Support for decreasing aid is driven by national-level economic concerns as well as strong national identities. Personal financial concerns do not play a role, and citizens in countries that contribute relatively more are not more sceptical. 3/4

We find few signs of war fatigue. Many Europeans are satisfied with current aid, although this might partially reflect non-attitudes. Considerable shares even want to increase aid, and only a small minority (~10%) categorically rejects it. 2/4

New publication in the Journal of European Public Policy together with @eliemichel.bsky.social.

We study public opinion toward supporting Ukraine in 6 European countries and ask whether citizens want to increase, sustain, or decrease support. 1/4

Paper (OA): doi.org/10.1080/1350...

We indeed find a strong winner-loser gap in referendum support, especially among affectively polarized citizens. Yet, this difference is completely attributed to electoral winners, who become much less supportive if they are affectively polarized. 4/6

New paper out in @bjpols.bsky.social, co-authored with Emilien Paulis.

Using survey data from 13 European democracies, we show that electoral winners are less supportive of referendums, especially when they are affectively polarized. 1/6

Paper: doi.org/10.1017/S0007123425000365

We find few signs of war fatigue: many are satisfied with current aid, and a slight majority even supports an increase. Around 10% categorically opposes any aid in each country. Importantly, opinions seem unrelated to existing aid: larger contributors (NL, PL) do not witness more scepticism. (4/12)

Just uploaded this new preprint co-authored with @eliemichel.bsky.social, and sharing here already because of the public relevance of the data.

We study public opinion toward supporting Ukraine in six European countries: BE, DE, HU, IT, NL, and PL. (1/12)
doi.org/10.31219/osf...