Bartłomiej Gajos
@bartekgajos.bsky.social
PhD. Historian. I work for the Polish think-tank Mieroszewski Centre, covering Russia and Ukraine. Currently based in Brussels.
You can read the whole story here (for free!):
bartekgajos.substack.com/p/st-petersb...
bartekgajos.substack.com/p/st-petersb...
St. Petersburg 1994: When Putin Listened and the West Worried (Part I)
Russia’s democratic turn looked fragile. Western delegates said so — in front of Vladimir Putin.
bartekgajos.substack.com
August 7, 2025 at 12:33 PM
You can read the whole story here (for free!):
bartekgajos.substack.com/p/st-petersb...
bartekgajos.substack.com/p/st-petersb...
The tone? Often open, occasionally heated.
Sobchak praised reforms. German journalist and a historian warned of authoritarian backlash.
Some Western participants feared Russian revanchism.
And Putin? Sitting quietly - but he spoke, too. 5/x
Sobchak praised reforms. German journalist and a historian warned of authoritarian backlash.
Some Western participants feared Russian revanchism.
And Putin? Sitting quietly - but he spoke, too. 5/x
August 7, 2025 at 12:33 PM
The tone? Often open, occasionally heated.
Sobchak praised reforms. German journalist and a historian warned of authoritarian backlash.
Some Western participants feared Russian revanchism.
And Putin? Sitting quietly - but he spoke, too. 5/x
Sobchak praised reforms. German journalist and a historian warned of authoritarian backlash.
Some Western participants feared Russian revanchism.
And Putin? Sitting quietly - but he spoke, too. 5/x
The transcript - mostly forgotten for decades - reveals how early many realized what was at stake.
Participants debated whether democracy in Russia was real, whether the state would hold, and whether the “strongman” model would return.
Spoiler: many were right. 4/x
Participants debated whether democracy in Russia was real, whether the state would hold, and whether the “strongman” model would return.
Spoiler: many were right. 4/x
August 7, 2025 at 12:33 PM
The transcript - mostly forgotten for decades - reveals how early many realized what was at stake.
Participants debated whether democracy in Russia was real, whether the state would hold, and whether the “strongman” model would return.
Spoiler: many were right. 4/x
Participants debated whether democracy in Russia was real, whether the state would hold, and whether the “strongman” model would return.
Spoiler: many were right. 4/x
The official themes:
– Russia’s internal political direction
– NATO–Russia relations
– Russia and the West
The timing was critical: just months after Yeltsin shelled the Russian parliament and new constitution was introduced. 3/x
– Russia’s internal political direction
– NATO–Russia relations
– Russia and the West
The timing was critical: just months after Yeltsin shelled the Russian parliament and new constitution was introduced. 3/x
August 7, 2025 at 12:33 PM
The official themes:
– Russia’s internal political direction
– NATO–Russia relations
– Russia and the West
The timing was critical: just months after Yeltsin shelled the Russian parliament and new constitution was introduced. 3/x
– Russia’s internal political direction
– NATO–Russia relations
– Russia and the West
The timing was critical: just months after Yeltsin shelled the Russian parliament and new constitution was introduced. 3/x
Among the participants:
– Anatoly Sobchak (mayor of St. Petersburg)
– Vladimir Putin (his deputy)
– Andrei Kokoshin (Deputy Defense Minister)
– Meyer-Landrut, Rühe, Gasteyger, Morel, Pavlova-Silvanskaya
– OSCE, MGIMO, German & French diplomats, academics, Pole and Estonian 2/x
– Anatoly Sobchak (mayor of St. Petersburg)
– Vladimir Putin (his deputy)
– Andrei Kokoshin (Deputy Defense Minister)
– Meyer-Landrut, Rühe, Gasteyger, Morel, Pavlova-Silvanskaya
– OSCE, MGIMO, German & French diplomats, academics, Pole and Estonian 2/x
August 7, 2025 at 12:33 PM
Among the participants:
– Anatoly Sobchak (mayor of St. Petersburg)
– Vladimir Putin (his deputy)
– Andrei Kokoshin (Deputy Defense Minister)
– Meyer-Landrut, Rühe, Gasteyger, Morel, Pavlova-Silvanskaya
– OSCE, MGIMO, German & French diplomats, academics, Pole and Estonian 2/x
– Anatoly Sobchak (mayor of St. Petersburg)
– Vladimir Putin (his deputy)
– Andrei Kokoshin (Deputy Defense Minister)
– Meyer-Landrut, Rühe, Gasteyger, Morel, Pavlova-Silvanskaya
– OSCE, MGIMO, German & French diplomats, academics, Pole and Estonian 2/x
You can read my full article about it here - it is for free:
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Imperialism and Ethnonationalism in Russia’s Turbulent Years (1989–1994) – How Narratives of Unjust Borders Shaped Putin’s ‘Time Bomb’ Metaphor | Nationalities Papers | Cambridge Core
