Abdul Sayed ترمذی سادات
@abdulsayedtarmize.bsky.social
I am a research analyst focusing on jihadism, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
|Consultant| |MSc @lunduniversity| |Views are mine| |Share/Like is not always endorsement|
|Consultant| |MSc @lunduniversity| |Views are mine| |Share/Like is not always endorsement|
and one of the most influential figures in al-Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan, also moved to Syria in 2015. This move came after his relocation from Waziristan to Afghanistan due to challenges faced by al-Qaeda. 4/4
December 2, 2024 at 6:49 PM
and one of the most influential figures in al-Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan, also moved to Syria in 2015. This move came after his relocation from Waziristan to Afghanistan due to challenges faced by al-Qaeda. 4/4
It is worth noting that a few years ago, some alleged correspondences of al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent surfaced, which revealed that one of the brothers of Ustad Ahmad Farooq, the founding deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent 3/4
December 2, 2024 at 6:49 PM
It is worth noting that a few years ago, some alleged correspondences of al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent surfaced, which revealed that one of the brothers of Ustad Ahmad Farooq, the founding deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent 3/4
It appears that several Pakistani members of al-Qaeda, who relocated to Syria after the 2015 exodus from Waziristan, have joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its allied groups, remaining active there. 2/4
December 2, 2024 at 6:49 PM
It appears that several Pakistani members of al-Qaeda, who relocated to Syria after the 2015 exodus from Waziristan, have joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its allied groups, remaining active there. 2/4
Lastly, ISKP’s response is predictable, likely involving rhetoric aimed at undermining HTS’s victory. This would mirror the propaganda themes ISKP used to discredit the Afghan Taliban’s August 2021 victory in Afghanistan. 6/n
November 30, 2024 at 10:40 AM
Lastly, ISKP’s response is predictable, likely involving rhetoric aimed at undermining HTS’s victory. This would mirror the propaganda themes ISKP used to discredit the Afghan Taliban’s August 2021 victory in Afghanistan. 6/n
AQIS might issue a generalized statement similar to Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s, avoiding direct references to HTS or Julani, or they might choose silence. However, judging by AQIS’s recent media campaigns, it appears unlikely they would ignore such a significant development. 5/n
November 30, 2024 at 10:40 AM
AQIS might issue a generalized statement similar to Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s, avoiding direct references to HTS or Julani, or they might choose silence. However, judging by AQIS’s recent media campaigns, it appears unlikely they would ignore such a significant development. 5/n
The potential response from AQIS warrants closer attention due to the complex relationship between Julani and Al-Qaeda, marked by tensions. 4/n
November 30, 2024 at 10:40 AM
The potential response from AQIS warrants closer attention due to the complex relationship between Julani and Al-Qaeda, marked by tensions. 4/n
The Afghan Taliban, given their current political challenges as Afghanistan’s de facto government, may avoid formal commentary, though their members and supporters have been celebrating this as a magnificent victory. 3/n
November 30, 2024 at 10:40 AM
The Afghan Taliban, given their current political challenges as Afghanistan’s de facto government, may avoid formal commentary, though their members and supporters have been celebrating this as a magnificent victory. 3/n
Other groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), might issue similar statements in the future.
However, the likelihood of a response from the Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remains uncertain. 2/n
However, the likelihood of a response from the Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remains uncertain. 2/n
November 30, 2024 at 10:40 AM
Other groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), might issue similar statements in the future.
However, the likelihood of a response from the Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remains uncertain. 2/n
However, the likelihood of a response from the Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) remains uncertain. 2/n
This marks the fourth TTP attack in Dera Ghazi Khan since January 2024, indicating a well-established TTP network in the district. 2/2
November 27, 2024 at 8:24 AM
This marks the fourth TTP attack in Dera Ghazi Khan since January 2024, indicating a well-established TTP network in the district. 2/2
In its Urdu magazine, ISKP portrayed this conflict as a sectarian struggle, framing it as a continuation of the war against the Shia community seen in Syria and Iraq. 2/2
November 27, 2024 at 7:35 AM
In its Urdu magazine, ISKP portrayed this conflict as a sectarian struggle, framing it as a continuation of the war against the Shia community seen in Syria and Iraq. 2/2