Ata Atay
@ataatay.bsky.social
Serra Húnter Associate Professor @ University of Barcelona. Mostly market design, network formation, and operations research. Love to ride his Orbea and watch cyclists in the mud (veldrit is de koning).
https://sites.google.com/site/ataatay
https://sites.google.com/site/ataatay
Reposted by Ata Atay
We were also delighted to welcome Leslie Marx (Fuqua School of Business at Duke University) and Alfonso Díez Minguela (the University of Valencia).
October 24, 2025 at 5:22 PM
We were also delighted to welcome Leslie Marx (Fuqua School of Business at Duke University) and Alfonso Díez Minguela (the University of Valencia).
We were delighted to host @chiaraina.bsky.social at our Game Theory Research Group Seminar Series ( @ubgametheory.bsky.social).
October 3, 2025 at 6:43 AM
We were delighted to host @chiaraina.bsky.social at our Game Theory Research Group Seminar Series ( @ubgametheory.bsky.social).
🚨 New paper 🚨
In many OR problems (queueing, mcst, ...), it is not clear how to build a TU game for sharing costs/benefits. We take a more general view. It allows us to relate opt/pes approaches to core/anti-core without studying each problem separately.
Open access: tinyurl.com/ATEJOR
In many OR problems (queueing, mcst, ...), it is not clear how to build a TU game for sharing costs/benefits. We take a more general view. It allows us to relate opt/pes approaches to core/anti-core without studying each problem separately.
Open access: tinyurl.com/ATEJOR
September 18, 2025 at 7:30 AM
🚨 New paper 🚨
In many OR problems (queueing, mcst, ...), it is not clear how to build a TU game for sharing costs/benefits. We take a more general view. It allows us to relate opt/pes approaches to core/anti-core without studying each problem separately.
Open access: tinyurl.com/ATEJOR
In many OR problems (queueing, mcst, ...), it is not clear how to build a TU game for sharing costs/benefits. We take a more general view. It allows us to relate opt/pes approaches to core/anti-core without studying each problem separately.
Open access: tinyurl.com/ATEJOR
What a beautiful and brutal day on the Paterberg. The last time we were there with @inanozdemir.bsky.social in 2022, VdP did not let Pogacar get away. Today, we watched Pogacar go up solo... a whole different level!
April 6, 2025 at 8:19 PM
What a beautiful and brutal day on the Paterberg. The last time we were there with @inanozdemir.bsky.social in 2022, VdP did not let Pogacar get away. Today, we watched Pogacar go up solo... a whole different level!
So happy we pulled off a great game theory workshop three years in a row! Big thanks to all the presenters who joined us this year and made it happen. tinyurl.com/UB3GT (@cienciagob.bsky.social @ubeconomics.bsky.social & BEAT Institute)
🏸 The 3rd Game Theory Workshop, organized by the research group Game Theory, Economics, and Voting, the BEAT Institute and the UB School of Economics, focused on assignment problems, political game theory, market design, and social choice, bringing together top researchers in the field.
February 15, 2025 at 11:15 AM
So happy we pulled off a great game theory workshop three years in a row! Big thanks to all the presenters who joined us this year and made it happen. tinyurl.com/UB3GT (@cienciagob.bsky.social @ubeconomics.bsky.social & BEAT Institute)
Reposted by Ata Atay
🚨New Paper🚨
𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲
Joint with Ella Segev
Social choice theory provides ways for aggregating the preferences of individuals in a society, to tell us what is better for society: alternative a or alternative b. However, this theory is silent on 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ a is better than b. 1/9
𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲
Joint with Ella Segev
Social choice theory provides ways for aggregating the preferences of individuals in a society, to tell us what is better for society: alternative a or alternative b. However, this theory is silent on 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ a is better than b. 1/9
December 17, 2024 at 5:22 PM
🚨New Paper🚨
𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲
Joint with Ella Segev
Social choice theory provides ways for aggregating the preferences of individuals in a society, to tell us what is better for society: alternative a or alternative b. However, this theory is silent on 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ a is better than b. 1/9
𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲
Joint with Ella Segev
Social choice theory provides ways for aggregating the preferences of individuals in a society, to tell us what is better for society: alternative a or alternative b. However, this theory is silent on 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ a is better than b. 1/9
Optimist: the cup is half full
Pessimist: the cup is half empty
C. Trudeau & I: is about who drank first and whether they made the cup bigger or smaller for the others. Here is an umbrella model — no need to check for each application (mcst, queueing, etc.)
Updated WP: arxiv.org/abs/2403.014...
Pessimist: the cup is half empty
C. Trudeau & I: is about who drank first and whether they made the cup bigger or smaller for the others. Here is an umbrella model — no need to check for each application (mcst, queueing, etc.)
