Carlton Haelig, PhD
@carltonhaelig.bsky.social
Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. All things national security strategy, force design and employment, and military innovation. https://www.cnas.org/people/carlton-haelig
Without a re-calibration of the Pentagon’s modernization plans, deterrence could fail before highly capable technologies become available. (12/12)
🔗 www.cnas.org/publications...
🔗 www.cnas.org/publications...
Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac
For more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac.
www.cnas.org
October 21, 2025 at 5:24 PM
Without a re-calibration of the Pentagon’s modernization plans, deterrence could fail before highly capable technologies become available. (12/12)
🔗 www.cnas.org/publications...
🔗 www.cnas.org/publications...
Overall, the intensity & composition of US modernization plans risk prioritizing long-term investments at the expense of critical near-term capability. (11/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:23 PM
Overall, the intensity & composition of US modernization plans risk prioritizing long-term investments at the expense of critical near-term capability. (11/12)
🛰️ Secure critical space supply chains & expand launch capacity to enable rapid proliferation of new systems once available. (10/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:23 PM
🛰️ Secure critical space supply chains & expand launch capacity to enable rapid proliferation of new systems once available. (10/12)
💨 Speed up the transition from R&D to procurement — esp. the Army’s Typhon missile, extended-range PrSM, & hypersonic weapons. (9/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:23 PM
💨 Speed up the transition from R&D to procurement — esp. the Army’s Typhon missile, extended-range PrSM, & hypersonic weapons. (9/12)
🤑 Buy more of what’s available now to shift the balance — esp. F-15EX, B-21, long-range fires & maritime strike missiles. (8/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:22 PM
🤑 Buy more of what’s available now to shift the balance — esp. F-15EX, B-21, long-range fires & maritime strike missiles. (8/12)
Our report identifies several opportunities to improve this situation: (7/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:22 PM
Our report identifies several opportunities to improve this situation: (7/12)
😬 Weapons that have been purchased often lack the capability or quantity to shift the balance in the Indo-Pacific.
💸 Major programs like missile defense, the F-35, Columbia-class subs & Constellation-class frigates are delayed & over budget. (6/12)
💸 Major programs like missile defense, the F-35, Columbia-class subs & Constellation-class frigates are delayed & over budget. (6/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:22 PM
😬 Weapons that have been purchased often lack the capability or quantity to shift the balance in the Indo-Pacific.
💸 Major programs like missile defense, the F-35, Columbia-class subs & Constellation-class frigates are delayed & over budget. (6/12)
💸 Major programs like missile defense, the F-35, Columbia-class subs & Constellation-class frigates are delayed & over budget. (6/12)
🔬 Pentagon spending has favored R&D over fielding new capabilities.
📈 R&D has increased while procurement has decreased as a share of the budget. (5/12)
📈 R&D has increased while procurement has decreased as a share of the budget. (5/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:21 PM
🔬 Pentagon spending has favored R&D over fielding new capabilities.
📈 R&D has increased while procurement has decreased as a share of the budget. (5/12)
📈 R&D has increased while procurement has decreased as a share of the budget. (5/12)
❓How is it possible that despite spending nearly $1 trillion a year on defense, the US military is losing its edge? (4/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:21 PM
❓How is it possible that despite spending nearly $1 trillion a year on defense, the US military is losing its edge? (4/12)
⚠️ This increases the likelihood that China may see a window of opportunity where it believes it can successfully challenge the United States in the Indo-Pacific. (3/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:21 PM
⚠️ This increases the likelihood that China may see a window of opportunity where it believes it can successfully challenge the United States in the Indo-Pacific. (3/12)
🇺🇸🇨🇳 The US is losing its edge over China in the Indo-Pacific.
⌛ Despite years of investment in modernization, the Pentagon has little to show. As China’s military grows in size & capability, the US military is becoming older & less capable. (2/12)
⌛ Despite years of investment in modernization, the Pentagon has little to show. As China’s military grows in size & capability, the US military is becoming older & less capable. (2/12)
October 21, 2025 at 5:20 PM
🇺🇸🇨🇳 The US is losing its edge over China in the Indo-Pacific.
⌛ Despite years of investment in modernization, the Pentagon has little to show. As China’s military grows in size & capability, the US military is becoming older & less capable. (2/12)
⌛ Despite years of investment in modernization, the Pentagon has little to show. As China’s military grows in size & capability, the US military is becoming older & less capable. (2/12)
NB: Congress has asked repeatedly for detailed spending plans for the defense portion of the BBB. DOD has yet to provide those plans. Regardless, by skirting the regular appropriations process, those plans would not bind the Pentagon in the same way that the annual defense budget process does.
October 10, 2025 at 6:49 PM
NB: Congress has asked repeatedly for detailed spending plans for the defense portion of the BBB. DOD has yet to provide those plans. Regardless, by skirting the regular appropriations process, those plans would not bind the Pentagon in the same way that the annual defense budget process does.
