Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'deki manevra alanı giderek daralıyor. Yunanistan, Kıbrıs ve İsrail arasında genişleyen ittifakın kıskacında sıkışan ve Washington tarafından giderek kenara itilen Ankara, yakında elindeki son kozu oynamak zorunda kalabilir: Suriye ile deniz yetki alanları sınırlandırma anlaşması. Al-Monitor'da yazan Ezgi Akın'a göre, son dönemde imzalanan Lübnan-Kıbrıs denizcilik ve münhasır ekonomik bölge anlaşmaları, Türkiye ile Kıbrıs Türklerinin bölgedeki yalnızlığını daha da pekiştirdi. Lefkoşa ile Beyrut arasında 26 Kasım'da imzalanan anlaşma, Kıbrıs'ın bölge komşularıyla yaptığı üçüncü anlaşma niteliği taşıyor. Daha önce 2003'te Mısır, 2010'da ise İsrail ile benzer anlaşmalar imzalanmıştı — hepsi de Ankara'nın itirazlarına rağmen. Peki Türkiye-Suriye denizcilik anlaşması neden dengeleri alt üst edebilir? Birincisi, böyle bir anlaşma Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'in önemli bölümleri üzerindeki taleplerini meşru zemine oturtacak ve rakiplerinin ördüğü hukuki çerçeveye meydan okuyacak. Türkiye uzun süredir, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin tek taraflı deniz sınırı belirlemelerinin Kıbrıs Türklerinin haklarını yok saydığını ve uluslararası meşruiyetten yoksun olduğunu savunuyor. Suriye ile yapılacak bir anlaşma, Ankara'ya kendisini dışlayan anlaşmalar ağına karşı kendi ikili anlaşmasını kazandıracak. İkincisi, böyle bir anlaşma planlanan enerji alt yapı projelerini tehlikeye atabilir. Kısa süre önce Washington'da düzenlenen zirve, Kıbrıs, Yunanistan, İsrail ve ABD enerji bakanlarını bir araya getirerek Türkiye'yi açıkça dışlayan bir enerji mimarisine Amerika'nın desteğini gözler önüne serdi. ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "kötü niyetli aktörlere bağımlılığı azaltarak bölgenin enerji kaynaklarını çeşitlendirme" hedefini vurguladı — hem Rusya'yı hem de Türkiye'yi hedef aldığı değerlendirilen bir söylem. Üçüncüsü, böyle bir anlaşma Türkiye'nin gelecekteki hidrokarbon projelerinde vazgeçilmez bölgesel aktör konumunu yeniden tescil edecek. Ankara merkezli Dış Politika Enstitüsü'nden eski diplomat Gülru Gezer, Al-Monitor'a yaptığı açıklamada, "Suriye ile münhasır ekonomik bölge anlaşması hem uygun hem de son derece önemli olacaktır" dedi. Gezer, karşı hamle yapılmazsa Türkiye'nin etkisini kısıtlamaya yönelik yeni sınırlandırma anlaşmalarının peş peşe geleceği uyarısında bulundu. Gezer şöyle devam etti: "Ankara karşı hamle yapmadığı takdirde bu tür anlaşmalar birbirini izleyecek. Amaç, Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'deki nüfuzunu sınırlamak." Ankara'da iktidar partisi de mevcut gidişattan duyduğu rahatsızlığı açıkça dile getirdi. Parti Sözcüsü Ömer Çelik, Lübnan-Kıbrıs anlaşmasını kastederek, "Bu anlaşma tamamen hukuka aykırıdır" dedi ve bunu "Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin egemenlik haklarını gasp etme girişimi" olarak nitelendirdi. Yılın başlarında Ulaştırma Bakanı Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, Ankara'nın Şam ile denizcilik anlaşması arayışında olduğuna işaret etmişti. Yunanistan ve Kıbrıs derhal itiraz ederek Suriye'nin geçiş hükümetinin uluslararası anlaşmalar imzalama yetkisine sahip olmadığını ileri sürdü. Resmî bir Türk kaynağı Al-Monitor'a, aktif bir müzakere süreci bulunmasa da kapının açık kaldığını doğruladı. Kaynak şunları söyledi: "Türkiye, tanıdığı tüm kıyıdaş devletlerle deniz yetki alanlarının sınırlandırılmasını âdil, hakkaniyete uygun ve uluslararası hukuka paralel biçimde ele almaya hazırdır." Ancak önemli belirsizlikler varlığını koruyor. Middle East Institute Türkiye Programı Direktörü Gönül Tol, böyle bir anlaşmanın Türkiye'nin çıkarlarına hizmet edeceğini belirtmekle birlikte, "Sharaa'nın tamamen Türkiye'nin yanında yer almasını beklemek gerçekçi olmaz" dedi. Suriye'nin yeni liderliğinin Ankara'nın denizcilik hedefleriyle ne ölçüde örtüşeceği, yanıtı merakla beklenen temel soru olmaya devam ediyor. Yine de elindeki seçenekler iyice azalan Türkiye için Suriye ile denizcilik anlaşması, Doğu Akdeniz'in kurallarını yeniden yazma yolundaki son büyük fırsat olabilir. 

Türkiye'nin Doğu Akdeniz'deki manevra alanı giderek daralıyor. Yunanistan, Kıbrıs ve İsrail arasında genişleyen ittifakın kıskacında sıkışan...

Turkey is running out of options in the Eastern Mediterranean. Squeezed by an expanding alliance between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel—and increasingly sidelined by Washington—Ankara may soon turn to its only remaining card: a maritime delimitation deal with Syria. According to Ezgi Akin, writing for Al-Monitor, the recent Lebanon-Cyprus maritime and exclusive economic zone agreements have further deepened Turkey and Turkish Cypriots' isolation in the region. The November 26 accord between Nicosia and Beirut marks Cyprus's third such agreement with regional neighbors, following deals with Egypt in 2003 and Israel in 2010—all signed over Ankara's objections. Here's why a Turkish-Syrian maritime deal would change everything. First, it would legitimize Turkey's claims to substantial portions of the Eastern Mediterranean, challenging the legal framework being constructed by its rivals. Turkey has long argued that any unilateral maritime delimitation by the Republic of Cyprus ignores the rights of Turkish Cypriots and lacks international legitimacy. A deal with Syria would provide Ankara with its own bilateral agreement to counter the expanding web of accords excluding it. Second, such an agreement could disrupt planned energy infrastructure projects. A recent Washington summit brought together energy ministers from Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States, signaling American support for an energy architecture that explicitly excludes Turkey. The U.S. State Department emphasized goals of "diversifying the region's energy supplies by reducing reliance on malign actors"—language widely interpreted as targeting both Russia and Turkey. Third, it would reassert Turkey's role as an indispensable regional player in any future hydrocarbon development. "A maritime exclusive economic zone deal with Syria would be suitable and significant," Gulru Gezer, a former diplomat with Ankara-based think tank Foreign Policy Institute, told Al-Monitor. She warned that without a countermove, more delimitation agreements designed to limit Turkey's influence will follow. "Unless Ankara makes a countermove, more such agreements will follow," Gezer said. "The aim is to limit Turkey's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean." Turkey's ruling party has already signaled its frustration with the current trajectory. "This agreement is completely illegal," declared Omer Celik, the party's spokesman, referring to the Lebanon-Cyprus deal and calling it "an attempt to usurp the sovereign rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Earlier this year, Turkey's Transportation Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu suggested Ankara intends to pursue a maritime deal with Damascus. Greece and Cyprus immediately objected, arguing Syria's transitional government lacks legal authority to sign international agreements. An official Turkish source confirmed to Al-Monitor that while no active negotiations are underway, the door remains open. "Turkey is ready to address the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions with all relevant coastal states it recognizes, in a fair and equitable manner and in line with international law," the source stated. However, significant uncertainties remain. Gonul Tol, director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, noted that while such a deal would serve Turkish interests, "it is not realistic to expect Sharaa to be fully in Turkey's corner." Whether Syria's new leadership will align with Ankara's maritime ambitions remains the critical question. Still, with few alternatives left, a Syrian maritime agreement may be Turkey's last best chance to rewrite the rules of the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense (MSB) has revealed new details about an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was shot down after entering Turkish airspace from the Black Sea, confirming that the aircraft was intercepted between the Central Anatolian province of Çankırı and Ankara’s Elmadağ district. The incident, first announced by the MSB on Monday evening, involved a drone that had reportedly gone out of control over the Black Sea before approaching Turkish airspace. According to a report by CNN Türk’s Ankara bureau chief Dicle Canova, cited by T24, the UAV followed a route over the Black Sea and moved along a Kastamonu line before being brought down in a sparsely populated area between Çankırı and Elmadağ. Canova said the drone’s relatively small size made it difficult to track on radar. “It was popping in and out of Turkish radar, leaving intermittent traces,” she noted, explaining that this initially led authorities to suspect the radar track might belong to a meteorological balloon or another weather-related object. Despite this early assessment, Turkish air defense units continued to monitor the track closely. As the object moved closer and was confirmed to be entering Turkish airspace, the MSB ordered an “alarm reaction” mission, scrambling F-16 fighter jets under both NATO and national command. The warplanes were instructed to shadow the drone and wait until it reached a location where it could be safely neutralized without posing a threat to civilians. Once the UAV arrived over a non-residential zone between Çankırı and Elmadağ, one of the F-16s fired a missile and successfully destroyed the target. The MSB emphasized that the engagement was carried out in line with routine air defense procedures designed to protect national airspace and public safety. The impact caused the drone to break apart and scatter over a wide area, complicating recovery efforts. Authorities have not yet been able to fully collect all the debris. Once the wreckage is gathered, it will be examined by the Turkish Air Force to determine the model, origin, and possible mission of the UAV. In its original statement, the MSB said that a “flight track” approaching Turkish airspace over the Black Sea had been detected and placed under surveillance. The ministry later confirmed that the object was an unmanned aerial vehicle that had gone out of control. “To ensure the security of the airspace, F-16s under NATO and national control were assigned an alarm reaction mission,” the statement said. “It was determined that the flight track belonged to an unmanned aerial vehicle that had lost control, and in order to prevent any adverse consequences, it was shot down in a safe area outside residential zones.” No injuries or damage on the ground have been reported. The MSB has not yet disclosed which country the drone may have belonged to, or whether it was military or civilian in nature. An investigation is ongoing. Turkey Shoots Down Out-of-Control Drone Over Central Anatolia Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense (MSB) has revealed new details about an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was shot down after entering Turkish airspace from the Black Sea, confirming that the aircraft was intercepted between the Central Anatolian province of Çankırı and Ankara’s Elmadağ district. The incident, first announced by the MSB on Monday evening, involved a drone that had reportedly gone out of control over the Black Sea before approaching Turkish airspace. According to a report by CNN Türk’s Ankara bureau chief Dicle Canova, cited by T24, the UAV followed a route over the Black Sea and moved along a Kastamonu line before being brought down in a sparsely populated area between Çankırı and Elmadağ. Canova said the drone’s relatively small size made it difficult to track on radar. “It was popping in and out of Turkish radar, leaving intermittent traces,” she noted, explaining that this initially led authorities to suspect the radar track might belong to a meteorological balloon or another weather-related object. Despite this early assessment, Turkish air defense units continued to monitor the track closely. As the object moved closer and was confirmed to be entering Turkish airspace, the MSB ordered an “alarm reaction” mission, scrambling F-16 fighter jets under both NATO and national command. The warplanes were instructed to shadow the drone and wait until it reached a location where it could be safely neutralized without posing a threat to civilians. Once the UAV arrived over a non-residential zone between Çankırı and Elmadağ, one of the F-16s fired a missile and successfully destroyed the target. The MSB emphasized that the engagement was carried out in line with routine air defense procedures designed to protect national airspace and public safety. The impact caused the drone to break apart and scatter over a wide area, complicating recovery efforts. Authorities have not yet been able to fully collect all the debris. Once the wreckage is gathered, it will be examined by the Turkish Air Force to determine the model, origin, and possible mission of the UAV. In its original statement, the MSB said that a “flight track” approaching Turkish airspace over the Black Sea had been detected and placed under surveillance. The ministry later confirmed that the object was an unmanned aerial vehicle that had gone out of control. “To ensure the security of the airspace, F-16s under NATO and national control were assigned an alarm reaction mission,” the statement said. “It was determined that the flight track belonged to an unmanned aerial vehicle that had lost control, and in order to prevent any adverse consequences, it was shot down in a safe area outside residential zones.” No injuries or damage on the ground have been reported. The MSB has not yet disclosed which country the drone may have belonged to, or whether it was military or civilian in nature. An investigation is ongoing. Photo: Gemini AI

