I woke up to 40 texts from my fiancée giving me a play-by-play of the last ten innings.

Did you watch the whole game last night?

I have no public thoughts on such matters until September of next year. By its terms, Article III does not cover the NLCS.

Haven’t had a chance to read it yet but I will!

But Josh multiple causes are hard and don’t fit my horserace politics priors.

Exactly.

On that view, the job of any judge applying federal law (lower federal court judges and all state court judges) is to guess at what the current SCOTUS will do with the case, regardless of what existing law says. It’s predictive. I don’t know what precedent means in that regime.

I heard a circuit judge on a podcast a few weeks ago discuss their fondness for SCOTUS concurrences and dissents (rather than just a single majority opinion) because they “tell circuit judges what’s coming down the pike.” That struck me as such an odd view of law and precedent.

Is that unique to admin law, though? It seems to me that, if that’s right, it probably describes all law.

*and Mayhew

Depends how important Skowronek is to your definition of being Yalified.

That's true but it makes the same assumption: that meaning was clear and determinate (and therefore determinable) at a particular time (1789/"at the founding" broadly construed, typically). It rejects the possibility that, at a given time, meaning wasn't settled and wasn't supposed to be.

In a sense, it's also a question of the philosophy of language. It's sort of Russell/Kripke vs. Wittgenstein. Not to take this too far afield... Anyway...

(which partially elides the question in constitutional politics/interpretation about whether looking at/prioritizing the meaning of text really is the best or only way to do it)

I think the question is whether (1) any piece of text has an inherently incontestable or distinct meaning or (2) all text is inherently meaningless absent social context, which by definition can change. Certain meanings become more or less contestable as a function of social mores.

It's extra odd that the purportedly non-universal relief means that NM probably won't try to enforce its 7-day waiting period against gun sellers who violate it. So the non-universal relief will become something closer to universal for people aware of the ruling.

I read the opinion this morning. The Trump v. CASA point at the end also is odd. The district court can order relief only as to the two named plaintiffs, then? So the 7-day waiting period is still in effect for everyone else who hasn't and won't sue?

Hello!

This reminds me of how memorable I found the Emil Bührle exhibit in the Kunsthaus in Zurich, which I've visited twice in the last year. It display's Bührle's art collection but is also overtly self-conscious about the prudence of displaying the collection at all.