malmoeb.bsky.social
@malmoeb.bsky.social
Head of Investigations at InfoGuard AG - dfir.ch
This slide also didn't make the cut. Yes, anyone who has spent more than five minutes on a Hack The Box machine will know pspy, but what about my blue-team colleagues?
November 11, 2025 at 7:53 AM
This slide also didn't make the cut. Yes, anyone who has spent more than five minutes on a Hack The Box machine will know pspy, but what about my blue-team colleagues?
The following slide hasn't made it into my "Fantastic cleartext password" talk, however, it's still a good one to share 🤓
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
November 10, 2025 at 2:37 PM
The following slide hasn't made it into my "Fantastic cleartext password" talk, however, it's still a good one to share 🤓
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
Two of my teammates published artifacts on the Velociraptor Exchange this week 💪
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
November 8, 2025 at 9:49 AM
Two of my teammates published artifacts on the Velociraptor Exchange this week 💪
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Dropping ngrok in a ZIP file onto disk results in the file being removed and an alert being raised, but installing ngrok via winget works just fine? 🤔🤷♂️
November 2, 2025 at 7:12 PM
Dropping ngrok in a ZIP file onto disk results in the file being removed and an alert being raised, but installing ngrok via winget works just fine? 🤔🤷♂️
This one here is a goodie! A customer called us because they had several incidents where the system time "magically" jumped days, sometimes even months, back and forth (see screenshot). You can imagine the issues inflicted by this behavior. So the question was.. Cyber? Attacker? Misconfiguration?
November 1, 2025 at 12:56 PM
This one here is a goodie! A customer called us because they had several incidents where the system time "magically" jumped days, sometimes even months, back and forth (see screenshot). You can imagine the issues inflicted by this behavior. So the question was.. Cyber? Attacker? Misconfiguration?
So, I wrote about "Behavior:Win32/SuspRclone" before. [1]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
October 31, 2025 at 10:07 AM
So, I wrote about "Behavior:Win32/SuspRclone" before. [1]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
Just when you think you know your way around Linux.. binfmt_misc: Hold my beer.
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
Today I learned: binfmt_misc | dfir.ch
Technical blog by Stephan Berger (@malmoeb)
dfir.ch
October 30, 2025 at 11:43 AM
Just when you think you know your way around Linux.. binfmt_misc: Hold my beer.
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
Today I learned: SeManageVolumePrivilege
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
October 25, 2025 at 7:32 AM
Today I learned: SeManageVolumePrivilege
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
Coming back to Maester! Do you know about the awesome Conditional Access What-If tests? [1]
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
October 24, 2025 at 8:22 AM
Coming back to Maester! Do you know about the awesome Conditional Access What-If tests? [1]
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
What is Maester? [1]
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
October 23, 2025 at 6:14 AM
What is Maester? [1]
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Today I learned: Using diskshadow to fetch the NTDS.dit. As mentioned several times, I love reading the HTB writeups from 0xdf because I always learn something new. Like here [1]:
October 22, 2025 at 5:10 AM
Today I learned: Using diskshadow to fetch the NTDS.dit. As mentioned several times, I love reading the HTB writeups from 0xdf because I always learn something new. Like here [1]:
Lately, I’ve talked about (alternative) forensic artifacts where the retention time might be higher than your classical Security Event Logs, or might not be the first artifact to be deleted in an "anti-forensics" operation by a threat actor.
October 21, 2025 at 5:58 AM
Lately, I’ve talked about (alternative) forensic artifacts where the retention time might be higher than your classical Security Event Logs, or might not be the first artifact to be deleted in an "anti-forensics" operation by a threat actor.
In various business email compromise (BEC) cases, we later discovered that although the customer had set up a conditional access (CA) policy to enforce multi-factor authentication, mistakes had been made during the implementation of said policies.
October 20, 2025 at 6:18 AM
In various business email compromise (BEC) cases, we later discovered that although the customer had set up a conditional access (CA) policy to enforce multi-factor authentication, mistakes had been made during the implementation of said policies.
We recently took over an APT investigation from another forensic company. While reviewing analysis reports from the other company, we discovered that the attackers had been active in the network for months and had deployed multiple backdoors.
October 19, 2025 at 7:29 AM
We recently took over an APT investigation from another forensic company. While reviewing analysis reports from the other company, we discovered that the attackers had been active in the network for months and had deployed multiple backdoors.
Second story from a recent coffee break with my pentest colleague. During a retest for a client, they discovered the same ESC1 vulnerability they had reported before. Why is that dangerous and also super critical?
October 18, 2025 at 6:46 AM
Second story from a recent coffee break with my pentest colleague. During a retest for a client, they discovered the same ESC1 vulnerability they had reported before. Why is that dangerous and also super critical?
1/ Coffee break with one of our pentesters. He casually mentioned to me, "The last attack simulation was pretty cool. We used gowitness (a website screenshot utility written in Golang, to generate screenshots of web interfaces) to find internal services [1].
October 17, 2025 at 6:45 AM
1/ Coffee break with one of our pentesters. He casually mentioned to me, "The last attack simulation was pretty cool. We used gowitness (a website screenshot utility written in Golang, to generate screenshots of web interfaces) to find internal services [1].
1/ During a recent engagement, the customer provided us with access to their extensive data collection in Splunk. One thing I checked was Sysmon’s Event ID 13 (Registry - Value Set) for modifications to various keys used for credential stealing (NetworkProvider, Notification- &, Security Packages).
October 16, 2025 at 8:52 AM
1/ During a recent engagement, the customer provided us with access to their extensive data collection in Splunk. One thing I checked was Sysmon’s Event ID 13 (Registry - Value Set) for modifications to various keys used for credential stealing (NetworkProvider, Notification- &, Security Packages).
