Jonas Nahm
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jonasnahm.com
Jonas Nahm
@jonasnahm.com

Associate Professor at Hopkins/SAIS. Former White House industrial strategy economist. Industrial policy, trade, climate, economic security. Views my own. DC | SF. 🏳️‍🌈

Economics 40%
Political science 32%

Every year we delay, Chinese producers become more competitive. Compete now or accept becoming an isolated ICE island in a world of Chinese EVs. 7/7

Rather than banning Chinese vehicles indefinitely, require data localization, rigorous software testing, and supply-chain diversification. This is what China does with Tesla in its own market. 6/

Hart's argument: use tariffs as breathing room to pursue a real repositioning strategy. Offer conditional financial support for domestic producers. Coordinate efforts with allies on supply chains. Carefully regulate imports and FDI—but dont' create a permanent wall. 5/

The historical precedent is Japan. When Japanese exports surged in the 1970s-80s, the US didn't just protect—it negotiated voluntary export restraints and encouraged Toyota, Honda, and others to invest in the US. That strategy worked. 4/

Tariffs buy time, but only temporarily. Without a serious strategy to reposition domestic producers for global competition, we're simply delaying the inevitable while falling further behind. 3/

The auto sector is the world's largest manufacturing industry. In the US, that's 775k direct jobs, $143 billion in exports, and over $1.2 trillion in total output. If China sustains its lead while America retreats behind tariffs, we lose the industry. 2/

Reposted by Henry Farrell

China has achieved first-mover advantage in autonomous, connected, electric (ACE) vehicles. The US response has been tariffs and market isolation. A new CFR paper by @profdavidhart.bsky.social argues this is a trap—we need to compete, not retreat. 1/

www.cfr.org/report/compe...
Compete, Don’t Retreat
The primary U.S. response to China’s first-mover advantages in emerging auto technologies has been protection. A smarter strategy would seek to compete by supporting producers and collaborating with …
www.cfr.org

This is a good read:

www.nytimes.com/2025/12/11/b...
Ford’s Car of the Future, Hatched in a Skunk Works Near Los Angeles
www.nytimes.com

I think the automakers are pretty committed to the transition in principle -- they know that this is the way the world is going and holding onto combustion technologies isn't going to make them competitive in the future. So I'm less worried about this noise at the margins.

If 10 years ago the EU had announced a 90 percent emissions reduction by 2035 the media would have reported this as a ban. So as long as that goal holds I think it'll be significant on both climate and industrial policy goals?

As Europe’s relative EV position vs China worsened, the signal became politically costly. So Brussels is softening the symbolism while keeping the disciplining effect.

The 2035 ban always functioned less as climate law than as industrial policy signaling: coordinating expectations, forcing capital reallocation, disciplining incumbents.

The EU hasn’t abandoned the EV transition — it has softened the symbolism while preserving the substance. That’s exactly what you’d expect when technology bans function as industrial policy signals rather than irreversible environmental commitments.

www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Taking back control – sign me up!

Seems largely symbolic and a small shift on substance? 10 percent of 2021 emissions is still a very drastic cut and would fundamentally change the auto sector.

Reposted by Jonas Nahm

Taking back control – sign me up!

Reposted by Andréas Nilsson

Subscribe to the NEIS Substack to follow along as we develop these frameworks and share findings with the community building the future of energy and industrial policy. 9/

neiscenter.substack.com/p/green-indu...

The NEIS Center is developing a research agenda around these questions—funding new research, curating analysis, and building practical tools for policymakers and firms. /8

Some insights exist in academic research but need translation for practitioners. Other questions require new investigation of natural experiments unfolding globally right now. We also need guardrails to prevent wasteful subsidy races and share best practices across countries. /7

These aren't academic debates—they're shaping the next decades of global industry. The answers will determine who leads in the technologies that define the 21st century. /6

Every major economy is subsidizing batteries, hydrogen, and EVs. Will this accelerate innovation or create overcapacity? How do you even measure success when goals span decarbonization, competitiveness, security, and regional development simultaneously? /5

The most pressing question may be this: When does global competition between nations drive innovation versus simply waste resources? 4/

How can nations build clean-tech industries amid technological uncertainty, geopolitical rivalry, and domestic politics? The NEIS Center is developing frameworks and evidence to help policymakers and practitioners answer exactly that. /3

Five years ago, governments were spending big to fight climate change. Now, they're spending big to win industries — in batteries, hydrogen, chips, critical minerals, and more. The framing has shifted from climate-first to competitiveness and resilience. /2

Industrial policy is back — and it's changing fast. What started as "green" strategy is now a global race for clean tech competitiveness and economic security. But do we actually know what works? That's what we're asking at the New Energy Industrial Strategy (NEIS) Center. /1