Dr Fabrício Campos
@camposvet.bsky.social
With a degree in Veterinary Medicine from UFPel, a Master's in Microbiology at PPGMAA/UFRGS, and a Ph.D. in Veterinary Science at UFRGS, I am a professor at PPGBIOTEC/UFT and serve as Coordinator at PPGMAA/UFRGS. For more information: www.labinftec.com.br
#H5N1 #H5N5 #InfluenzaA #OneHealth #Biosafety
- Criado, 2025. youtu.be/BsbjFzhqQe8
- DOH, 2025. doh.wa.gov/newsroom/gra...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
10/10
- Criado, 2025. youtu.be/BsbjFzhqQe8
- DOH, 2025. doh.wa.gov/newsroom/gra...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
10/10
Avian Influenza Virus: A Global One Health Threat
YouTube video by ViroClube
youtu.be
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
#H5N1 #H5N5 #InfluenzaA #OneHealth #Biosafety
- Criado, 2025. youtu.be/BsbjFzhqQe8
- DOH, 2025. doh.wa.gov/newsroom/gra...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
10/10
- Criado, 2025. youtu.be/BsbjFzhqQe8
- DOH, 2025. doh.wa.gov/newsroom/gra...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
10/10
The story is still unfolding. We do not know where this panzootic ends, but ignoring its repeated warnings is not merely a technical failure. It is an ecological, economic, and public health risk with potentially severe consequences. 9/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
The story is still unfolding. We do not know where this panzootic ends, but ignoring its repeated warnings is not merely a technical failure. It is an ecological, economic, and public health risk with potentially severe consequences. 9/10
Not because the industry initiated it, but because reality has imposed limits that industrial-scale biosafety cannot sustain. After months following this panzootic, the question is unavoidable: are we learning from past mistakes, or repeating them at a larger scale? 8/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Not because the industry initiated it, but because reality has imposed limits that industrial-scale biosafety cannot sustain. After months following this panzootic, the question is unavoidable: are we learning from past mistakes, or repeating them at a larger scale? 8/10
With so little virus needed to start an outbreak, any operational failure can be costly. Meanwhile, previously taboo topics, such as vaccinating laying hens, turkeys, and long-cycle flocks, are finally entering global discussion. 7/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
With so little virus needed to start an outbreak, any operational failure can be costly. Meanwhile, previously taboo topics, such as vaccinating laying hens, turkeys, and long-cycle flocks, are finally entering global discussion. 7/10
As noted by Miriã Criado (Auburn University), the virus is highly adapted: the infectious dose is extremely low, and many mammals express both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acid receptors, making the bird–mammal barrier far more fragile than assumed. 6/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
As noted by Miriã Criado (Auburn University), the virus is highly adapted: the infectious dose is extremely low, and many mammals express both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acid receptors, making the bird–mammal barrier far more fragile than assumed. 6/10
Scale has become the enemy of biosafety. In the U.S., transmission among cattle went unnoticed until the virus literally overflowed through raw milk. Few imagined H5N1 could adapt to ruminants, now Japan repeats the same mistakes. The issue is systemic, not geographic. 5/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Scale has become the enemy of biosafety. In the U.S., transmission among cattle went unnoticed until the virus literally overflowed through raw milk. Few imagined H5N1 could adapt to ruminants, now Japan repeats the same mistakes. The issue is systemic, not geographic. 5/10
Since the emergence of the Gs/GD lineage in 1996, the same script has repeated across countries: operational failures, delayed detection, underestimated risks, massive flocks, lack of surveillance, resistance to vaccination, and overreliance on inadequate protocols. 4/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Since the emergence of the Gs/GD lineage in 1996, the same script has repeated across countries: operational failures, delayed detection, underestimated risks, massive flocks, lack of surveillance, resistance to vaccination, and overreliance on inadequate protocols. 4/10
Even so, the case reinforces a recurring pattern: the virus exploits any breach, from barns housing one million birds to backyard flocks with inherently limited biosafety. 3/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Even so, the case reinforces a recurring pattern: the virus exploits any breach, from barns housing one million birds to backyard flocks with inherently limited biosafety. 3/10
In recent days, the first human case of H5N5 in the U.S. resulted in death. The patient was an older adult with comorbidities, and the outcome was expected given the high lethality of this subtype in mammals. No human-to-human transmission occurred. 2/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
In recent days, the first human case of H5N5 in the U.S. resulted in death. The patient was an older adult with comorbidities, and the outcome was expected given the high lethality of this subtype in mammals. No human-to-human transmission occurred. 2/10
#H5N1 #InfluenzaA #OneHealth
- Damodaran et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1038/s415...
- Gazik et al., 2025. doi.org/10.20944/pre...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
- Sullivan et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1139/cjm-...
13/13
- Damodaran et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1038/s415...
- Gazik et al., 2025. doi.org/10.20944/pre...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
- Sullivan et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1139/cjm-...
13/13
Ecology and spread of the North American H5N1 epizootic - Nature
The panzootic of highly pathogenic H5N1 since 2021 was driven by around nine introductions into the Atlantic and Pacific flyways, followed by rapid dissemination through wild migratory birds, primaril...
doi.org
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
#H5N1 #InfluenzaA #OneHealth
- Damodaran et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1038/s415...
