📚 This contribution may speak to those who works on migration, compliance, human rights law, or international hypocrisy.

It examines how irregular migrants’ rights r undermined in practice.
I argue that states engage in political malignancy creating a compliance gap to systematically bypass the rights of irregular migrants.
I also argue that“states cooperate not to cooperate”when it comes to protecting those rights.

📘 We hope the UWMIT dataset opens up new research avenues on treaty design, compliance, regime durability & global governance.

🧾 Article link: brill.com/view/journal...
🔍 Supported by TÜBİTAK3501 Grant 220K326
📬 Happy to discuss, collaborate, or share the dataset!

Sovereignty, domestic politics & economic interests have become key drivers of treaty exits, especially post-2005.
Examples:
🇬🇧 Brexit
🇺🇦🇬🇪 Exits from Russian-led agreements
📜 Non-compliance with international courts/tribunals in HR cases

🔎 Minilateral treaties (2–9 parties) are less likely to see unilateral withdrawals.
Though they make up 36% of MITs, they only account for 24% of all exits.

🕊️ Over 63% of withdrawals since 1991 occurred after 2001.
📈 This supports earlier work on the rising trend of unilateralism in global governance.
🌍 The UN Security Council P5 (just 5 out of 165 states) account for 11% of all unilateral exits in the dataset.

We introduce an original dataset of 945 unilateral withdrawals from 206 multilateral treaties since 1945. We identify 2broad categories of withdrawal reasons:
📘Regime-driven (e.g. Ineffectiveness) and 🏛State-driven (e.g. NationalSecurity,Sovereignty,Economic interests)