Prosecutors in Istanbul have alleged that so-called “new generation mafia” networks are systematically recruiting children aged 15 to 18 for armed attacks and street-level criminal operations, according to recent indictments in major organized crime investigations. The allegations, reported by Turkish outlet T24 Gender, suggest that young teenagers are being pushed into roles ranging from armed assailants to lookouts and couriers, often through a combination of cash promises and intimidation. Prosecutors say these practices allow gangs to expand their operational capacity while exploiting legal protections and reduced sentences that apply to minors under Turkish law. The indictments stem from investigations led by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office into several organized crime groups, including a network allegedly linked to mob figure Barış Boyun. In case files running to roughly 300 pages, prosecutors describe a pattern in which children from low-income families are targeted, drawn into the orbit of criminal organizations and then deployed in high-risk operations. According to the files, suspects in the Boyun investigation are accused of bringing some minors from other cities to Istanbul specifically to use them as “hitmen,” “lookouts” and “bodyguards.” Prosecutors argue that gang leaders deliberately select under-18s to carry out operations in order to benefit from the different trial procedures and sentencing regimes that apply to children in conflict with the law. Testimonies cited in the indictments portray a dual strategy of seduction and coercion. Some youths were allegedly first approached with “job offers” promising quick and easy money in return for simple tasks. When they hesitated or refused, threats reportedly followed. In one statement quoted by prosecutors, a child claimed he was forced into an armed action after being told, “If you don’t do it, I’ll kill you.” The documents also suggest that once inside these networks, leaving becomes increasingly difficult. Children who try to disengage are said to face pressure, harassment or direct threats, turning what began as a “temporary job” into an ongoing entanglement with organized crime. Beyond armed attacks, prosecutors say minors have been used in extortion schemes, workplace shootings, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, as well as courier work. Official data on juvenile crime appears to mirror the growing concern. The number of children recorded by security agencies as “driven to crime” reportedly rose from around 179,000 in 2023 to approximately 202,000 in 2024. While these figures cover all forms of juvenile offending, not only organized crime, they are cited in the case files as evidence of a wider trend of vulnerability and exploitation. Experts consulted in the indictments and related reporting argue that the response must go beyond criminal investigations. They highlight several priority areas for policymakers: reducing school dropout rates, expanding social support systems for at-risk families, strengthening programs to combat addiction and developing targeted preventive initiatives for children in high-risk neighborhoods. The case files ultimately depict minors as the “most fragile and most easily steered” link in organized crime structures—individuals whose economic hardship, need for shelter and search for belonging are being weaponized by networks that see them as expendable assets rather than children in need of protection. 

Prosecutors in Istanbul have alleged that so-called “ new generation mafia ” networks are systematically recruiting children aged 15 to 18 ...

As Australia mourns the 15 victims of Sunday's horrific shooting at a Hanukkah celebration on Bondi Beach, speculation about Iran's possible...

Deposed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is living a secluded life of luxury in Russia and the United Arab Emirates, largely cut off from both Syrian and Russian political circles, according to multiple sources and leaked data. Fourteen years after a teenage graffiti warning – “It’s your turn, Doctor” – heralded Syria’s descent into brutal conflict, the former London-trained ophthalmologist has traded dictatorship for an obscure existence on Moscow’s affluent outskirts. Reporting by William Christou and Pjotr Sauer for The Guardian, based on a family friend, sources in Russia and Syria, and leaked Russian data, offers a rare glimpse inside the once untouchable Assad household. Their investigation describes a toppled strongman “brushing up on his ophthalmology” in Moscow classrooms, studying Russian and contemplating a return to medical practice, potentially serving the city’s wealthy elite. Assad fled Damascus with his sons in the early hours of 8 December 2024 as rebels closed in on the capital from the north and the south. Escorted by Russian forces to the Khmeimim airbase, they were flown to safety, leaving behind relatives and regime insiders who say they received no warning. One acquaintance of Assad’s powerful brother Maher claims Maher was desperately trying to reach Bashar as the capital fell, only to find the palace abandoned so hastily that rebels discovered his shisha coals still warm. Now, sources say, the Assad family are believed to reside in Rublyovka, the heavily guarded enclave favoured by Russia’s political and business elite and other deposed leaders such as former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. Western sanctions imposed in 2011 had already pushed the Assads to move much of their wealth into Russia, ensuring that in exile they are not short of money. Yet the former ruler’s status in Moscow appears diminished. A source close to the Kremlin describes Assad as “irrelevant” to President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s inner circle. Russia’s ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, has publicly confirmed that Assad is barred from any political or media activity, noting that while he is “safe and alive”, he “may live here but cannot engage in political activities”. The family’s initial months in Russia focused on the health of Asma al-Assad, the British-born former first lady, whose long-term leukaemia had become critical. According to a source familiar with her case, she has since recovered following experimental treatment overseen by Russian security services. With her condition stabilised, Assad has reportedly prepared interviews with Kremlin-backed broadcaster RT and a prominent rightwing American podcaster, though Russian authorities have yet to permit any public appearance. The couple’s children appear to be adapting more visibly to their new surroundings. Leaked data and eyewitness accounts indicate they have embraced the lifestyle of Moscow’s upper class, frequenting luxury boutiques, beauty salons and elite gyms. The only public sighting of the family together – without Bashar – came at daughter Zein al-Assad’s graduation in June from MGIMO, the prestigious Moscow university that trains much of Russia’s diplomatic corps. Witnesses say the family kept a low profile and left quickly, avoiding the stage photographs other families took. Hafez al-Assad, once widely viewed as Bashar’s heir apparent, has largely disappeared from public view after a February Telegram video in which he defended the family’s flight from Damascus and insisted Moscow ordered their departure. Syrian social media users promptly geolocated him on the streets of Moscow. Since then, he has shut down most public accounts and reportedly uses pseudonyms online. Leaked flight records suggest the UAE remains a favoured destination for the Assad children, who travel regularly between Abu Dhabi and Moscow. The family had hoped to relocate there permanently, but sources say even the UAE – known for sheltering controversial figures – is reluctant to host a deposed leader whose rule left more than 620,000 dead and nearly 14 million displaced. As rebels circulated intimate photos from abandoned Assad residences – including images of a young Bashar in underwear and swimming – the carefully maintained image of the aloof, unshakeable ruler gave way to glimpses of an unexpectedly private man. Yet, as analyst Kamal Alam notes, even after the regime’s fall, the family remains intensely secretive. For Syrians who endured 14 years of war and repression, the reality of Assad’s quiet exile in Moscow underscores a final, bitter reversal: the dictator survived his downfall, but only as a sidelined figure living under the protection, and control, of the Kremlin.  Photo: The Guardian

