a military strike on Iran’s program over this outcome (and if that happens, use that as justification to leave the NPT and develop weapons). 3/
Option 1: Give in to the maximalist version of Trump’s demands (abandon the nuclear program, and perhaps other policies of concern) in exchange for significant sanctions relief. 2/
April 2, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Option 1: Give in to the maximalist version of Trump’s demands (abandon the nuclear program, and perhaps other policies of concern) in exchange for significant sanctions relief. 2/