& 4 opp'n MNAs. An NA majority that lacks respect for constitutionalism could elect a partisan NA President, thereby capture the Office, and then wield the Office to try to influence the CC (or even unseat members). An unscrupulous party thus wouldn't even need a 2/3 majority to do serious damage.

frequency of revisions), enabling it to impact the members' conditions of service very significantly. This is dangerous in and of itself. In particularly adverse circumstances it can also turn into a power of the *executive* over the CC. The Office of the NA consists of the NA President, 5 govt

persons from membership of the CC (worse: the text doesn't exclude offices already held by incumbent CC members, so the Office could try to unseat a member through the backdoor), and (3) set the CC members' rules of ethics and professional conduct (w/o any statutory limits on their content, or the

(VI) The CC is subject to significant influence by the legislature. The draft gives the Office of the National Assembly the power to (1) vary the default no-remuneration rule and grant the CC members pay, or subsequently decrease or rescind it, (2) declare that the holding of any office disqualifies

(V) The members of the CC (1) will be unpaid, according to the proposed default rule, and (2) won't be barred from any kind of economic activity during their tenure. This lack of financial independence opens the door wide for the members to be influenced by corporate, govt etc. economic interests.

(IV) The chair of the CC is substituted in case of absence, vacancy etc. by an interim chair chosen from among the members by the govt - direct executive influence on the CC's functioning. Cf. the Court of Appeal: the Chief Justice of Quebec is automatically substituted by the senior puisne judge.

limit on CC members' terms, and the prohibition on serving consecutive terms, illusory. The veto players can reward CC members for conduct favourable to them w/ effective extensions of tenure, and keep any CC composition they approve of in place as long as they themselves are in office.

(III) CC members remain in office until their respective successors are appointed. This means that any NA minority larger than 1/3, any Premier, and (theoretically) any minister of justice [or of const'l affairs, possibly], can maintain members in office indefinitely. This makes the 6-year max

(II) A 2/3 NA majority can dismiss CC members from office for any reason whatsoever; dismissals presumably couldn't be challenged in court. This incentivises the CC to conform its opinions to NA preferences. A single-party 2/3 majority can also replace the entire CC for partisan reasons at any time.

today, and any of his successors w/ similar electoral success, would be able to hand-pick CC members subject only to the dubious constraint of their own caucuses. The risk that some will abuse this power to pack the CC with loyalists is intolerably high.

In QC's FPTP electoral system, single-party 2/3 majorities can easily come about and don't even require a simple majority of the popular vote. 6 out of the 18 elections since 1960 have produced 2/3 majorities, incl. the latest in 2022, where the CAQ got one w/ just 41% of the vote. Premier Legault

if a single party wins a 2/3 majority, it gets all the power over appointments and can, if it wants, put in partisan hacks and thereby end the institution's independence. Notoriously, this is the way Hungary's dictator Viktor Orbán captured most of the country's previously independent institutions.

this can't be relied on given the power of party discipline. So a 2/3 rule is primarily about fostering cross-party consensus, which can indeed be a foundation for workable appointments systems (e.g. Germany's Federal Const'l Court). But it doesn't directly require consensus, which is a fatal flaw:

being appointed, even if their caucus would be willing to act as a check on their exercise of the power. (3) is the main mechanism through which power over CC appointments is dispersed - but it's a poor one. While it's to be hoped that govt backbench MNAs refuse to vote for unsuitable nominees,

govts or dispersed power w/in a party could transform it into a de facto check on the Premier. (2) is crucial: no one can become a CC member w/o the Premier's support. A Premier who lacks respect for constitutionalism could thus single-handedly prevent persons of integrity and independence from

(I) The CC's 5 members are (1) recommended by the justice minister [& possibly the const'l affairs minister; the drafting is unclear], (2) nominated by the Premier, (3) appointed by the Nat'l Assembly w/ a 2/3 majority required. (1) will usually be a proxy for the Premier's will, although coalition

But if you are looking for a serious study of what a Quebec constitution could do and what constraints — legal, political, and principled — apply to provincial constitution-making, check out @richardalbert.bsky.social's and my edited book: www.mqup.ca/a-written-co...