  Four members of Syria’s Road Security Administration were killed and another wounded in an ambush on a security patrol in Idlib province, northwestern Syria, amid a growing wave of attacks claimed by the Islamic State group (IS or ISIS).   The Syrian Ministry of Interior said the patrol came under fire on the road to Maarrat al-Numan in southern Idlib on Sunday, 14 December, without initially naming those responsible. A correspondent for the independent Syrian outlet Enab Baladi reported that unknown assailants targeted the patrol near Idlib city’s southern bridge, causing multiple deaths and injuries (Enab Baladi, 14 December 2025). Specialized security units subsequently launched intensive sweep operations in the surrounding area in an attempt to track down the perpetrators, according to the ministry. Enab Baladi said it had obtained the names of the dead officers and photographs of their bodies but declined to publish them out of respect for the victims and their families.   On Monday, 15 December, IS claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement posted on its “Sah al-Wagha” outlet, which the group uses for official announcements. It said its fighters ambushed and killed four personnel it described as “apostates” affiliated with Syria’s Ministry of Interior in southern Idlib, referring to the location as part of what it calls “Wilayat al-Sham, Idlib.” The group’s claim followed the Syrian Interior Ministry’s earlier decision not to attribute the attack to any party.   The ambush comes against the backdrop of a broader escalation in IS operations across areas controlled by the Syrian government and its allies. On 13 December, IS said it attacked a Ministry of Interior security post in the Palmyra desert in eastern Homs governorate, claiming it had targeted both American and Syrian personnel stationed there.   The group has also claimed responsibility for several attacks on security and government-linked figures in recent weeks. On 4 December, it said it ambushed a customs police patrol escorting a transit truck in al-Zarbah, in the southern Aleppo countryside, killing two customs officers. On 9 December, IS announced it had killed a judicial official by detonating a sticky bomb attached to his car in Deir Hassan, in the northern Idlib countryside.   In a separate set of operations on 28 November, IS said it carried out two assassinations in Homs and Hama. Through “Sah al-Wagha,” the group claimed its fighters shot and killed a former regime candidate and wounded a member of the current government in Hama’s al-Tattan neighborhood. It also said its militants used automatic weapons to kill a former member of what it called “Rafidite militias” in the village of al-Mazra’a in Homs countryside.   IS additionally reported three attacks in what it refers to as “Wilayat al-Khayr” (Deir Ezzor governorate). The group claimed it killed a man it described as a government “spy” in al-Bukamal on 27 November, alleging he had previously served with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) before switching sides and using his work selling car spare parts to monitor and report on IS activity. It also said it had targeted two SDF members in separate incidents in the same region.   Syrian security services have responded with a series of raids in Idlib province targeting suspected IS cells. Earlier in December, the Interior Ministry announced two operations in cooperation with the General Intelligence Service, one in the Dana area near the Turkish border and another west of Idlib city. According to Brigadier General Ghassan Bakir, head of Internal Security in Idlib, the raids led to the seizure of weapons, ammunition, suicide vests, and ready-to-use explosive devices.   Two suspects were killed after “refusing to surrender,” while other alleged cell members were arrested. Initial investigations linked some detainees to the killing and secret burial of a civilian near Maarrat Misrin, north of Idlib city. The ministry said the detainees had been referred to the competent judicial authorities and vowed to continue security operations aimed at “drying up the group’s sources” and curbing IS activity in areas under its control. Photo: Enab Baladi

As the open-ended war in Gaza persists and tensions in the Red Sea reach new heights, a fierce debate has engulfed the Middle East regarding the future of non-state armed groups. From Baghdad to Beirut, intensifying international pressure to confine weaponry to state authority is colliding head-on with the firm insistence of factions aligned with the "Axis of Resistance." For these groups, maintaining independent arsenals is no longer a tactical choice but an existential necessity amidst what they perceive as unchecked aggression. According to a detailed analysis published by Shafaq News on Sunday, this geopolitical tug-of-war has exposed deep strategic fractures across the region. The outlet reports that diverging views on disarmament have emerged following sustained US pressure on the governments of Iraq and Lebanon. While Western powers frame disarmament as a prerequisite for regional stability, the armed factions view their weapons as the only viable guarantee against external threats, rejecting the notion of their arsenals being negotiable assets. The complexity of the situation was highlighted by Ghazi Qansou, Dean of the College of Islamic Studies at the Islamic University of Lebanon, who provided a comparative framework for the resistance groups. Qansou identified Yemen’s Ansarallah movement (the Houthis) as the most "intransigent force" in the current landscape. Having transitioned from an insurgency to a de facto sovereign authority controlling Sanaa, the Houthis have engaged in direct military confrontation with US and British forces. Consequently, Qansou argues that disarming the group is "nearly impossible," as their weaponry has become an integral component of their governing authority. Hezbollah and Hamas occupy a middle ground of "strategic defiance." Hezbollah maintains a long-term deterrence equation against Israel, which Qansou warns would collapse if disarmament were enforced without the Lebanese state assuming a central defense role. Similarly, Ali Baraka, Head of National Relations for Hamas, told reporters that demanding disarmament is illogical while "Israeli attacks on Gaza persist." Baraka cited the failure of Israel to honor the Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire agreement from October 10 as proof that abandoning weapons would be premature. At the other end of the spectrum lie Iraq’s armed factions, which analysts view as the most susceptible to pressure due to their partial integration into state structures. While full disarmament remains unrealistic, experts suggest there is room for "restructuring" within the framework of the Iraqi state. However, Iraqi analyst Saeed Al-Badri warned that factions might opt for confrontation if pressed too hard, viewing their arms as the last line of defense against "Israeli-American domination projects." In stark contrast to the resistance narrative, Hussein Al-Deek, a specialist at the University of Haifa, indicated that a US-European-Arab consensus is crystallizing to end the era of "non-state actors." He warned that if political understandings fail, military force may be the next step to eliminate weapons outside state control. Ultimately, the region remains trapped in a dangerous paradox. International actors demand disarmament to stop the war, while armed factions refuse to disarm because the war continues. With trust deeply eroded and security guarantees absent, the gap between external demands and internal realities is widening, leaving the prospect of a demilitarized Middle East as a distant, if not impossible, ambition.  Photo: Shafaq News

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Syria has entered a period of profound political transformation, with decentralisation re-emerging as a focal point of competing visions for the country's future governance. Recent remarks by U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barak at the Doha Forum have thrust this contentious issue back into the spotlight, drawing sharp reactions from analysts and researchers across the region. According to The Syrian Observer, Barak stated that "decentralisation has not succeeded in the Middle East and will not succeed in Syria"—a comment widely interpreted as signalling Washington's preference for strong central authority as a means of achieving rapid stability and avoiding a repeat of the Iraqi experience. Political researcher Abdullah al-Kheir argued that the United States has adopted a firm position against political decentralisation or federalism in Syria, asserting that Barak's comments reflect a strategic orientation rather than a personal view. Analysts suggest this position reflects the broader approach of President Donald Trump's second administration while aligning with Turkish interests that firmly oppose any form of political autonomy for minorities. International relations researcher Firas Alawi offered a nuanced reading of Barak's remarks, arguing they were primarily directed at political decentralisation in the sense of federalism. Speaking to Ultra Syria, Alawi explained that administrative decentralisation, which already exists in limited form, could contribute to preserving Syria's territorial unity. By contrast, he described political decentralisation as historically and economically unviable in a country marked by deep population intermixing and integrated resource networks. Alawi pointed to Iraq's failure to manage relations between the centre and peripheries as a cautionary example, adding that the absence of strong central authority during Syria's current transition heightens the risk of internal conflict. Writer and researcher Dr Basel Marawi similarly argued that decentralisation is not a prerequisite for state success, noting that many stable and prosperous countries rely on highly centralised systems. He emphasised that Syria's transitional phase requires a strong central government capable of unifying decision-making, particularly in times of crisis. Marawi warned that implementing decentralisation at this stage could result in a dysfunctional sectarian system resembling those of Iraq or Lebanon. He cautioned against quota-based arrangements that ultimately divide society into antagonistic components, advocating instead for inclusive national partnership. However, al-Kheir warned that Washington's stance risks facilitating a return to centralised authoritarianism. He proposed that Syria could develop its own model of administrative and developmental decentralisation while maintaining centralised control over sovereign decision-making, suggesting practical measures such as establishing a national revenue-distribution fund and integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces into the national army under temporary international supervision. A broad consensus has emerged among experts that political decentralisation is ill-suited to Syria's current conditions, while administrative decentralisation may represent a realistic transitional option—provided it is preceded by the restoration of strong central authority.

