Tom W. Etienne
tomwetienne.bsky.social
Tom W. Etienne
@tomwetienne.bsky.social
PhD candidate in political science and communication at @upenn.edu.
Senior Research Fellow @Kieskompas
To me, this is more about the impact of #ideology & #antiAmericanism on security than about #nuclearweapons per se.

It provides a backdrop for my dissertation research, which investigates the nature and consequences of US-based political identities abroad (outside of the US).
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
4. More generally, our study sheds light on how populism may impact alliances and international organisation with pooled or delegated sovereignty.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
Take-aways:
1. #Populists are not inherently pro–nuclear weapons.
2. Their support hinges on who controls the weapons and against whom they are used.
3. These findings have implications for #NATO’s #deterrence posture
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
Only when the nuclear weapons are not framed as US-owned or used against Russia do we observe a populist affinity for nuclear weapons.

When nuclear weapons are framed as US-owned and used against Russia, populist support drops sharply, as predicted by our theory.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
To directly test the common assumption that populists favour nuclear weapons, we experimentally vary both US ownership of the weapons and the target state.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
In a population-based survey experiment in 🇳🇱, we show that populists' opposition to the nuclear sharing arrangement stems from the US ownership of these weapons.

Without priming the US, this negative relationship disappears, but is still not significantly positive.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
We find that populists are indeed no more favourable to nuclear weapons.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
We test this using original survey data from all five European nuclear-sharing states (🇧🇪 🇩🇪 🇮🇹 🇳🇱 🇹🇷)
+ a population-based survey experiment in the Netherlands.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
We say that populist publics in Europe should therefore be less, not more, supportive of #nuclearsharing -- precisely because it constrains national #sovereignty and hands over control to the #US
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
They simultaneously display an affinity for #Putin's #Russia:

"European populists find in Russia not only an ally in their pursuit of authoritarian and anti-pluralist policies, but also the ideal counterpole for their anti-American and anti-establishment attitudes."
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
Populists harbour more #antiAmerican sentiment:

"As the hegemonic superpower, the United States is frequently seen as the epicenter of a global elite. [...] Anti-Americanism is often driven by opposition to US military dominance."
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
Importantly, power is delegated not to just any political establishment, but to the #USA & a US-led #NATO, whereas the weapons primary use is as a deterrent against #Russia.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
"Populists may view the sharing arrangement as a foreign imposition by elites, leaving decisions about the use of these weapons in the hands of an international bureaucracy rather than the sovereign will of the people."
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
This is at odds with two core dimensions of #populism: anti-elitism & popular sovereignty
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM
We argue that this expectation should not hold in European #NATO nuclear-sharing states. Under NATO #nuclearsharing, nuclear weapons stay under #US control, meaning sovereignty over powerful security decisions is effectively outsourced to Washington & NATO.
February 16, 2026 at 3:56 AM