A fair number of Americans now in their 30s and working in clean energy and sustainability can trace their journey back to the @350.org movement at some point. Perhaps the pipeline that mattered most was the talent pipeline, after all.

Figure in preceding tweet is from this paper: link.springer.com/article/10.1...

It is also notable that combusting all life on Earth's surface = the same CO2 ppm as the unrealistic-worst-case-not-happening RCP8.5 scenario where humanity burns most known coal reserves: ~900ppm in 2100, with room to climb more. This does speak to the volume of coal out there.

Many earth scientists learn this during their standard coursework. I remember doing the "spontaneous combustion of all life" back-of-the-envelope calculation for an assignment, though I can no longer recall which class specifically that was for... 😅

The counterintuitive explanation is that the % oxygen in the air today was built up steadily over the Earth's geologic history from net photosynthesis, a vast "bank" built over such long timescales that the mass of life in existence today is relatively stoichiometrically small.

All of this makes for a fascinating case of how quickly large industrial facilities can rise + fall in China. Outside of China new smelter projects are typically depreciated over 30 yrs and cost 4x higher CAPEX, so building something + demolishing it in 3 yrs is just wild. (END)

Weiqiao owns nearly all the coal units in this industrial part of Zouping, plus 2.6GW of coal capacity just offscreen east, so such coal unit/policy reshufflings have constrained their local power supply, likely informing the decision to shut down phase 1 and look to Yunnan.

Some new local captive coal construction was also halted, with a large plant of 8x660 MW ultra-supercritical coal units only seemingly having gotten permission to complete/operate 6 units, leaving two unfinished.

Note more decommissioned subcritical units at bottom left.

Other context is that tightening regulations on coal plants have put some pressure on older, less efficient units to close, like these captive units at Weiqiao's co-located alumina refinery (converts bauxite to alumina, the preceding step to aluminum smelting).

Both phases 1 + 2 of the project used state-of-the-art-tech, namely NEUI600 high-amperage 600kA electrolytic cells designed by the Northeastern University Engineering & Research Institute (NEUI), so interestingly the decommissioned facility was a modern one, hardly an old plant with obsolete tech!

Interestingly, the facility above that Weiqiao chose to decommission was actually phase 1 of two phases built, and the second phase of 6 potlines of about 1 million tons/yr capacity seems to have continued to operate since.

(All of this can be found at 36.895, 117.813)

In light of the cap + tightening regulations on the aluminum sector, this perhaps can be interpreted as part of a broader race to secure finite available hydro capacity in Yunnan, providing a good foundation for production for the forseeable future.

transitionasia.org/the-chinese-...

Some of the context is China capped nationwide aluminum capacity at 45 million t/yr in 2017, so to build new capacity producers must decommission capacity. Within years Weiqiao began transferring 4 million t/yr of its capacity from Shandong to Yunnan.

www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/1...

By leading the charge in expanding enrichment capabilities + diversifying the nuclear fuel supply chain, the US + allies can position nuclear deployment efforts for success and support a more resilient and sustainable global nuclear industry.

Our report: thebreakthrough.org/issues/energ...

“Failure to achieve needed scale for the nuclear fuel cycle will create a supply bottleneck limiting nuclear deployment. Even the short-term goal of transitioning N. American + European countries away from previous reliance on Russian enrichment will pose difficulties”

“From the starting point of an enrichment industry—outside of Russia—accustomed to stagnant if not decaying market demand, the enrichment sector must grow at a pace sufficient to support potentially 100s of GW of new nuclear capacity each decade beginning in the 2030s.”

We emphasize that spent fuel management poses a major financial and political challenge for nuclear newcomer countries, motivating efforts to develop international spent fuel transfer or take-back programs (with the potential benefit of maximally utilizing spent fuel).

Countries with unique supply chain and nuclear energy policy circumstances will particularly benefit from greater flexibility to internally move, repackage, reprocess, or alter nuclear materials with appropriate safeguards and oversight.