Members of the all-female Turkish music group Manifest and collaborating artist Ayça Dalaklı, known professionally as AYDEED, have been handed suspended prison sentences of three months and 22 days each on charges of "indecent acts through exhibitionism" following their concert performance earlier this year. According to Turkish news outlet T24, the Istanbul 49th Criminal Court of First Instance issued the ruling after reviewing footage from the group's 18+ concert held at Küçükçiftlik Park in September. The court opted to defer the announcement of the verdict, a legal mechanism that effectively suspends the sentence provided the defendants do not commit similar offenses within a specified period. Additionally, the judicial travel ban that had been imposed on the artists was lifted. The case involves Manifest members Esin Bahat, Hilal Yelekli, Lidya Pınar, Sueda Uluca, Zeynep Sude Oktay, and Mina Solak, alongside guest performer Dalaklı. The court reached its decision based solely on documentary evidence without requiring the accused to appear before the judge. In its written reasoning, the court described the performers' stage movements as constituting criminal behavior under Article 225/1 of the Turkish Penal Code. The ruling specifically cited "dance figures where two singers made contact in an embracing manner evoking sexual intercourse," performers "bending over with their backs to the audience while making gestures toward sexual areas over their clothing," and "hand movements reminiscent of touching another person's genital region." The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office had initially filed an indictment seeking up to one year of imprisonment for the artists, alleging that their dance choreography was "sexual in nature," "damaging to public morality and privacy," and "openly accessible to many people including children." The September concert attracted approximately 12,000 attendees and sparked immediate controversy on social media. Within days of the performance, authorities announced they had launched an investigation into potential exhibitionism and indecency charges. The prosecution's approach drew criticism from legal experts at the time. Attorney Ekin Baltaş, Secretary of the Istanbul Bar Association Women's Rights Center, had previously told T24 that applying such charges to stage performances was legally unprecedented. "Looking at this legally, applying these articles to stage performance is impossible," Baltaş stated. "Freedom of expression and artistic freedom are constitutional rights. No legal regulation can supersede constitutional rights." Baltaş had expressed confidence that conviction was unlikely, noting that courts have historically issued acquittals in similar cases involving women accused of indecency based solely on their appearance or clothing. "I believe it is nearly impossible for these female artists to receive punishment from this," she had said. The deferred verdict means the artists avoid immediate imprisonment but remain under judicial supervision. Should they be convicted of similar offenses during the deferral period, the original sentence could be activated. The case has reignited debate in Turkey regarding artistic freedom, women's rights, and the application of public morality laws to performance art. Photo: T24