Updated WP: arxiv.org/abs/2403.014...
December 12, 2024 at 9:52 AM
Optimist: the cup is half full
Pessimist: the cup is half empty
C. Trudeau & I: is about who drank first and whether they made the cup bigger or smaller for the others. Here is an umbrella model — no need to check for each application (mcst, queueing, etc.)
Updated WP: arxiv.org/abs/2403.014...
Pessimist: the cup is half empty
C. Trudeau & I: is about who drank first and whether they made the cup bigger or smaller for the others. Here is an umbrella model — no need to check for each application (mcst, queueing, etc.)
Updated WP: arxiv.org/abs/2403.014...
Sunday morning done right. This climb is from Dosrius to Cardedeu which is passed in la Volta time to time. Barcelona is a great city for game theory and cycling.
December 1, 2024 at 12:48 PM
Sunday morning done right. This climb is from Dosrius to Cardedeu which is passed in la Volta time to time. Barcelona is a great city for game theory and cycling.
🚨New paper alert🚨
When agents are farsighted, the singleton set of TTC matching turns out to be farsightedly stable on top of Pareto efficiency. It is enough for agents to anticipate just three steps ahead. Meanwhile, DA and also Boston may not belong to any farsighted stable set. tinyurl.com/GEBFSS
When agents are farsighted, the singleton set of TTC matching turns out to be farsightedly stable on top of Pareto efficiency. It is enough for agents to anticipate just three steps ahead. Meanwhile, DA and also Boston may not belong to any farsighted stable set. tinyurl.com/GEBFSS
November 28, 2024 at 11:12 PM
🚨New paper alert🚨
When agents are farsighted, the singleton set of TTC matching turns out to be farsightedly stable on top of Pareto efficiency. It is enough for agents to anticipate just three steps ahead. Meanwhile, DA and also Boston may not belong to any farsighted stable set. tinyurl.com/GEBFSS
When agents are farsighted, the singleton set of TTC matching turns out to be farsightedly stable on top of Pareto efficiency. It is enough for agents to anticipate just three steps ahead. Meanwhile, DA and also Boston may not belong to any farsighted stable set. tinyurl.com/GEBFSS
Looks like SLMath (MSRI) has joined here. Had amazing time during the Market Design program last year. Follow and support @mathmoves.bsky.social
Hello to our followers here with some blue skies over the Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute in Berkeley! We'll be sharing news of SLMath opportunities for the mathematics community as well as the #MathicalBooks Book Prize for PreK-12th grade readers, upcoming films, public events & more.
November 28, 2024 at 3:48 PM
Looks like SLMath (MSRI) has joined here. Had amazing time during the Market Design program last year. Follow and support @mathmoves.bsky.social
Interesting takes on Bluesky by @nvraemdonck.bsky.social: "Power, however, consolidates in the ATmosphere with Bluesky, both in the company and in certain users. This can both make for healthier social interactions and potentially fragment the public sphere at the whims of certain powerful users."
Nathalie Van Raemdonck asks, where does power consolidate in BlueSky, the decentralized network that has emerged as a favored alternative to X? www.techpolicy.press/where-does-p...
Where Does Power Consolidate on Bluesky? | TechPolicy.Press
Nathalie Van Raemdonck says only time will tell how the pieces fit together and how they interact to create a new "public square."
www.techpolicy.press
November 27, 2024 at 8:55 PM
Interesting takes on Bluesky by @nvraemdonck.bsky.social: "Power, however, consolidates in the ATmosphere with Bluesky, both in the company and in certain users. This can both make for healthier social interactions and potentially fragment the public sphere at the whims of certain powerful users."
All institutional accounts of University of Barcelona has stopped their activity on Twitter. We will be on Bluesky.
#UniBarcelona | 💙 Estrenem perfil en aquesta xarxa social i us animem a seguir-nos-hi!
📱 La #UniBarcelona ha deixat de publicar a X per marcar distàncies amb un espai on es fomenten missatges d’odi i prolifera la desinformació.
Llegeix el comunicat 👉 web.ub.edu/web/actualit...
📱 La #UniBarcelona ha deixat de publicar a X per marcar distàncies amb un espai on es fomenten missatges d’odi i prolifera la desinformació.
Llegeix el comunicat 👉 web.ub.edu/web/actualit...
November 21, 2024 at 1:36 PM
All institutional accounts of University of Barcelona has stopped their activity on Twitter. We will be on Bluesky.
Waited to get an invitation. Came here when he bought Twitter. Then, deleted the account. Returned herer for #EconSky and Pro Cycling Chatter Feed.
November 20, 2024 at 8:09 AM
Waited to get an invitation. Came here when he bought Twitter. Then, deleted the account. Returned herer for #EconSky and Pro Cycling Chatter Feed.