I wrote in an earlier thread (see below) on the implications. Most importantly: there is room for elites to shape opinions if they justify aid clearly. But framing it as a trade-off with the domestic economy – as Scholz has done – risks undermining support. 4/4

Support for decreasing aid is driven by national-level economic concerns as well as strong national identities. Personal financial concerns do not play a role, and citizens in countries that contribute relatively more are not more sceptical. 3/4

We find few signs of war fatigue. Many Europeans are satisfied with current aid, although this might partially reflect non-attitudes. Considerable shares even want to increase aid, and only a small minority (~10%) categorically rejects it. 2/4

More broadly, the winner-loser gap literature might have focused too much on electoral losers. If anything, we find that they actually want *more* democracy to influence policy. It’s rather the electoral winners that we might need to worry about. 6/6

The main implication is that affective polarization might undermine the accountability mechanism between parties and government voters. Obviously, opposition to referendums is not inherently problematic, and more research is needed to unpack this mechanism. 5/6

We indeed find a strong winner-loser gap in referendum support, especially among affectively polarized citizens. Yet, this difference is completely attributed to electoral winners, who become much less supportive if they are affectively polarized. 4/6

Additionally, we theorize that these dynamics are strongest among affectively polarized citizens. Affective polarization should make electoral defeat more painful for losers, whereas it should reinforce the impulse of winners to protect their party in government from outside interference. 3/6

The winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy is well-known, but little research has studied its consequences. We argue that losers should be more supportive of electoral alternatives such as referendums, while winners desire their party to govern without constraint. 2/6

While the former seems not a concern for European leaders, the latter should be. In fact, the current aid strategy to Ukraine (letting it fight the war, but not win the war) might undermine support for continued (and increasing) aid on the long run if setbacks on the battlefield surge. (12/12)

Second, we know from American literature that the public is capable of incurring battlefield casualties, provided two conditions: the public believes the war has a just cause and it still has enough potential to reach its goals. (11/12)
press.princeton.edu/books/paperb...

And that is just a financial calculation. The political and security costs of a Russian win in Ukraine, for the EU and for European democracies, remains unforeseen. (10/12)

But that requires solid justification. Mixing up economic concerns with aid to Ukraine (as Scholz has done) might have a depressing effect on the latter, while supporting Ukraine is far less costly than letting Russia win the war. (9/12)
www.ifw-kiel.de/publications...

These findings have several implications, of which I discuss two here. First, there is still room for European leaders to increase support to Ukraine, as well as to shape public opinion on this topic – the high selection of the midpoint on our scale seems partially rooted in non-attitudes. (8/12)

Furthermore, people who identify along national lines are also clearly more sceptical of sending aid to Ukraine. It shows that attitudes to Ukraine are not solely an economic consideration, in line with findings in the European integration literature. (7/12)

With regards to economic concerns, we find that people with pessimistic views of the domestic economy are clearly less supportive of aiding Ukraine. At a personal level, we find no evidence for this: concerns about personal incomes do not drive attitudes toward supporting Ukraine. (6/12)

We propose two factors that should shape these attitudes: economic concerns (national and individual) and national (vs. European) identities. (5/12)

We find few signs of war fatigue: many are satisfied with current aid, and a slight majority even supports an increase. Around 10% categorically opposes any aid in each country. Importantly, opinions seem unrelated to existing aid: larger contributors (NL, PL) do not witness more scepticism. (4/12)

We asked respondents if they want to increase, decrease, or maintain their country's current support level (0-10 scale). We argue that this better reflects political debates on Ukraine, which have focused on adjusting aid levels (increasing/decreasing) rather than ceasing support entirely. (3/12)

Fielded more than two years after the start of the war (just after the 2024 EP elections), we believe that this should provide a clear picture of public opinion on supporting Ukraine, uncontaminated by initial rally effects. (2/12)