- Gazik et al., 2025. doi.org/10.20944/pre...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
- Sullivan et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1139/cjm-...
13/13
- Damodaran et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1038/s415...
- Gazik et al., 2025. doi.org/10.20944/pre...
- Kondo et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1155/tbed...
- Sullivan et al., 2025. doi.org/10.1139/cjm-...
13/13
Together, the studies show the panzootic is driven by three pillars: migratory wild birds, progressive mammalian adaptation, and structural failures in biosecurity across poultry systems. 12/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Together, the studies show the panzootic is driven by three pillars: migratory wild birds, progressive mammalian adaptation, and structural failures in biosecurity across poultry systems. 12/13
Simple measures like changing footwear at barn entrances and restricting secondary doors significantly reduced the risk of H5N1 introduction, showing basic biosecurity is still the most effective barrier. 11/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Simple measures like changing footwear at barn entrances and restricting secondary doors significantly reduced the risk of H5N1 introduction, showing basic biosecurity is still the most effective barrier. 11/13
The fourth study examined Japan’s largest outbreak: 84 farms affected and 17 million birds culled. The strongest risk factor was farm size — especially operations with ≥100,000 birds. 10/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
The fourth study examined Japan’s largest outbreak: 84 farms affected and 17 million birds culled. The strongest risk factor was farm size — especially operations with ≥100,000 birds. 10/13
Before 2021, these species showed almost no antibodies against highly pathogenic H5. The rapid increase indicates intense viral circulation and highlights these ducks as natural sentinels. 9/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Before 2021, these species showed almost no antibodies against highly pathogenic H5. The rapid increase indicates intense viral circulation and highlights these ducks as natural sentinels. 9/13
The third study shows a sharp rise in immunity among wild birds. In U.S. Lesser Scaup, influenza A seroprevalence jumped from 38%→80% in juveniles and 82%→90% in adults after H5N1 arrival. 8/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
The third study shows a sharp rise in immunity among wild birds. In U.S. Lesser Scaup, influenza A seroprevalence jumped from 38%→80% in juveniles and 82%→90% in adults after H5N1 arrival. 8/13
Despite these risks, pasteurization fully inactivates the virus, underscoring the importance of the formal dairy industry and regulated processing chains in mitigating H5N1 transmission to humans. 7/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Despite these risks, pasteurization fully inactivates the virus, underscoring the importance of the formal dairy industry and regulated processing chains in mitigating H5N1 transmission to humans. 7/13
There have been 41 human infections linked to occupational exposure. The PB2-E627K mutation — a hallmark of mammalian adaptation — is becoming increasingly frequent in recent isolates. 6/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
There have been 41 human infections linked to occupational exposure. The PB2-E627K mutation — a hallmark of mammalian adaptation — is becoming increasingly frequent in recent isolates. 6/13
The second study focuses on mammals. H5N1 now infects more than 72 species, including dairy cattle in the U.S., with sustained cow-to-cow transmission and virus detected directly in milk samples. 5/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
The second study focuses on mammals. H5N1 now infects more than 72 species, including dairy cattle in the U.S., with sustained cow-to-cow transmission and virus detected directly in milk samples. 5/13
Some of these introductions persisted for up to six months. A key finding: backyard flocks were infected nine days earlier than industrial farms — a potential early-warning signal of rising transmission. 4/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Some of these introductions persisted for up to six months. A key finding: backyard flocks were infected nine days earlier than industrial farms — a potential early-warning signal of rising transmission. 4/13
Rapid expansion was driven mainly by Anseriformes, while non-canonical species acted as dead-end hosts. Unlike 2015, poultry outbreaks came from 46–113 independent spillovers from wild birds. 3/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
Rapid expansion was driven mainly by Anseriformes, while non-canonical species acted as dead-end hosts. Unlike 2015, poultry outbreaks came from 46–113 independent spillovers from wild birds. 3/13
The first study analyzed 1,818 HA sequences and showed that the North American panzootic emerged from nine independent introductions via Atlantic and Pacific migratory flyways. 2/13
November 20, 2025 at 8:44 PM
The first study analyzed 1,818 HA sequences and showed that the North American panzootic emerged from nine independent introductions via Atlantic and Pacific migratory flyways. 2/13
Full article: www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17...
#COVID19 #SARSCoV2 #VaccinationImpact #GenomicSurveillance #PublicHealth #Genomics #Brazil
4/4
#COVID19 #SARSCoV2 #VaccinationImpact #GenomicSurveillance #PublicHealth #Genomics #Brazil
4/4
www.mdpi.com
November 20, 2025 at 10:53 AM
• Sequencing of 3,941 genomes revealed 166 lineages and multiple variant waves, ending with LP.8.1.4 in 2025.
• Tocantins acted as a genomic “variant corridor” linking North and Central-West Brazil.
3/4
• Tocantins acted as a genomic “variant corridor” linking North and Central-West Brazil.
3/4
November 20, 2025 at 10:53 AM
• Sequencing of 3,941 genomes revealed 166 lineages and multiple variant waves, ending with LP.8.1.4 in 2025.
• Tocantins acted as a genomic “variant corridor” linking North and Central-West Brazil.
3/4
• Tocantins acted as a genomic “variant corridor” linking North and Central-West Brazil.
3/4