1/
Love that Minesweeper reference here :) They tried hard to blend in; however, certain metadata about a file is baked into the PE header. Attackers can rename binaries all they want, but fields like original_file_name or inconsistencies in headers often give them away.
Love that Minesweeper reference here :) They tried hard to blend in; however, certain metadata about a file is baked into the PE header. Attackers can rename binaries all they want, but fields like original_file_name or inconsistencies in headers often give them away.
September 28, 2025 at 7:47 AM
1/
Love that Minesweeper reference here :) They tried hard to blend in; however, certain metadata about a file is baked into the PE header. Attackers can rename binaries all they want, but fields like original_file_name or inconsistencies in headers often give them away.
Love that Minesweeper reference here :) They tried hard to blend in; however, certain metadata about a file is baked into the PE header. Attackers can rename binaries all they want, but fields like original_file_name or inconsistencies in headers often give them away.
1/
In today's BEC (Business E-Mail Compromise) case, I stumbled (again) over the "Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration" operation. I talked about it a while back. [1]
The attacker also created a new Inbox rule for moving incoming emails for target personnel to a designated folder.
In today's BEC (Business E-Mail Compromise) case, I stumbled (again) over the "Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration" operation. I talked about it a while back. [1]
The attacker also created a new Inbox rule for moving incoming emails for target personnel to a designated folder.
September 27, 2025 at 7:43 AM
1/
In today's BEC (Business E-Mail Compromise) case, I stumbled (again) over the "Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration" operation. I talked about it a while back. [1]
The attacker also created a new Inbox rule for moving incoming emails for target personnel to a designated folder.
In today's BEC (Business E-Mail Compromise) case, I stumbled (again) over the "Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration" operation. I talked about it a while back. [1]
The attacker also created a new Inbox rule for moving incoming emails for target personnel to a designated folder.
My team colleague, Yann Malherbe, wrote an in-depth blog post about the Automation of VHDX Investigations with 🦖
labs.infoguard.ch/posts/automa...
labs.infoguard.ch/posts/automa...
Automation of VHDX Investigations - InfoGuard Labs
Automation of VHDX Investigations - InfoGuard Labs
labs.infoguard.ch
September 26, 2025 at 12:04 PM
My team colleague, Yann Malherbe, wrote an in-depth blog post about the Automation of VHDX Investigations with 🦖
labs.infoguard.ch/posts/automa...
labs.infoguard.ch/posts/automa...
1/
My first keynote will be about how we spend billions on (cyber) security but remain insecure. I’ll use a recent case as an example, which my colleague Asger Deleuran Strunk investigated:
My first keynote will be about how we spend billions on (cyber) security but remain insecure. I’ll use a recent case as an example, which my colleague Asger Deleuran Strunk investigated:
September 26, 2025 at 10:27 AM
1/
My first keynote will be about how we spend billions on (cyber) security but remain insecure. I’ll use a recent case as an example, which my colleague Asger Deleuran Strunk investigated:
My first keynote will be about how we spend billions on (cyber) security but remain insecure. I’ll use a recent case as an example, which my colleague Asger Deleuran Strunk investigated:
1/
Mandiant mentioned the User Access Logs in their newest report [1]. We use the UAL extensively in our investigations, as this artifact can retain logs for a longer period of time, as outlined by Mandiant (and also covered in my Anti-Forensics presentation).
Mandiant mentioned the User Access Logs in their newest report [1]. We use the UAL extensively in our investigations, as this artifact can retain logs for a longer period of time, as outlined by Mandiant (and also covered in my Anti-Forensics presentation).
September 25, 2025 at 10:18 AM
1/
Mandiant mentioned the User Access Logs in their newest report [1]. We use the UAL extensively in our investigations, as this artifact can retain logs for a longer period of time, as outlined by Mandiant (and also covered in my Anti-Forensics presentation).
Mandiant mentioned the User Access Logs in their newest report [1]. We use the UAL extensively in our investigations, as this artifact can retain logs for a longer period of time, as outlined by Mandiant (and also covered in my Anti-Forensics presentation).
1/ PingCastle now highlights when no policy is in place to prevent scripting files (such as .js) from being executed via double-click.
September 21, 2025 at 11:06 AM
1/ PingCastle now highlights when no policy is in place to prevent scripting files (such as .js) from being executed via double-click.
1/ Next one from the HP Wolf Report [1]: This file is decoded by the PowerShell command and saved as “CHROME.PIF” in the ProgramData directory. It is then run.
September 20, 2025 at 7:37 AM
1/ Next one from the HP Wolf Report [1]: This file is decoded by the PowerShell command and saved as “CHROME.PIF” in the ProgramData directory. It is then run.
1/ XWorm, as described in the latest HP Wolf Security report [1], goes to great lengths to evade security products.
.chm file, VBScript, PowerShell, batch file, JavaScript, PowerShell, Steganography (the data from the image is used to reflectively load a .NET assembly).. 😮
.chm file, VBScript, PowerShell, batch file, JavaScript, PowerShell, Steganography (the data from the image is used to reflectively load a .NET assembly).. 😮
September 19, 2025 at 4:48 PM
1/ XWorm, as described in the latest HP Wolf Security report [1], goes to great lengths to evade security products.
.chm file, VBScript, PowerShell, batch file, JavaScript, PowerShell, Steganography (the data from the image is used to reflectively load a .NET assembly).. 😮
.chm file, VBScript, PowerShell, batch file, JavaScript, PowerShell, Steganography (the data from the image is used to reflectively load a .NET assembly).. 😮