When do armed groups capture democratic elections, and when do they fail to do so?
In a new study, @andresuribe.bsky.social (@uwmadison.bsky.social) investigates how local party competition can shape the effectiveness of coercion during Colombia’s 2002 Senate elections.
When do armed groups capture democratic elections, and when do they fail to do so?
In a new study, @andresuribe.bsky.social (@uwmadison.bsky.social) investigates how local party competition can shape the effectiveness of coercion during Colombia’s 2002 Senate elections.
#Criminal #Governance in #Latin #America: Prevalence and Correlates
By @andresuribe.bsky.social, Benjamin Lessing, Noah Schouela & Elayne Stecher
doi.org/10.1017/S153...
#Criminal #Governance in #Latin #America: Prevalence and Correlates
By @andresuribe.bsky.social, Benjamin Lessing, Noah Schouela & Elayne Stecher
doi.org/10.1017/S153...
➡️ @andresuribe.bsky.social & N. Schouela propose a theory of opportunistic rebel tactics, tested using landslide-induced road closures as an exogenous shock to state capacity www.cambridge.org/core/journal... #FirstView
Conflictsky @polviolencepapers.bsky.social
doi.org/10.1177/0010...