Του Ναμίκ Ταν Δύο κυρίαρχες αφηγήσεις κυκλοφορούν διαρκώς στην Τουρκία. Αλληλοσυμπλέκονται και αλληλοτροφοδοτούνται. Και οι δύο υποστηρίζουν ότι η χώρα, υπό τη διακυβέρνηση Ερντογάν —ιδίως μετά τη μετάβαση στο «αλά τούρκα» προεδρικό σύστημα— απογειώθηκε. Σύμφωνα με αυτή τη λογική, η Τουρκία πλέον στέκεται όρθια, η φωνή της ακούγεται και, όποτε το κρίνει αναγκαίο, ενεργεί μονομερώς. Ποιες είναι αυτές οι αφηγήσεις; Η πρώτη υποστηρίζει ότι στην αμυντική βιομηχανία σημειώθηκε εξαιρετική πρόοδος προς την αυτάρκεια, ικανή να ανταποκριθεί στην εποχή της παγκόσμιας τεχνολογικής επανάστασης. Η δεύτερη ισχυρίζεται ότι οι πολιτικές Ερντογάν στην εξωτερική πολιτική και την εθνική ασφάλεια είναι επιτυχημένες και επαινούνται από ευρύτατα κοινωνικά στρώματα, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της αντιπολίτευσης. Αυτή η διπλή αφήγηση προϋποθέτει ότι η Τουρκία, καθώς αφήνει πίσω της τα εκατό χρόνια της Δημοκρατίας, βρίσκεται στο κατώφλι —ή έχει ήδη κατακτήσει— τη «στρατηγική αυτονομία». Με άλλα λόγια, ενώ είναι προφανές ότι η Τουρκία κακοδιοικείται σχεδόν σε κάθε τομέα, τουλάχιστον σε αυτά τα ζητήματα κάνει τις σωστές επιλογές. Κατά κάποιο τρόπο, τα βήματα που γίνονται για την επιβίωση αποτελούν το αναγκαίο «τίμημα» της γενικότερης παρακμής. Η πραγματικότητα όμως είναι διαφορετική. Και δεν θα μπορούσε να είναι αλλιώς. Το ζήτημα είναι πολυσύνθετο: όταν η οικονομία, η δημοκρατία, η δικαιοσύνη και η παιδεία καταρρέουν, όταν η χώρα μένει πίσω από την εποχή της και απομακρύνεται από τον πολιτισμό, δεν είναι ούτε εφικτό ούτε λογικό να «πετάξει» στην εθνική ασφάλεια ή την αμυντική βιομηχανία. Είναι αλήθεια ότι φέτος πέντε τουρκικές εταιρείες εισήλθαν στη λίστα των 100 μεγαλύτερων αμυντικών βιομηχανιών του κόσμου: TUSAŞ, BAYKAR, ASELSAN, HAVELSAN και MKE. Όπως φαίνεται, πλην της BAYKAR, όλες είναι δημόσιες. Πίσω από αυτή την επιτυχία και τη συνέργεια υπάρχει ένας σχεδιασμός με ρίζες δεκαετιών, που φθάνει μέχρι την επιχείρηση «Αττίλας» του 1974. Αυτό που συμβαίνει σήμερα είναι η εκτόξευση της γεωπολιτικής αξίας της Τουρκίας —δηλαδή της θέσης της στον χάρτη— λόγω ευνοϊκών συγκυριών. Μια αξία που επισκιάζει τις αρχές, τα ιδεώδη, τα δικαιώματα και τις ελευθερίες, σπρώχνοντάς τα στο περιθώριο. Το καθεστώς αυτό —άλλοτε οπορτουνιστικό, άλλοτε κολακευτικό, άλλοτε φιλικό προς τη Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα ή πανισλαμιστικό— βλέπει την παρούσα κατάσταση ως «θείο δώρο». Ωστόσο, το ίδιο καθεστώς επιδεικνύει και την «ευελιξία» να προσποιείται ότι δεν βρίσκεται «εδώ και τώρα». Για παράδειγμα, η Συρία στον νότο είναι διαρκώς στην ατζέντα και η Τουρκία δήθεν εμπλέκεται. Για την Ουκρανία στον βορρά όμως αρκείται να παρακολουθεί από απόσταση και να σκέφτεται δυνατά. Ενώ το γεγονός ότι η γειτονική Ιράν βρίσκεται ένα βήμα πριν αποκτήσει πυρηνικά όπλα δεν εμφανίζεται καν στο ραντάρ των υπαρξιακών απειλών. Ομοίως, δεν υπάρχει ενδιαφέρον για το περιεχόμενο των τελικών ανακοινώσεων που υπογράφονται στις συνόδους κορυφής του ΝΑΤΟ. Εν μέσω οικονομικής κρίσης και δήθεν πολιτικών λιτότητας, η Τουρκία αναλαμβάνει τη φιλοξενία μιας τέτοιας συνόδου με κόστος δισεκατομμυρίων δολαρίων, για λόγους υποτιθέμενου κύρους. Σε αυτό το «αλά τούρκα» καθεστώς, ο ένας άνθρωπος έχει απόλυτη εξουσία αλλά καμία ευθύνη. Τίποτα δεν γίνεται με σχέδιο, αλλά σε κάθε ζήτημα υιοθετείται η προσέγγιση «ό,τι με συμφέρει». Σαν στο έγγραφο οράματος να αναγράφεται «το καραβάνι φτιάχνεται στον δρόμο» και στη δήλωση αποστολής «πού είναι το δικό μου συμφέρον;». Κατά συνέπεια: Δεν είναι μυστικό ότι η ρουσφετολογία στις προμήθειες αμυντικού υλικού αποτελεί πάγια πρακτική. Αποσιωπάται ότι η Ιταλία, μία από τις τέσσερις χώρες που παράγουν τα Eurofighter, είχε προσκαλέσει την Τουρκία στην παραγωγική αλυσίδα ήδη από το 2005. Η πρόσκληση απορρίφθηκε με το αιτιολογικό ότι προτιμήθηκαν τα F-35. Δεν διευκρινίζεται αν το υψηλό κόστος των Eurofighter οφείλεται σε αναγκαιότητα ή σε πρόσθετα στοιχεία, όπως τα πυραυλικά συστήματα αέρος-αέρος Meteor ή η πρόσβαση σε υπολογιστές αποστολής και μεταφορά υψηλής τεχνολογίας. Δεν αναφέρεται ότι ο διαγωνισμός αεράμυνας δόθηκε αρχικά στην Κίνα, ότι απορρίφθηκαν οι αμερικανικοί Patriot παρά την προσφερόμενη μεταφορά τεχνολογίας, ότι δεν εγκρίθηκε το ευρωπαϊκό σύστημα SAMP-T, και τελικά —με εντελώς αυθαίρετο τρόπο— αγοράστηκαν τα S-400, με αποτέλεσμα την αποβολή της Τουρκίας από το πρόγραμμα παραγωγής των F-35. Σήμερα, ο Αμερικανός πρέσβης Τομ Μπάρακ επιβάλλει ανοιχτά τον όρο ότι η Τουρκία «δεν μπορεί ούτε να κατέχει ούτε να χρησιμοποιεί» τα S-400, όπως προβλέπει και ο αμερικανικός αμυντικός προϋπολογισμός. Αυτή η παρέμβαση του Μπάρακ —τον οποίο ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Χακάν Φιντάν επαινεί με κάθε ευκαιρία— γίνεται ανεκτή, όπως και άλλες προκλητικές ενέργειες που πλήττουν την εθνική κυριαρχία. Αποκρύπτεται ότι για το πρόγραμμα KAAN (παλαιότερα TF-X MMU) δεν έγιναν εγκαίρως οι απαραίτητες παραγγελίες κινητήρων F-110 της αμερικανικής General Electric. Η εξαγωγή της κορβέτας TCG Akhisar στη Ρουμανία παρουσιάζεται ως επιτυχία, ενώ αποσιωπάται ότι το πλοίο κατασκευάστηκε για το τουρκικό Πολεμικό Ναυτικό, ότι υπάρχουν παρόμοια προβλήματα με αυτά της Πολεμικής Αεροπορίας, και δεν τίθεται το ερώτημα αν η πώληση οφείλεται στα άδεια ταμεία. Παρουσιάζεται ως επιτυχία η εγκατάσταση ραντάρ AESA στο μη επανδρωμένο αεροσκάφος Kızılelma της BAYKAR και η προσομοίωση κατάρριψης F-16 αέρος-αέρος. Δεν αναφέρεται όμως ότι το γειτονικό Αζερμπαϊτζάν έχει ήδη τοποθετήσει ραντάρ AESA σε κινεζικά μαχητικά που αγόρασε από το Πακιστάν, ενώ η Τουρκία δεν έχει φτάσει ακόμη σε αυτό το στάδιο με τα δικά της F-16. Δεν συζητείται ότι μέχρι το 2040 οι αεροπορίες γειτονικών χωρών θα διαθέτουν Rafale και F-35, ενώ η Τουρκία έχει χάσει εδώ και καιρό την απόλυτη περιφερειακή αποτρεπτική ισχύ που αποτελεί τον κύριο άξονα της αεράμυνάς της, εξαιτίας αυτών ακριβώς των λανθασμένων πολιτικών. Δεν αναλύεται ότι οι ΗΠΑ, υπό την πίεση του Ισραήλ, θα πουλήσουν στη Σαουδική Αραβία την εξαγωγική έκδοση των F-35. Η λογική του προγράμματος F-35 βασίζεται στο να διαθέτουν όλες οι συμμετέχουσες χώρες το ίδιο αεροσκάφος, λειτουργώντας ως δίκτυο. Ακόμη κι αν η Τουρκία καταφέρει κάποτε στο μακρινό μέλλον να αποκτήσει F-35, θα έχει ήδη υποβαθμιστεί στην κατηγορία χωρών εκτός ΝΑΤΟ, όπως η Σαουδική Αραβία. Αποκρύπτεται ότι το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των προϊόντων της τουρκικής αμυντικής βιομηχανίας βρίσκεται ακόμη σε στάδιο πρωτοτύπου, και ότι η μαζική παραγωγή είναι εντελώς διαφορετική υπόθεση. Δεν εξετάζεται το ενδεχόμενο ότι, ακόμη κι αν ξεκινήσει η μαζική παραγωγή, οι εξαγωγές θα είναι δύσκολες λόγω έλλειψης χρηματοδότησης. Οι ανταγωνιστές χρηματοδοτούν τις πωλήσεις τους μέσω δικών τους τραπεζών, ενώ η Τουρκία δεν διαθέτει χρηματοπιστωτικά ιδρύματα τέτοιου μεγέθους. Χωρίς εξαγωγές, η αμυντική βιομηχανία δεν μπορεί να επιβιώσει και οι ανάγκες των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων δεν μπορούν να καλυφθούν με βιώσιμο τρόπο. Δεν τίθεται ποτέ το ερώτημα γιατί στα περίπου 25 χρόνια πριν από τη διακυβέρνηση Ερντογάν προστέθηκαν περίπου 400 αεροσκάφη στην Πολεμική Αεροπορία, ενώ στα 23 χρόνια της δικής του θητείας προστέθηκαν μόλις 30. Μέσα σε αυτή την αλυσίδα αντιφάσεων, λαθών και ελλείψεων, η Τουρκία αναγκάζεται διαρκώς να αναζητά λύσεις που απλώς σώζουν τη στιγμή. Τα μη επανδρωμένα αεροσκάφη Kızılelma προσπαθούν να υποκαταστήσουν τα F-16. Μέτρα όπως η αναγκαστική αγορά Eurofighter είναι πάντα παρηγορητικά —δηλαδή απλά μπαλώματα. Επιπλέον, χάνονται ιστορικές ευκαιρίες, όπως η διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ με τη Σουηδία και τη Φινλανδία. Η γεωπολιτική αξία που αναδύεται αυθόρμητα δεν αξιοποιείται σε τέτοιες στιγμές για διπλωματική πίεση ή πειθώ. Δεν μετατρέπεται σε απτά οφέλη —ούτε για κατάργηση της βίζας προς την ΕΕ, ούτε για σχετική επίλυση εκκρεμών ζητημάτων στην αμυντική βιομηχανία. Εν τω μεταξύ, η πρόσφατη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας (NSS) των ΗΠΑ αποτελεί την υλοποίηση της ανησυχητικής ομιλίας του Αντιπροέδρου Τζ. Ντ. Βανς στη Διάσκεψη Ασφαλείας του Μονάχου τον περασμένο Φεβρουάριο. Η παρένθεση 80 ετών κλείνει. Το έγγραφο αντιμετωπίζει την ΕΕ και την ευρωπαϊκή ιδέα ως αντίπαλο, ενώ σχεδόν δεν αναφέρει τη Ρωσία ή την Κίνα. Οι «αρχιτέκτονες» της υποτιθέμενης επιτυχίας στην εθνική ασφάλεια και την αμυντική βιομηχανία της Άγκυρας θα υποδεχθούν ευχαρίστως αυτή την εξέλιξη και θα κοιμηθούν ήσυχοι. Ο Τραμπ έχει στρέψει το βλέμμα του στα δεσμευμένα ρωσικά περιουσιακά στοιχεία στις Βρυξέλλες (EuroClear), τα οποία οι ισχυρότερες χώρες της ΕΕ επιθυμούν να χρησιμοποιήσουν για τη στήριξη της Ουκρανίας, με σκοπό τις δικές του επενδυτικές συνεργασίες. Παρομοίως, ο Ερντογάν θα χαρεί με το ξανάνοιγμα της πόρτας προς τη Ρωσία, θα εκτιμήσει ότι η ΕΕ θα τον χρειάζεται σε θέματα όπως το κοινό αμυντικό ταμείο SAFE, και δεν θα ανησυχήσει που το μέλλον της ΕΕ —ακόμη και του ΝΑΤΟ— τίθεται υπό αμφισβήτηση. Ωστόσο, η θεσμική αγκύρωση και ο ιστορικός προσανατολισμός της Τουρκίας είναι ξεκάθαροι. Το Κογκρέσο εξισορροπεί το συγκεκριμένο έγγραφο NSS με τον νόμο NDAA, δηλαδή τον αμυντικό προϋπολογισμό. Το ίδιο Κογκρέσο, πέραν του NDAA, συνεχίζει να υψώνει τείχη μπροστά στα αναγκαία βήματα για την εθνική άμυνα της Τουρκίας μέσω του νόμου CAATSA. Ο Τραμπ μπορεί να ρισκάρει σύγκρουση με το Κογκρέσο σε ζητήματα που τον συμφέρουν. Τα αμυντικά συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας όμως δεν ανήκουν σε αυτά. Η «εργασία» που ο Τραμπ έχει αναθέσει στον Ερντογάν για να ξεπεράσει το εμπόδιο του Κογκρέσου είναι η αποκατάσταση των σχέσεων με το Ισραήλ του Νετανιάχου. Ο φάκελος της Συρίας περιλαμβάνεται στο ίδιο μενού. Συμπερασματικά, στη σχεδόν 25ετή διακυβέρνηση Ερντογάν, η αμυντική βιομηχανία, η εθνική ασφάλεια και η εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας συνεχίζουν να παρασύρονται χωρίς σχέδιο, πρόγραμμα, πρόβλεψη ή σύνεση. Πέρα από τις ανοιχτές συγκρούσεις στην περιφέρειά της, οι αβεβαιότητες και οι προκλήσεις έχουν οξυνθεί στο έπακρο και σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο. Η Τουρκία εισέρχεται σε αυτή την τέλεια καταιγίδα —χάρη στην «παγκόσμια ηγεσία» του Ερντογάν— χωρίς τιμόνι, με αβέβαιο προορισμό και εντελώς απροετοίμαστη. * Το παρόν άρθρο γνώμης του πρώην Τούρκου διπλωμάτη Ναμίκ Ταν δημοσιεύτηκε για πρώτη φορά στις 13 Δεκεμβρίου 2025 στην τουρκική ενημερωτική ιστοσελίδα T24 και μεταφράστηκε στα ελληνικά για τους αναγνώστες του TLF. Φωτογραφία: Wikipedia  

