Very true. Also macro picture hides politically sensitive sectors (think wine/spirits) that play an outsized role in negotiations.

Bernd Lange stressing an important point that still sometimes gets lost: For the EU, sectoral tariffs are much more important than a general baseline - most of the EU exports into the US are concentrated in few key sectors.

The lion's den turned into a nice tea chit-chat between "friends". General sentiment on defence is positive: Trump acknowledged Europe's Ukraine support and said US troops would remain in Germany
Very little on trade but some talk of a possible deal (Trump showed of knowledge that EU is responsible)

Spoke to @koenverhelst.bsky.social from @politico.eu a couple weeks ago on Chinese overcapacities amidst the US-China "truce".

For a more detailed breakdown on the issue, check out my latest policy brief: www.delorscentre.eu/en/publicati...

5/ The EU is feeling the pressure. China is replacing European exports with domestic supply at home while redirecting its industrial surplus abroad. The result: a growing EU trade deficit, especially in chemicals, machinery, and manufactured goods.

4/ China’s domestic demand remains too weak to absorb rising industrial output. Utilisation rates are falling, inventories are rising, and more firms are operating at a loss. Yet production continues to grow, making Chinese firms ever more reliant on external markets to absorb their production

1/ US tariffs pose a major challenge to the EU economy as a whole, threatening exports worth €530 billion or ~3% of the EU’s GDP. Yet,
some member states and sectors will be hit harder than others, as their exposure to US exports varies greatly:

This is true. Challenge will however be to keep everyone in line despite the very significant differences in economic damages that the tariffs will incur. Further complicated if Trump further targets sectors that are geographically concentrated (tbt to 200% on wines and spirits)

It would be funny, if it wasn't this serious

In case anyone feels like ruining their Monday evening: ustr.gov/about-us/pol...

Imagine telling someone from 2012 that this is how global trade politics is conducted in 2025.

Happy new year everyone! Glad to see our paper on the EU's exposure to Trump 2.0 and possible response capacities covered in today's @politico.eu Trade Newsletter. As inauguration day ticks closer, have a read if you missed it pre-Xmas.

5/ Whether the US imposes sector-specific tariffs or goes for an all-round duty hike exposure varies among member states, with especially Ireland, Slovakia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Hungary particularly exposed to potential trade restrictions:

3/ A sectoral breakdown of the trade balance reveals that the pharmaceuticals, chemical, machinery, and vehicles sectors are the primary drivers of the EU's surplus (thanks for the great data @danielkral.bsky.social):

Day 2 of the Pariser Platz dialogue with topics spanning the fields of security, democracy, and the economy @delorsberlin.bsky.social

Join the public session today at 15:30 online, which brings together the key take-aways from the several discussion rounds: www.delorscentre.eu/en/events-at...

Also marks the lowest parliamentary support since EP has a say in COM's approval... (taken from @politico.eu)

1/ Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EV value chain has significantly increased over the last years. With the EV tariffs and increased international uncertainty (looking at you US) this trend is likely to continue. (Thanks @rhodiumgroup.bsky.social for great data as usual)