Psychology & Economic Theory Postdoc @ Harvard Economics / HBS
http://www.zachary-wojtowicz.com
In the paper, I discuss implications for law, theory of firm, diversity, AI-IO, & more
In the paper, I discuss implications for law, theory of firm, diversity, AI-IO, & more
Pairs with shared context (prior talk about similar items) were better at understanding…
And more likely to play honestly!
Pairs with shared context (prior talk about similar items) were better at understanding…
And more likely to play honestly!
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) bounds efficiency
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) bounds efficiency
Coordination failures (misunderstandings) have major consequences
Coordination failures (misunderstandings) have major consequences
But communication is itself a coordination problem!
But communication is itself a coordination problem!
1. Buyer orders a good
2. Seller delivers a good
3. Buyer accepts / rejects delivery
• Seller wants to misdeliver if possible (think up-sell)
• Buyer wants to forgive genuine misunderstanding, but punish deception
1. Buyer orders a good
2. Seller delivers a good
3. Buyer accepts / rejects delivery
• Seller wants to misdeliver if possible (think up-sell)
• Buyer wants to forgive genuine misunderstanding, but punish deception
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) places a lower bound on communication costs
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) places a lower bound on communication costs
Coordination failures matter: E.g. the \$3.5b lawsuit over whether each plane on 9/11 was a separate “occurrence”
Coordination failures matter: E.g. the \$3.5b lawsuit over whether each plane on 9/11 was a separate “occurrence”
But communication is itself a coordination problem!
But communication is itself a coordination problem!
BUYER orders a good
SELLER delivers a good
BUYER accepts / rejects delivery
SELLER wants to misdeliver if possible (think up-sell)
BUYER wants to forgive genuine misunderstanding, but punish deception
BUYER orders a good
SELLER delivers a good
BUYER accepts / rejects delivery
SELLER wants to misdeliver if possible (think up-sell)
BUYER wants to forgive genuine misunderstanding, but punish deception
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) places a lower bound on communication costs
Common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann) places a lower bound on communication costs
Contextual equilibria Pareto dominate in sender-receiver games with differentially costly (type indep.) messages
Contextual equilibria Pareto dominate in sender-receiver games with differentially costly (type indep.) messages
E.g. the \$3.5b insurance dispute over whether each plane on 9/11 was a separate “occurrence”
Big Q: Given the risks, why not adopt a totally unambiguous system?
E.g. the \$3.5b insurance dispute over whether each plane on 9/11 was a separate “occurrence”
Big Q: Given the risks, why not adopt a totally unambiguous system?
Language is highly contextual: messages can mean wildly different things in different circumstances (e.g., “I’ll have the usual”)
Language is highly contextual: messages can mean wildly different things in different circumstances (e.g., “I’ll have the usual”)
www.nature.com/articles/nco...
www.nature.com/articles/nco...