Tensions between Syria's interim government and local factions in the predominantly Druze province of Suwayda escalated over the weekend following repeated drone attacks on internal security forces, threatening fragile ceasefire arrangements in the southern region. According to Enab Baladi, local factions in Suwayda renewed attacks on internal security forces affiliated with Syria's Ministry of Interior on Saturday, December 13, targeting a security vehicle with an explosive-laden drone in the town of al-Mazraa in western Suwayda countryside. The attack followed a similar strike on Friday evening, marking the second assault within 24 hours. Qutaiba Azzam, head of the Public Relations Office in Suwayda Governorate, confirmed to the outlet that no security personnel were injured in the incidents. State-run al-Ikhbariya channel quoted a security source describing the attackers as "rebel gangs" and characterizing the drone strikes as repeated breaches of the Suwayda ceasefire agreement. The source warned that security forces would respond firmly to any future violations. The escalation comes amid mutual accusations between both sides. The National Guard, a local faction backed by Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, issued a statement on Friday accusing Syrian government forces of targeting civilians in al-Majdal with sniper fire. According to the group, one civilian was seriously wounded, requiring doctors to amputate his hand. The faction described the incident as "hostile, resentful, and terrorist" behavior threatening regional stability. Jordan is currently leading mediation efforts, coordinated with the United States, to resolve the ongoing crisis. A Jordanian source told Lebanese newspaper al-Modon that diplomatic visits between Syrian parties and Amman are ongoing, with current efforts focused on building confidence between Damascus and Sheikh al-Hijri. "The distance between Damascus and Suwayda is still wide, but what is certain is that mediation will succeed, especially since Washington is engaged in it," the source stated. The mediation is based on a road map announced in September following a trilateral meeting in Damascus between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, and U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack. The agreement outlined measures including international investigations into violations, humanitarian aid delivery, police deployment along key routes, and reconciliation meetings with local communities. Meanwhile, Mowafaq Tarif, spiritual leader of Israel's Druze community, urged Washington to protect Syrian minorities' rights, arguing that American support would render Israeli intervention in southern Syria unnecessary. Background Suwayda province, located in southern Syria bordering Jordan, is home to Syria's largest Druze population, a religious minority with communities spanning Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Since the fall of the Assad regime and the establishment of Syria's interim government, clashes have repeatedly erupted between local Druze factions seeking autonomy and central authorities in Damascus. The Druze community's cross-border ties, particularly with Israeli Druze who serve in the Israeli military, have created a complex dynamic. Israel has maintained interest in protecting Druze populations near its borders, with some analysts viewing the region as a potential flashpoint for broader regional intervention should violence escalate further.  Photo: Enab Baladi

Tensions between Syria's interim government and local factions in the predominantly Druze province of Suwayda escalated over the weekend fol...

Του Ναμίκ Ταν Δύο κυρίαρχες αφηγήσεις κυκλοφορούν διαρκώς στην Τουρκία. Αλληλοσυμπλέκονται και αλληλοτροφοδοτούνται. Και οι δύο υποστηρίζουν...

Tensions between Syria's interim government and local factions in the predominantly Druze province of Suwayda escalated over the weekend fol...