Imperialism and Ethnonationalism in Russia’s Turbulent Years (1989–1994) – How Narratives of Unjust Borders Shaped Putin’s ‘Time Bomb’ Metaphor
www.cambridge.org
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
You can read my full article about it here - it is for free:
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
To the outside world, this may look like revanchism or paranoia. But to the Kremlin, it’s the response to a century-old betrayal - by Lenin, by the Soviet structure, and by the West’s recognition of these borders. The metaphor isn’t about security. It’s about identity
18/x
18/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
To the outside world, this may look like revanchism or paranoia. But to the Kremlin, it’s the response to a century-old betrayal - by Lenin, by the Soviet structure, and by the West’s recognition of these borders. The metaphor isn’t about security. It’s about identity
18/x
18/x
This is why the “time bomb” metaphor persists in Putin's rhetoric. It reflects a durable conviction that Russia’s post-Soviet borders are historically wrong - and that correcting them isn’t aggression, but justice. 17/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
This is why the “time bomb” metaphor persists in Putin's rhetoric. It reflects a durable conviction that Russia’s post-Soviet borders are historically wrong - and that correcting them isn’t aggression, but justice. 17/x
For many in Moscow, imperialism and ethnonationalism weren’t contradictions - they were complementary. The mental map of new Russia was reimagined not as domination over others, but as reunification with Russian kin “wrongly” separated by Leninist borders. 16/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
For many in Moscow, imperialism and ethnonationalism weren’t contradictions - they were complementary. The mental map of new Russia was reimagined not as domination over others, but as reunification with Russian kin “wrongly” separated by Leninist borders. 16/x
This mindset wasn’t confined to fringe figures. In August 1991, Yeltsin’s spokesman Voshchanov issued a warning: if no union treaties were signed, Russia reserved the right to raise the issue of border revision - specifically with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 15/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
This mindset wasn’t confined to fringe figures. In August 1991, Yeltsin’s spokesman Voshchanov issued a warning: if no union treaties were signed, Russia reserved the right to raise the issue of border revision - specifically with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 15/x
“Crimea… It cannot be returned. It is a disgrace to Russia’s national consciousness.”
- Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991 14/x
- Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991 14/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
“Crimea… It cannot be returned. It is a disgrace to Russia’s national consciousness.”
- Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991 14/x
- Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991 14/x
“The right to self-determination… was taken to the point of absurdity. It created a completely distorted map of the national-state structure.”
- Anatoly Sobchak, 1995 13/x
- Anatoly Sobchak, 1995 13/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
“The right to self-determination… was taken to the point of absurdity. It created a completely distorted map of the national-state structure.”
- Anatoly Sobchak, 1995 13/x
- Anatoly Sobchak, 1995 13/x
After 1991, Russian elites debated different models of the nation: civic (rossiyskiy), imperial, or ethnic (russkiy). But what marked a qualitative shift was the growing dominance of ethnonationalism - as the primary criterion for imagining Russia’s borders. 12/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
After 1991, Russian elites debated different models of the nation: civic (rossiyskiy), imperial, or ethnic (russkiy). But what marked a qualitative shift was the growing dominance of ethnonationalism - as the primary criterion for imagining Russia’s borders. 12/x
“I’m referring not only to Crimea or northern Kazakhstan, but also, for example, the Kaliningrad region.”
The mention of the Kaliningrad region is most likely a mistake in the transcript or a slip of the tongue.
11/x
The mention of the Kaliningrad region is most likely a mistake in the transcript or a slip of the tongue.
11/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
“I’m referring not only to Crimea or northern Kazakhstan, but also, for example, the Kaliningrad region.”
The mention of the Kaliningrad region is most likely a mistake in the transcript or a slip of the tongue.
11/x
The mention of the Kaliningrad region is most likely a mistake in the transcript or a slip of the tongue.
