Unreasonable Doubt. How Strategic Science Skeptics Exploit the Argument from Disagreement

Hannes Leitgeb is an LMU philosopher and winner of the Leibniz Prize. He investigates truth and rationality and under which conditions artificial intelligence arrives at reasonable decisions.

Having spent the last 25 years of my life teaching history of philosophy, I’ve obviously had a lot of opportunity to give advice and feedback to students on their writing projects. I often find myself...

Synthese - A major issue for the trustworthiness of modern AI-models is their lack of robustness. A notorious example is that putting a small sticker on a stop sign can cause AI-models to classify...

As 2025 draws to an end I wanted to thank all the listeners for sticking with HoPWaG for another year - we started in 2010 so in October we marked the 15th anniversary of the project - and also to giv...

Practically every discussion I’ve ever had with a beginning PhD student has involved my telling them that their envisioned project is too ambitious and broad. Often, grad students outline dissertation...

This rule might sound shocking, with its echo of the accusation made against the ancient sophists, that they “made the weaker argument the stronger,” but there is a crucial difference between “strong”...

Having spent the last 25 years of my life teaching history of philosophy, I’ve obviously had a lot of opportunity to give advice and feedback to students on their writing projects. I often find myself...

Ein Vorhaben zur arabischen Überlieferung des Alten Testaments sowie ein Vorhaben zum Werk des Philosophen Rudolf Carnap werden 2026 im Akademienprogramm ihre Arbeit aufnehmen.

Some authors argue that responsibility gaps can open up when no one has sufficient control over negative outcomes. With recent developments in Artificial Intelligence, the responsibility gap is thought to have grown since AI technologies can produce negative outcomes over which people do not have sufficient control. This paper aims to close the responsibility gap by recommending allocating responsibility according to a strategy constituted by two conditions: in scenarios where no one seems to be responsible for negative outcomes, responsibility should be primarily allocated to people who have (1) intentionally and voluntarily exercised prerequisite control that causally makes the current situation uncontrolled, and (2) expected personal benefits when exercising the prerequisite control. Theoretically speaking, every case of the responsibility gap contains at least one agent meeting these two conditions, and the responsibility gap could thus be closed.