Λίγες ώρες μετά τη φονική ενέδρα του ISIS που στοίχισε τη ζωή σε δύο Αμερικανούς στρατιώτες και έναν πολίτη διερμηνέα, οι δυνάμεις του συνασπισμού υπό αμερικανική ηγεσία εξαπέλυσαν εκτεταμένες επιχειρήσεις συλλήψεων στην αρχαία πόλη της Παλμύρας αργά το βράδυ του Σαββάτου. Η κίνηση αυτή σηματοδότησε μια άμεση και αποφασιστική απάντηση σε μία από τις πιο αιματηρές επιθέσεις κατά Αμερικανών στη Συρία φέτος. Η Νυχτερινή Επιδρομή Σύμφωνα με πηγές που μίλησαν αποκλειστικά στο Syria TV, οι δυνάμεις του συνασπισμού, ενεργώντας σε συντονισμό με Σύρους αξιωματικούς ασφαλείας, συνέλαβαν τουλάχιστον τρία άτομα στην Παλμύρα κατά τη διάρκεια επιχειρήσεων που διήρκεσαν περίπου δύο ώρες. Οι δυνάμεις σάρωσαν τις συνοικίες Al-Wadi και Al-Jumhuriya, περιοχές που θεωρούνται καταφύγιο συμπαθούντων του ISIS και μελών κοιμώμενων πυρήνων. Πριν από την επιχείρηση, πραγματοποιήθηκε εντυπωσιακή επίδειξη ισχύος: Αμερικανικά αεροσκάφη έριξαν φωτοβολίδες πάνω από την Παλμύρα, φωτίζοντας την πόλη της ερήμου σαν να ήταν μέρα. Σύμφωνα με τη Wall Street Journal, που επικαλέστηκε υψηλόβαθμο Αμερικανό αξιωματούχο, η Ουάσιγκτον έστειλε δύο μαχητικά F-16 για πτήσεις σε χαμηλό ύψος πάνω από την πόλη. Το μήνυμα ήταν σαφές: η Αμερική δεν θα άφηνε την επίθεση αναπάντητη. Ο Πρόεδρος των ΗΠΑ Ντόναλτ Τραμπ, σχολιάζοντας την επίθεση, δήλωσε ότι ο μεταβατικός Σύρος Πρόεδρος Ahmed al-Sharaa είναι «εξαιρετικά οργισμένος» για την επίθεση στην έρημο και υποσχέθηκε σθεναρή ανταπόκριση. Η δήλωση αυτή υπογράμμισε τη στρατηγική εταιρική σχέση μεταξύ Ουάσιγκτον και της νέας συριακής ηγεσίας στην αντιμετώπιση της διαρκούς απειλής του ISIS στις απέραντες ερήμους της ανατολικής Συρίας. Τι Συνέβη στη Badiya; Σύμφωνα με το Πεντάγωνο, το Σάββατο μαχητές εξαπέλυσαν ένοπλη ενέδρα εναντίον Αμερικανικού προσωπικού που επιχειρούσε στην περιοχή της Παλμύρας, στην κεντρική έρημο της Συρίας γνωστή τοπικά ως Badiya. Δύο Αμερικανοί στρατιώτες και ένας πολίτης διερμηνέας έχασαν τη ζωή τους, ενώ τρεις ακόμη στρατιώτες τραυματίστηκαν. Η Κεντρική Διοίκηση των ΗΠΑ (CENTCOM) επιβεβαίωσε ότι οι Αμερικανικές δυνάμεις δέχθηκαν ενέδρα από πυρήνες του ISIS που δρουν στην έρημο. Η ανταλλαγή πυρών που ακολούθησε κατέληξε σε αυτές τις απώλειες, αποτελώντας σημαντική τακτική επιτυχία για την τρομοκρατική οργάνωση, παρά τη δραματική συρρίκνωση των εδαφών που ελέγχει. Σε μια αποκαλυπτική δήλωση, ο Nour al-Din al-Baba, εκπρόσωπος του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών της Συρίας, αποκάλυψε ότι η συριακή διοίκηση εσωτερικής ασφάλειας είχε προειδοποιήσει εκ των προτέρων τις Αμερικανικές δυνάμεις στην περιοχή Badiya για πιθανές διεισδύσεις ή επιθέσεις του ISIS. Ωστόσο, όπως τόνισε ο al-Baba, οι δυνάμεις του συνασπισμού «δεν έλαβαν υπόψη τις συριακές προειδοποιήσεις». Περιγράφοντας λεπτομερώς το περιστατικό, ο al-Baba εξήγησε ότι η επίθεση σημειώθηκε στην είσοδο στρατιωτικής εγκατάστασης στην έρημο της Παλμύρας, όπου ένας μαχητής του ISIS άνοιξε πυρ κατά του προσωπικού. Ο εκπρόσωπος φρόντισε να διευκρινίσει ότι ο δράστης δεν είχε καμία σύνδεση με την ηγεσία της Συριακής Εσωτερικής Ασφάλειας και δεν υπηρετούσε ως συνοδός κάποιου ανώτερου αξιωματούχου — μια διευκρίνιση που φαινόταν να αποσκοπεί στη διάλυση οποιασδήποτε υποψίας για εμπλοκή εκ των έσω. Η Ευρύτερη Εικόνα: Το ISIS Παραμένει Ενεργή Απειλή σε Τρεις Χώρες Η ενέδρα στην Παλμύρα δεν ήταν μεμονωμένο περιστατικό. Αξιολογήσεις πληροφοριών και δεδομένα παρακολούθησης των τελευταίων τριάντα ημερών αποκαλύπτουν ότι το ISIS παραμένει δραστήριο σε Συρία, Ιράκ και Τουρκία. Ωστόσο, το μοτίβο διαφέρει σημαντικά από τις μεγάλης κλίμακας εδαφικές κατακτήσεις της εποχής του χαλιφάτου: πρόκειται για μια χαμηλής έντασης εξέγερση με μικρές βομβιστικές επιθέσεις, ενέδρες, δολοφονίες και επιχειρήσεις υλικοτεχνικής υποστήριξης. Η Συρία συνεχίζει να καταγράφει την υψηλότερη συγκέντρωση δραστηριότητας του ISIS μεταξύ των τριών χωρών. Οι επιθέσεις είναι γεωγραφικά διάσπαρτες αλλά επίμονες. Ομάδες παρακολούθησης που καταγράφουν περιστατικά κοιμώμενων πυρήνων στη Βόρεια και Ανατολική Συρία κατέγραψαν 21 επιθέσεις του ISIS μόνο τον Νοέμβριο, με τις περισσότερες να συγκεντρώνονται στις επαρχίες Deir ez-Zor και Hasakah. Οι επιθέσεις αυτές είχαν ως αποτέλεσμα πολλαπλές στρατιωτικές απώλειες και τραυματισμούς, ενώ τα θύματα μεταξύ αμάχων παρέμειναν σχετικά περιορισμένα. Οι τακτικές που χρησιμοποιήθηκαν περιλαμβάνουν αυτοσχέδιους εκρηκτικούς μηχανισμούς (IED), στοχευμένες ένοπλες επιθέσεις και δολοφονίες μελών των Συριακών Δημοκρατικών Δυνάμεων (SDF) και τοπικών αξιωματούχων. Σύμφωνα με την Κεντρική Διοίκηση των ΗΠΑ, μεταξύ 1ης Οκτωβρίου και 6ης Νοεμβρίου πραγματοποιήθηκαν περισσότερες από 22 κοινές επιχειρήσεις κατά του ISIS στη Συρία, με αποτέλεσμα τον θάνατο πέντε μαχητών και τη σύλληψη 19. Αυτός ο επιχειρησιακός ρυθμός πιθανότατα συνεχίζεται, υπογραμμίζοντας τη συνεχιζόμενη προσπάθεια αποδυνάμωσης του ISIS, παρόλο που η οργάνωση διατηρεί την ικανότητά της να προκαλεί θανάτους. Το Ιράκ παρουσιάζει μια εικόνα υπολειμματικής εξέγερσης παρά ενεργού πολέμου, με το ISIS να περιορίζεται σε μεγάλο βαθμό σε αγροτικά καταφύγια. Η παρακολούθηση περιστατικών από ανοιχτές πηγές για το 2025 δείχνει σταθερή αλλά σημαντικά μειωμένη παρουσία του ISIS στο Ιράκ. Σποραδικές επιθέσεις συνεχίζονται, παράλληλα με συχνές αεροπορικές επιδρομές και επιχειρήσεις σάρωσης που στοχεύουν μικρούς πυρήνες σε περιοχές όπως οι οροσειρές Hamrin και Balkana, το Kirkuk, το Salah al-Din και η επαρχία Diyala. Πρόσφατες αξιολογήσεις του περιβάλλοντος ασφαλείας στο Ιράκ τονίζουν ότι το ISIS έχει υποβαθμιστεί σε κατάσταση «υπολειμμάτων», με τις Ιρακινές Δυνάμεις Ασφαλείας και τις Δυνάμεις Λαϊκής Κινητοποίησης να επικεντρώνονται σε επιχειρήσεις περιορισμού και περιοδικές επιδρομές αντί για μάχες υψηλής έντασης. Αξιοσημείωτο είναι ότι δεν υπάρχουν ενδείξεις μεγάλης κλίμακας επιθέσεων μαζικών απωλειών του ISIS στο Ιράκ τις τελευταίες τριάντα ημέρες — μόνο περιστατικά χαμηλού προφίλ και αντιτρομοκρατικές επιχειρήσεις. Τα Μυστικά Δίκτυα Επιβιώνουν, η Τουρκική Διάσταση Παρόλο που το χαλιφάτο έχει ηττηθεί εδαφικά, αναλύσεις για το Ιράκ της μετα-ISIS εποχής επισημαίνουν ότι η οργάνωση διατηρεί μυστικά δίκτυα ικανά να διεξάγουν επιθέσεις με IED, δολοφονίες και εκστρατείες εκφοβισμού — έστω και σε σημαντικά μικρότερη κλίμακα σε σύγκριση με προηγούμενα χρόνια. Η Τουρκία κατέχει μια μοναδική θέση στο τρέχον τοπίο απειλής του ISIS: δέχεται ελάχιστες άμεσες επιθέσεις, ενώ ταυτόχρονα λειτουργεί ως κρίσιμος κόμβος logistics και διέλευσης για την οργάνωση. Την τελευταία περίοδο δεν έχουν αναφερθεί ευρέως μεγάλης κλίμακας επιθέσεις του ISIS σε τουρκικό έδαφος. Ωστόσο, η Τουρκία παραμένει κεντρικής σημασίας για τις επιχειρήσεις διέλευσης και logistics που συνδέονται με το ISIS. Μια πρόσφατη τρομοκρατική υπόθεση στις ΗΠΑ αποκάλυψε ένα φερόμενο σχέδιο στο οποίο δύο άτομα σκόπευαν να συναντηθούν στο Diyarbakır και να χρησιμοποιήσουν παγιωμένες διαδρομές λαθρεμπορίου μέσω της νοτιοανατολικής Τουρκίας προς τη Συρία για να ενταχθούν στο ISIS. Υλικό δικαστικών υποθέσεων και σχόλια ειδικών περιγράφουν την Τουρκία ως διαρκή «βάση προετοιμασίας» και διάδρομο διέλευσης για συμπαθούντες του ISIS, ιδιαίτερα μέσω νοτιοανατολικών επαρχιών όπως το Diyarbakır, η Gaziantep, η Kilis και η Şanlıurfa. Αυτό το μοτίβο θυμίζει την περίοδο 2013-2017, όταν η Τουρκία αποτελούσε την κύρια πύλη εισόδου ξένων μαχητών στο χαλιφάτο, υποδηλώνοντας ότι τα δίκτυα διευκόλυνσης εξακολουθούν να υπάρχουν ακόμη και απουσία θεαματικών επιθέσεων εντός της Τουρκίας. Νωρίτερα το 2025, οι τουρκικές αρχές διεξήγαγαν μεγάλης κλίμακας επιχειρήσεις συλλήψεων υπόπτων μελών του ISIS σε πολλές επαρχίες. Δεν υπάρχει ένδειξη ότι αυτή η αντιτρομοκρατική στάση έχει χαλαρώσει· αντίθετα, το περιβάλλον χαρακτηρίζεται από συνεχή επιτήρηση, συλλήψεις και ματαιωμένα σχέδια παρά από επιτυχημένες ανοιχτές επιθέσεις. Στρατηγικές Επιπτώσεις Η επίθεση στην Παλμύρα και το ευρύτερο μοτίβο δραστηριότητας του ISIS στην περιοχή συνεπάγονται αρκετές στρατηγικές επιπτώσεις: 1. Η Badiya Παραμένει Ανεξέλεγκτη: Παρά τις πολυετείς στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις, η κεντρική έρημος της Συρίας συνεχίζει να παρέχει καταφύγιο σε πυρήνες του ISIS ικανούς να εξαπολύουν φονικές επιθέσεις ακόμη και κατά καλά εξοπλισμένων δυνάμεων του συνασπισμού. 2. Κενά στον Συντονισμό Πληροφοριών: Η αποκάλυψη του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών της Συρίας ότι οι προειδοποιήσεις αγνοήθηκαν υποδηλώνει πιθανές τριβές ή αποτυχίες επικοινωνίας μεταξύ συριακών και αμερικανικών υπηρεσιών ασφαλείας — μια ευπάθεια που το ISIS μπορεί να εκμεταλλευτεί. 3. Χαμηλή Ένταση, Υψηλή Επιμονή: Το ISIS έχει προσαρμοστεί στην εδαφική του ήττα υιοθετώντας μια κλασική ανταρτική στάση: μικρές επιθέσεις, στοχευμένες δολοφονίες και υπομονή. Αυτή η προσέγγιση απαιτεί λιγότερους πόρους ενώ διατηρεί την επιχειρησιακή σημασία της οργάνωσης. 4. Ο Διπλός Ρόλος της Τουρκίας: Η θέση της Άγκυρας τόσο ως εταίρου στην αντιτρομοκρατική δράση όσο και ως ακούσιου διαδρόμου διέλευσης για μαχητές του ISIS δημιουργεί διπλωματικές και επιχειρησιακές πολυπλοκότητες που η οργάνωση συνεχίζει να εκμεταλλεύεται. 5. Η Δέσμευση του Συνασπισμού Δοκιμάζεται: Οι αμερικανικές απώλειες αναπόφευκτα εγείρουν εσωτερικά πολιτικά ερωτήματα σχετικά με την παρουσία των ΗΠΑ στη Συρία, δημιουργώντας δυνητικά πιέσεις είτε για κλιμάκωση είτε για αποχώρηση — και οι δύο επιλογές ενέχουν σημαντικούς κινδύνους. Ενδεικτικές Ανοιχτές Πηγές [1] Institute for the Study of War - Χάρτης Καταγεγραμμένων Επιθέσεων ISIS (28 Νοεμβρίου - 9 Δεκεμβρίου 2025) [2] Rojava Information Center - Αναφορά Κοιμώμενων Πυρήνων, Νοέμβριος 2025 [3] Critical Threats Project - Ενημέρωση για το Ιράν, 4 Δεκεμβρίου 2025 [4] Nordic Monitor - Αποτυχημένο Σχέδιο ISIS Αποκαλύπτει τον Κεντρικό Ρόλο της Τουρκίας [5] Syria Weekly - Ενημέρωση Δεδομένων, 2-9 Δεκεμβρίου 2025 [6] U.S. Central Command - Δελτίο Τύπου για Επιχειρήσεις Αποδυνάμωσης του ISIS [7] Security Council Report - Μηνιαία Πρόβλεψη για τη Συρία, Δεκέμβριος 2025 [8] Forbes - Ανάλυση για τους Αμερικανούς Στρατιώτες που Σκοτώθηκαν στη Συρία [9] Χρονολόγιο του Ισλαμικού Κράτους (2025) [10] Χρονολόγιο της Ιρακινής Εξέγερσης (2025) [11] PRIF Blog - Αξιολόγηση Απειλής Daesh/ISIS 2025 [12] Relief Web - Παγκόσμιος Δείκτης Τρομοκρατίας 2025 [13] CSPS George Mason University - Ιρανική Επιρροή στο Ιράκ μετά το ISIS [14] Relief Web - Αντιτρομοκρατικές Επιχειρήσεις στην Τουρκία [15] UK Government - Κατάλογος Απαγορευμένων Τρομοκρατικών Οργανώσεων [16] Al Jazeera - Κάλυψη ISIL/ISIS *Αυτή η ανάλυση συντάχθηκε από πολλαπλές ροές πληροφοριών ανοιχτών πηγών, επίσημες κυβερνητικές δηλώσεις και περιφερειακούς οργανισμούς παρακολούθησης. Οι αριθμοί απωλειών και τα περιστατικά θα πρέπει να θεωρούνται κατά προσέγγιση εν αναμονή επίσημης επαλήθευσης.