11/x
He also addressed the issue of borders:
“In the name of peace in Europe, Russia voluntarily ceded vast territories to the former Soviet republics […] which had historically always belonged to Russia..." 10/x
“In the name of peace in Europe, Russia voluntarily ceded vast territories to the former Soviet republics […] which had historically always belonged to Russia..." 10/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
He also addressed the issue of borders:
“In the name of peace in Europe, Russia voluntarily ceded vast territories to the former Soviet republics […] which had historically always belonged to Russia..." 10/x
“In the name of peace in Europe, Russia voluntarily ceded vast territories to the former Soviet republics […] which had historically always belonged to Russia..." 10/x
Putin spoke only once and said the following:
“As a result, today 25 million Russians suddenly live outside the country’s borders - and Russia simply cannot afford, even from the perspective of European security, to leave these people to their own fate.” 9/x
“As a result, today 25 million Russians suddenly live outside the country’s borders - and Russia simply cannot afford, even from the perspective of European security, to leave these people to their own fate.” 9/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Putin spoke only once and said the following:
“As a result, today 25 million Russians suddenly live outside the country’s borders - and Russia simply cannot afford, even from the perspective of European security, to leave these people to their own fate.” 9/x
“As a result, today 25 million Russians suddenly live outside the country’s borders - and Russia simply cannot afford, even from the perspective of European security, to leave these people to their own fate.” 9/x
Thanks to a post by Wolfgang Ischinger, I learned about this event and accessed the full transcript. What Putin said back then isn’t exactly how Ischinger quoted it. Judging from the protocol, Ischinger didn’t participate in the event himself.
8/x
8/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Thanks to a post by Wolfgang Ischinger, I learned about this event and accessed the full transcript. What Putin said back then isn’t exactly how Ischinger quoted it. Judging from the protocol, Ischinger didn’t participate in the event himself.
8/x
8/x
Let's go back to Putin and his take on Russia's post-1991 borders. At the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis in 1994, Putin described Russia’s post-Soviet borders as fundamentally unfair. 7/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Let's go back to Putin and his take on Russia's post-1991 borders. At the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis in 1994, Putin described Russia’s post-Soviet borders as fundamentally unfair. 7/x
Digression: you might recognize the name: he was the father of Alexander Rahr, the better-known pro-Russian lobbyist. 6/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Digression: you might recognize the name: he was the father of Alexander Rahr, the better-known pro-Russian lobbyist. 6/x
But the metaphor didn’t originate with Putin. It likely came from Gleb Rahr, an émigré nationalist who in 1991 described Lenin’s USSR as a “time bomb” beneath the Russian nation.
His broadcasts in Radio Svoboda framed the 1922 founding of the USSR as anti-Russian by design. 5/x
His broadcasts in Radio Svoboda framed the 1922 founding of the USSR as anti-Russian by design. 5/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
But the metaphor didn’t originate with Putin. It likely came from Gleb Rahr, an émigré nationalist who in 1991 described Lenin’s USSR as a “time bomb” beneath the Russian nation.
His broadcasts in Radio Svoboda framed the 1922 founding of the USSR as anti-Russian by design. 5/x
His broadcasts in Radio Svoboda framed the 1922 founding of the USSR as anti-Russian by design. 5/x
Want an early example of Putin using the metaphor?
In a 1992 documentary, he said:
“The activists of October 1917 planted a time bomb under this edifice… the unitary state that called itself Russia.”
4/x
In a 1992 documentary, he said:
“The activists of October 1917 planted a time bomb under this edifice… the unitary state that called itself Russia.”
4/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
Want an early example of Putin using the metaphor?
In a 1992 documentary, he said:
“The activists of October 1917 planted a time bomb under this edifice… the unitary state that called itself Russia.”
4/x
In a 1992 documentary, he said:
“The activists of October 1917 planted a time bomb under this edifice… the unitary state that called itself Russia.”
4/x
The “time bomb” metaphor, famously used by Putin several times, including his piece 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainian', expresses the conviction that the USSR’s constitutional structure - by giving republics the right to secede -made disintegration inevitable.3/x
August 4, 2025 at 2:17 PM
The “time bomb” metaphor, famously used by Putin several times, including his piece 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainian', expresses the conviction that the USSR’s constitutional structure - by giving republics the right to secede -made disintegration inevitable.3/x