#MarketDesign
1/3 Winning isn't always winning—especially in India’s bond auctions.

As demand deepens and auction cutoffs grow sharper, traders face a strange paradox: the more aggressive their bids, the higher the risk of overpaying.

#BondAuctions #MarketDesign #RBI #DebtMarkets #PublicDebt
BasisPointInsight.com - The Paradox of Victory: The Winner’s Curse in India’s Bond Auctions by Babuji K
How India’s government bond auctions reveal the winner’s curse, where success can conceal costly misjudgements and shape financial market behaviour. by Babuji K, BasisPointInsight.com
basispointinsight.com
November 4, 2025 at 10:39 AM
I am very excited to see "Market Design as Organizational Problem" out at AJS: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1.... How do we explain systemic levels of destructive behavior in platform markets (system failures)? I suggest that we should focus on the organization that
Market Design as Organizational Problem: Explaining System Failures in Platform Markets | American Journal of Sociology: Vol 0, No ja
www.journals.uchicago.edu
March 19, 2025 at 10:05 AM
'Improving productivity, service standards and innovation in the care economy is a key part of improving Australians’ living standards.'

Read the paper: bit.ly/3UN2Pq6

#Healthcare #Health #HumanServices #CareEconomy #MarketDesign #MarketOversight #CareServices #Care
Competitive care: Why, when and how competition can improve human services - Conference Paper
Commissioner Stephen King presented an earlier version of this conference paper to The Treasury’s Competition Policy for the Modern Economy Conference.
bit.ly
August 29, 2025 at 12:04 AM
#econsky Preparing the reading list for my graduate course in #marketdesign for students to write a report. Any suggestion of recent papers in matching or auctions? (2yo max) self promotion encouraged. Any method welcome: theory, structural, empirical, experimental...etc
January 16, 2025 at 7:21 AM
Tayfun Sönmez and I have an interesting paper analyzing a recent Supreme Court of India decision regarding the constitutionality of the Economically Weaker Sections reservation category from a market design perspective: https://t.co/NQJ91Nqzdr
#MarketDesign #EconTwitter
November 26, 2024 at 9:49 PM
⚡: Read this new publication: "Designing markets, governing data: Engineering value in the American healthcare system" by @puellaludens.bsky.social!

🔓: journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

#datafication #governance #marketdesign #healthcare #value #scienceandtechnologystudies #economicsociology
July 14, 2025 at 2:52 PM
#Energinet has released its Information Package 3, the most comprehensive look yet at the #Danish #Hydrogen Backbone (#DHB1). It details the #Tech, #Regulation & #MarketDesign shaping #Denmark’s future #H₂ network and links with #Germany. 🙌
🔗 lnkd.in/dvze7TwN

#HydrogenIsHappening #EnergyTransition
October 29, 2025 at 8:38 AM
NBER Market Design Working Group Report, talking about many exciting recent papers in all areas of market design/design of economic mechanisms. www.nber.org/reporter/202...
Working Group Report: Market Design
www.nber.org
January 30, 2025 at 7:36 PM
August 17, 2025 at 11:50 AM
North Dakota offers a rare natural experiment in #pharmacy #marketdesign/competition: no Walgreens/CVS, and min #PBM vertical integration. A 1963 law fostered decentralized mkt shaping 💊 access. A counterfactual worth watching.

Interviewed by @TheHustle thehustle.co/originals/th...
The only state without a Walgreens pharmacy
Many independent pharmacies are in turmoil throughout the US. But a unique law has made North Dakota a haven for mom-and-pop operators.
thehustle.co
August 5, 2025 at 5:21 PM
• 📉 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲: this leads to weaker market efficiency and lower liquidity compared to rational agents

𝐀 𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡𝐭-𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐨𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐥𝐠𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐡𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐛𝐞𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞.

📄 Slides: francescosangiorgi.com/wp-content/u...

