Seems like "mowing the lawn" is their long-term strategy and they clearly believe it’s sustainable--at least under the current world order

Thank you!!

I deeply appreciate the invaluable feedback from so many mentors and colleagues. I’m also very thankful to the
@apsrjournal.bsky.social reviewers and editors whose feedback greatly improved this paper.

Contributions:
1) First systematic theory of minority regimes.

2) Challenges assumptions in ethnic stacking lit—shows when identity drives loyalty, and when it doesn't.

3) Bridges conflict & authoritarianism research by explaining when ethnic regimes are stable vs. vulnerable.

This is a mixed-methods paper using:

– Original dataset on minority autocracies (1900–2015).

– Case study of Bahrain, drawing on interview data collected during my fieldwork in Bahrain, Lebanon, and London (UK).

This fear generates 3 key dynamics:

1⃣ The demobilization of the minority group, which engages in policing and sanctioning dissenting coethnics.

2⃣ Countermobilization of coethnics– loyal civilians and militias participate in repression.

3⃣ Elite cohesion/ no defections.

I find that minority regimes excluding a single majority group (e.g, Syria, Bahrain, Apartheid S. Africa) are exceptionally durable. (3 times less likely to breakdown).

Why?
Fear of majoritarian rule creates a high threat perception among ruling minorities and a largely "unconditional loyalty".

I distinguish between two types of minority autocracies:

1⃣ Those that exclude a majority ethnic group.

2⃣ Those that exclude other minorities in highly fractionalized societies where no group is a majority.

In ethnically divided societies, autocrats rely on ethnic identity to stay in power—but coethnics don’t always fall in line. I explain variation in loyalty and regime durability by showing how relative group size and ethnic configuration shape threat perceptions and loyalty among ruling minorities.

I deeply appreciate the invaluable feedback from so many mentors and colleagues. I’m also very thankful to the
@apsrjournal.bsky.social reviewers and editors whose feedback greatly improved this paper.

Contributions:

1) First systematic theory of minority regimes.

2) Challenges assumptions in ethnic stacking lit—shows when identity drives loyalty, and when it doesn't.

3) Bridges conflict & authoritarianism research by explaining when ethnic regimes are stable vs. vulnerable.

This is a mixed-methods paper using:

– Original dataset on minority autocracies (1900–2015).

– Case study of Bahrain, drawing on interview data collected during my fieldwork in Bahrain, Lebanon, and London (UK).

This fear generates 3 key dynamics:

1⃣ The demobilization of the minority group, which engages in policing and sanctioning dissenting coethnics.

2⃣ Countermobilization of coethnics– loyal civilians and militias participate in repression.

3⃣ Elite cohesion/ no defections.

I find that minority regimes excluding a single majority group (e.g, Syria, Bahrain, Apartheid S. Africa) are exceptionally durable. (3 times less likely to breakdown).

Why?
Fear of majoritarian rule creates a high threat perception among ruling minorities and a largely "unconditional loyalty".

I distinguish between two types of minority autocracies:

1⃣ Those that exclude a majority ethnic group.

2⃣ Those that exclude other minorities in highly fractionalized societies where no group is a majority.

In ethnically divided societies, autocrats rely on ethnic identity to stay in power—but coethnics don’t always fall in line. I explain variation in loyalty and regime durability by showing how relative group size and ethnic configuration shape threat perceptions and loyalty among ruling minorities.

Thank you so much, William!

Really sorry to hear this. I know that your work and your contributions to the community have meant so much to so many!