The cab rank rule does not apply to foreign work, e.g. proceeding in Jersey. See rC30.5 of BSB Handbook

Is work in Jersey covered by the cab rank rule? I seem to recall an exception for Foreign Work (as defined)

Any idea what happened next? Did they marry? Did they stay together?

If she was outside the jurisdiction while writing / publishing, would it even be an offence? It is unusual for a criminal statute to have extra-territorial effect

Is this just a linguistic criticism, or a substantive one? When courts are deciding whether to redact a judgment they [weigh] [compare] Art8 rights with Art10. Do you say that is wrong in principle, or only that a different verb should be used (or that Art8 and Art10 rights are commensurable)?

Is robing required in the Family Division when making a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards application? Difficult to say that this does not 'concern the liberty of the subject'.

Recorders do; deputy High Court judges (s.9(4)) do not. Perhaps based on a misconception that DHCJs will already hold another judicial post?

Roses are red
Violets are blue
Your claim is struck out if
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Facts would be admissible - such as the directors not turning up (if not more prejudicial than probative). But the High Court's conclusion would be inadmissible.

Coercion will be incredibly difficult to spot, if it is subtle pressure from family members. No law can change that. Plus, this law makes it more difficult by not having a list of statutory consultees (children, other relatives, care home managers) who can warn of red flags

Isn't "why" part of the range of questions anyone will ask in order to check for coercion? Along with, e.g., who have you discussed this with, what other options have you considered, does anyone stand to gain from you dying, etc etc? The approach can surely not be a tick box "Have you been coerced?"

That is the point I think. Currently, if P is capacitous and wants to die, judge does not have to be (cannot be) invoved. Now, as proposed, judges must be involved. This isn't a dry question of jurisdiction. It requires judges to adopt a fundamentally different mindset in these cases.

That is where judicial conscience becomes an issue. If a judge does not believe that personal autonomy should extend as far as suicide, which is the current law, requiring a judge to participate in the assisted dying process raises a novel issue of conscience for judges

But section 4(5) of Mental Capacity Act 2005 excludes from 'best interests' any desire to bring about death, unless I have misread that? So, currently at least, a desire to die cannot feature in assessing a person's 'best interests', and that is the law judges are applying

There is a big difference between COP etc decisions - where judges are asked to make decisions in the best interests of P - and what is now proposed, where judges approve the lawfulness of something contrary to best interests (death). It is odd that medics can have a conscience but judges cannot.

Has there been discussion of a conscience clause for judges? What would be the position for a judge who, out of conscience, does not want to be involved in an assisted dying?

See www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cd..., at 2.38pm

On (abortive) day 1 of the trial, the BBC report said something along the lines of Counsel telling the judge that the trial should not begin because if the trial began "a substantial sum would become payable". What was that about? Some kind of CFA?