#AIinFinance #ReinforcementLearning #MarketDesign
May 9, 2025 at 10:59 AM
#BehavioralEconomics in Education #MarketDesign: A

Forward-Looking Review

https://alexreesjones.github.io/papers/Behavioral%20Economics%20in%20Education%20Market%20Design.pdf

"The literature studying the design of centralized education markets is an unambiguous success story of … 1/2
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESBEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN EDUCATION MARKET DESIGN:A FORWARD-LOOKING REVIEWAlex Rees-JonesRan ShorrerWorking Paper 30973http://www.nber.org/papers/w30973NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138February 2023
alexreesjones.github.io
February 24, 2024 at 10:17 PM
3. But DA works when preferences are known. So what shall we do if preferences are unknown? How do we ensure stability?

4. We design a bandit learning algorithm that utilizes action elimination & property of the stable lattice. The result: stablity with low sample complexity!

#marketdesign
December 9, 2024 at 3:33 PM
Thursday 22nd and Friday 23rd at @unisg.ch and online:

PhD minicourse on Minimalistic Market Design

with @tayfunsonmez.bsky.social !!!

Pls share and register for online or onsite attendance!

#econsky #econ #academicsky #marketdesign
May 19, 2025 at 6:53 AM
Alberta's Restructured Energy Market Design Significantly Altered Following Stakeholder Feedback and Ministerial Direction #AESO #AlbertaEnergy #MarketDesign #StakeholderFeedback #RenewableEnergy #MinisterialDirection
Alberta's Restructured Energy Market Design Significantly Altered Following Stakeholder Feedback and Ministerial Direction
Alberta's Restructured Energy Market (REM) design has undergone a significant shift. On April 4, 2025, the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) announced the removal of the proposed Day-Ahead Commitment (DAC) and Day-Ahead Energy Scheduling (DAES) markets from the REM framework. This decision follows a direction from the Minister of Affordability and Utilities (MAU) in March 2024 to initiate a technical design proposal for the REM, initially including these markets as part of a phased implementation approach. The intention behind the DAC and DAES markets was to increase predictability regarding generation commitments, aiming for improved system stability and reduced price fluctuations. Extensive consultations were undertaken throughout 2024 and into early 2025. Following initial design sprints, the AESO sought feedback from stakeholders between December 2024 and January 2025, followed by finalization sessions in February and March 2025. Concerns emerged during these discussions, particularly regarding the potential for over-procurement within the DAC market, largely linked to inflexible pricing structures. Stakeholders also voiced broader concerns about the need for strong governance and independent oversight to ensure financial stability and prevent increased consumer costs. The AESO maintains that the decision to exclude the DAC and DAES markets is directly responsive to stakeholder input and will not compromise the reliability or affordability of Alberta’s power system. Key elements of the REM design remain, including the co-optimization of energy and ramping reserves, a wider real-time price range (with a $3,000/MWh cap), congestion pricing (with Locational Marginal Pricing as the preferred method), and measures to mitigate market power through a secondary offer cap. The AESO hosted a session on April 10, 2025, to provide further details on the decision, the reasoning behind it, and its effect on the REM's overall timeline. These design changes are anticipated to extend the timeframe for rule approval into early 2026.
www.cozzyenergysolutions.com
April 24, 2025 at 11:42 AM
New version of our paper with a lot of new results after 2 years of revision! Check it out #econsky #marketdesign I learned a lot in the process. A great team of coauthors.
@crestumr.bsky.social
I am excited to share the new version of our paper "Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment:
An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools" with @combeju.bsky.social, Umut Dur, Olivier Tercieux, and @camilleterrier.bsky.social
January 30, 2025 at 6:38 AM
Here's an interesting looking job search. (I remember a time when there weren't searches for market designers...)
#econsky #academicsky #marketdesign
marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2025/07/job-...
Job search for Professor of Market Design: U. Mannheim and ZEW--Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
marketdesigner.blogspot.com
July 10, 2025 at 1:39 PM
.@nytimes.com coverage lacks nuance about cold time & transplant ctr incentive to use organs. Expedited placement for organs turned down serially is a good idea - just needs a better #marketdesign to support their placement down the list efficiently/fairly. #econsky

www.nytimes.com/interactive/...
Organ Transplant System ‘in Chaos’ as Waiting Lists Are Ignored
The sickest patients are supposed to get priority for lifesaving transplants. But more and more, they are being skipped over.
www.nytimes.com
February 27, 2025 at 5:23 PM