One of the most significant risks to defense modernization associated with reconciliation is that by not tying the $150 billion dollars in defense funding to specific programs you leave the possibility that these funds will be redirected, unspent, or otherwise wasted. (2/2)
October 10, 2025 at 6:42 PM
One of the most significant risks to defense modernization associated with reconciliation is that by not tying the $150 billion dollars in defense funding to specific programs you leave the possibility that these funds will be redirected, unspent, or otherwise wasted. (2/2)
13/
Instead, indications of cuts to both procurement & RDTE do not inspire confidence that the Pentagon is postured to modernize the force.
Instead, indications of cuts to both procurement & RDTE do not inspire confidence that the Pentagon is postured to modernize the force.
June 4, 2025 at 6:20 PM
13/
Instead, indications of cuts to both procurement & RDTE do not inspire confidence that the Pentagon is postured to modernize the force.
Instead, indications of cuts to both procurement & RDTE do not inspire confidence that the Pentagon is postured to modernize the force.
12/
The Pentagon’s promised 8% reallocation was supposed to cut waste, streamline acquisition, and let the U.S. buy more hardware now and speed up future systems.
The Pentagon’s promised 8% reallocation was supposed to cut waste, streamline acquisition, and let the U.S. buy more hardware now and speed up future systems.
June 4, 2025 at 6:20 PM
12/
The Pentagon’s promised 8% reallocation was supposed to cut waste, streamline acquisition, and let the U.S. buy more hardware now and speed up future systems.
The Pentagon’s promised 8% reallocation was supposed to cut waste, streamline acquisition, and let the U.S. buy more hardware now and speed up future systems.
11/
Our analysis suggests a balance can be struck b/w equipping the force w/ enough capability to deter today and still fielding the next-gen systems that will form the war-winning backbone of tomorrow’s force.
Our analysis suggests a balance can be struck b/w equipping the force w/ enough capability to deter today and still fielding the next-gen systems that will form the war-winning backbone of tomorrow’s force.
June 4, 2025 at 6:20 PM
11/
Our analysis suggests a balance can be struck b/w equipping the force w/ enough capability to deter today and still fielding the next-gen systems that will form the war-winning backbone of tomorrow’s force.
Our analysis suggests a balance can be struck b/w equipping the force w/ enough capability to deter today and still fielding the next-gen systems that will form the war-winning backbone of tomorrow’s force.
10/
We focus on key areas of modernization, including: ground-based long-range precision fires, space modernization, hypersonic weapons, ships, and tactical aircraft.
We focus on key areas of modernization, including: ground-based long-range precision fires, space modernization, hypersonic weapons, ships, and tactical aircraft.
June 4, 2025 at 6:20 PM
10/
We focus on key areas of modernization, including: ground-based long-range precision fires, space modernization, hypersonic weapons, ships, and tactical aircraft.
We focus on key areas of modernization, including: ground-based long-range precision fires, space modernization, hypersonic weapons, ships, and tactical aircraft.
9/
In our upcoming report on the shifting relationship between procurement & RDTE, we examine how the FY26 request affects these trends—and recommend targeted adjustments to both areas.
In our upcoming report on the shifting relationship between procurement & RDTE, we examine how the FY26 request affects these trends—and recommend targeted adjustments to both areas.
June 4, 2025 at 6:20 PM
9/
In our upcoming report on the shifting relationship between procurement & RDTE, we examine how the FY26 request affects these trends—and recommend targeted adjustments to both areas.
In our upcoming report on the shifting relationship between procurement & RDTE, we examine how the FY26 request affects these trends—and recommend targeted adjustments to both areas.
8/
These are the very spending categories essential to military modernization.
These are the very spending categories essential to military modernization.
June 4, 2025 at 6:19 PM
8/
These are the very spending categories essential to military modernization.
These are the very spending categories essential to military modernization.
7/
Yet what we know about the FY26 budget doesn’t suggest a shift. Compared to the Biden Admin’s projection for FY26, Trump’s actual FY26 request makes deep cuts to both RDTE and procurement.
Yet what we know about the FY26 budget doesn’t suggest a shift. Compared to the Biden Admin’s projection for FY26, Trump’s actual FY26 request makes deep cuts to both RDTE and procurement.
June 4, 2025 at 6:19 PM
7/
Yet what we know about the FY26 budget doesn’t suggest a shift. Compared to the Biden Admin’s projection for FY26, Trump’s actual FY26 request makes deep cuts to both RDTE and procurement.
Yet what we know about the FY26 budget doesn’t suggest a shift. Compared to the Biden Admin’s projection for FY26, Trump’s actual FY26 request makes deep cuts to both RDTE and procurement.