Yoko Okuyama
@yoko-okuyama.bsky.social
Asst. Prof. at Uppsala University | Yale Econ. alum. | Family, labor and political economics | RT ≠ endorsement | www.okuyamayoko.com
February 13, 2025 at 1:40 PM
(Frequently asked QA2)
Does longer hours boost skills through learning-by-doing?
No, our data on manufacturing and sales output per hour do not support that.
Does longer hours boost skills through learning-by-doing?
No, our data on manufacturing and sales output per hour do not support that.
February 13, 2025 at 1:40 PM
(Frequently asked QA2)
Does longer hours boost skills through learning-by-doing?
No, our data on manufacturing and sales output per hour do not support that.
Does longer hours boost skills through learning-by-doing?
No, our data on manufacturing and sales output per hour do not support that.
(Frequently asked QA1)
Do (Japanese) women quit after birth?
No, in our firm, mothers don’t quit more than others. Instead, most opt for “reduced hours for parenting,” common in large firms.
Labor supply adjusts at the intensive, not extensive, margin.
Do (Japanese) women quit after birth?
No, in our firm, mothers don’t quit more than others. Instead, most opt for “reduced hours for parenting,” common in large firms.
Labor supply adjusts at the intensive, not extensive, margin.
February 13, 2025 at 1:40 PM
(Frequently asked QA1)
Do (Japanese) women quit after birth?
No, in our firm, mothers don’t quit more than others. Instead, most opt for “reduced hours for parenting,” common in large firms.
Labor supply adjusts at the intensive, not extensive, margin.
Do (Japanese) women quit after birth?
No, in our firm, mothers don’t quit more than others. Instead, most opt for “reduced hours for parenting,” common in large firms.
Labor supply adjusts at the intensive, not extensive, margin.
2. Child penalty — key findings
▫️ 55% (46% mom penalty + dad premium)
▫️ Early on, time-based pay drives the penalty but fades over time.
▫️ By year 15, job-rank-based pay dominates, indicating missed promotions due to childbirth.
▫️ 55% (46% mom penalty + dad premium)
▫️ Early on, time-based pay drives the penalty but fades over time.
▫️ By year 15, job-rank-based pay dominates, indicating missed promotions due to childbirth.
February 13, 2025 at 1:40 PM
2. Child penalty — key findings
▫️ 55% (46% mom penalty + dad premium)
▫️ Early on, time-based pay drives the penalty but fades over time.
▫️ By year 15, job-rank-based pay dominates, indicating missed promotions due to childbirth.
▫️ 55% (46% mom penalty + dad premium)
▫️ Early on, time-based pay drives the penalty but fades over time.
▫️ By year 15, job-rank-based pay dominates, indicating missed promotions due to childbirth.
4./ In Japan, welfare inequality has declined across birth cohorts, mainly due to lower intrahousehold inequality — a sign of women's improving economic position.
MMWI makes this trend visible.
MMWI makes this trend visible.
February 9, 2025 at 4:00 PM
4./ In Japan, welfare inequality has declined across birth cohorts, mainly due to lower intrahousehold inequality — a sign of women's improving economic position.
MMWI makes this trend visible.
MMWI makes this trend visible.
3./ Those with less bargaining power benefit more from shared goods, which help redistribute welfare.
As a result, MMWI-based intrahousehold inequality is lower than when measured by private consumption alone— crucial for policies like fair compensation in divorce settlements.
As a result, MMWI-based intrahousehold inequality is lower than when measured by private consumption alone— crucial for policies like fair compensation in divorce settlements.
February 9, 2025 at 4:00 PM
3./ Those with less bargaining power benefit more from shared goods, which help redistribute welfare.
As a result, MMWI-based intrahousehold inequality is lower than when measured by private consumption alone— crucial for policies like fair compensation in divorce settlements.
As a result, MMWI-based intrahousehold inequality is lower than when measured by private consumption alone— crucial for policies like fair compensation in divorce settlements.
1./ A large share of household resources is "shared" (see Japan's case in the figure).
How should we account for this when measuring intrahousehold welfare inequality?
We tackle this by proposing a Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), examining its anatomy, and applying it to Japanese data.
How should we account for this when measuring intrahousehold welfare inequality?
We tackle this by proposing a Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), examining its anatomy, and applying it to Japanese data.
February 9, 2025 at 4:00 PM
1./ A large share of household resources is "shared" (see Japan's case in the figure).
How should we account for this when measuring intrahousehold welfare inequality?
We tackle this by proposing a Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), examining its anatomy, and applying it to Japanese data.
How should we account for this when measuring intrahousehold welfare inequality?
We tackle this by proposing a Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), examining its anatomy, and applying it to Japanese data.
📌 WP update (and hello #econsky)
Intra-Household Welfare Inequality and Household Public Goods | PA. Chiappori, C. Meghir & Y. Okuyama
www.nber.org/papers/w32645
Intra-Household Welfare Inequality and Household Public Goods | PA. Chiappori, C. Meghir & Y. Okuyama
www.nber.org/papers/w32645
February 9, 2025 at 4:00 PM
📌 WP update (and hello #econsky)
Intra-Household Welfare Inequality and Household Public Goods | PA. Chiappori, C. Meghir & Y. Okuyama
www.nber.org/papers/w32645
Intra-Household Welfare Inequality and Household Public Goods | PA. Chiappori, C. Meghir & Y. Okuyama
www.nber.org/papers/w32645