Λίγες ώρες μετά τη φονική ενέδρα του ISIS που στοίχισε τη ζωή σε δύο Αμερικανούς στρατιώτες και έναν πολίτη διερμηνέα, οι δυνάμεις του συνασ...

İki ABD askeri ile bir sivil tercümanın hayatını kaybettiği kanlı IŞİD pususunun ardından, Amerikan öncülüğündeki koalisyon güçleri cumartesi akşamı geç saatlerde tarihi Palmira kentinde kapsamlı güvenlik operasyonları başlattı. Bu adım, yıl içinde Suriye'deki Amerikan personeline yönelik en ağır saldırılardan birine karşı hızlı ve sert bir yanıtın habercisiydi. Gece Baskını Syria TV'ye konuşan kaynaklara göre, koalisyon güçleri Suriyeli güvenlik birimleriyle koordineli şekilde yürüttüğü ve yaklaşık iki saat süren operasyonlarda Palmira'da en az üç kişiyi gözaltına aldı. Ekipler, IŞİD sempatizanlarına ve uyuyan hücre mensuplarına ev sahipliği yaptığı düşünülen Al-Wadi ile Al-Jumhuriya mahallelerini didik didik aradı. Operasyonun hemen öncesinde etkileyici bir güç gösterisi gerçekleştirildi: Amerikan uçakları Palmira'nın karanlık gökyüzüne aydınlatma fişekleri bırakarak çöl kentini gündüz gibi aydınlattı. Wall Street Journal'ın üst düzey bir ABD yetkilisine dayandırdığı habere göre Washington, Palmira semalarında alçak uçuş yapması için iki F-16 savaş uçağı sevk etti. Mesaj gayet açıktı: Amerika bu saldırıyı yanıtsız bırakmayacaktı. ABD Başkanı Donald Trump saldırıyla ilgili yaptığı açıklamada, Suriye Devlet Başkanı Ahmed al-Sharaa'nın çöldeki bu saldırı nedeniyle "son derece öfkeli" olduğunu belirterek kararlı bir karşılık verileceğinin sözünü verdi. Bu açıklama, Washington ile yeni Suriye yönetimi arasında ülkenin doğusundaki engin çöllerde kol gezen IŞİD tehdidine karşı örülen stratejik ortaklığı bir kez daha gözler önüne serdi. Badiye'de Neler Yaşandı? Pentagon'un açıklamasına göre cumartesi günü, yerel halkın Badiye olarak adlandırdığı Suriye'nin iç kesimlerindeki çöllük Palmira bölgesinde görev yapan ABD personeline militanlar silahlı pusu kurdu. Saldırıda iki Amerikan askeri ile bir sivil tercüman hayatını kaybederken üç asker yaralandı. Ek ayrıntılar paylaşan ABD Merkez Komutanlığı (CENTCOM), çölde faaliyet gösteren IŞİD hücrelerinin Amerikan güçlerine pusu kurduğunu teyit eder nitelikte. Çatışmadan bu kayıplarla çıkan terör örgütü, toprak hâkimiyetinin büyük ölçüde erimiş olmasına karşın önemli bir taktik başarı elde etmiş oldu. Suriye İçişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Nour al-Din al-Baba'nın dikkat çekici açıklamasına göre Suriye iç güvenlik komutanlığı, Badiye'de görev yapan Amerikan kuvvetlerini olası IŞİD sızmaları ve saldırıları konusunda önceden uyarmıştı. Ne var ki al-Baba'nın vurguladığı üzere koalisyon güçleri "bu uyarıları dikkate almadı." Olayın ayrıntılarını aktaran al-Baba, saldırının Palmira çölündeki bir askeri tesisin girişinde gerçekleştiğini ve bir IŞİD militanının personele ateş açtığını anlattı. Sözcü, saldırganın Suriye İç Güvenlik yapılanmasında herhangi bir komuta kademesiyle bağlantısı olmadığını ve üst düzey yetkililere refakat eden biri olmadığını özellikle belirtti. Bu açıklama, olayda içeriden birinin parmağı olduğu yönündeki şüpheleri bertaraf etmeye yönelikti. Büyük Resim: IŞİD, Üç Ülkede Canlı Bir Tehdit Olmayı Sürdürüyor Palmira pususu münferit bir olay değildi. Son otuz günlük istihbarat değerlendirmeleri ve izleme verileri, IŞİD'in Suriye, Irak ve Türkiye genelinde faaliyetlerini sürdürdüğünü ortaya koyuyor. Ancak tablo, hilafet döneminin büyük çaplı toprak fetihlerinden çok farklı: Küçük bombalı eylemler, pusular, suikastler ve lojistik operasyonlarla bezeli düşük yoğunluklu bir isyan söz konusu. Üç ülke arasında en yoğun IŞİD faaliyeti Suriye'de yaşanıyor. Saldırılar coğrafi olarak dağınık olmakla birlikte ısrarlı biçimde devam ediyor. Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye'deki uyuyan hücre faaliyetlerini izleyen gruplar, yalnızca Kasım ayında 21 IŞİD saldırısı tespit etti; bunların büyük bölümü Deir ez-Zor ve Haseke vilayetlerinde yoğunlaşmıştı. Saldırılarda çok sayıda askeri kayıp ve yaralanma yaşanırken sivil kayıplar nispeten sınırlı kaldı. Örgütün başvurduğu taktikler arasında el yapımı patlayıcılar (EYP), hedefli silahlı saldırılar ile Suriye Demokratik Güçleri (SDG) mensupları ve yerel yetkililere yönelik suikastler yer alıyor. ABD Merkez Komutanlığı verilerine göre 1 Ekim-6 Kasım arasında Suriye'de IŞİD'e karşı 22'den fazla ortak operasyon düzenlendi; bu operasyonlarda beş militan öldürülürken 19'u yakalandı. Bu operasyonel temponun şu an da sürdüğü tahmin ediliyor. Örgüt öldürücülüğünü korusa da kapasitesini aşındırmaya yönelik çabalar kararlılıkla devam ediyor. Irak'taki tablo ise aktif bir savaştan ziyade artık kalıntı düzeyine inmiş bir isyanı yansıtıyor; IŞİD büyük ölçüde kırsal sığınaklara sıkışmış durumda. 2025 açık kaynak olay takiplerine göre ülkedeki IŞİD varlığı istikrarlı ancak belirgin biçimde azalmış. Hamrin ve Balkana dağlarından Kerkük, Salahaddin ve Diyala vilayetlerine uzanan bölgelerde küçük hücrelere yönelik hava saldırıları ve güvenlik operasyonları aralıksız sürüyor. Son güvenlik değerlendirmeleri, IŞİD'in Irak'ta "kalıntı" konumuna gerilediğini vurguluyor. Irak Güvenlik Kuvvetleri ve Haşdi Şabi, yüksek yoğunluklu çatışmalar yerine çevreleme operasyonları ve periyodik baskınlara odaklanmış durumda. Dikkat çekici olan nokta şu: Son otuz gün içinde Irak'ta büyük çaplı bir IŞİD saldırısına dair iz yok; sadece düşük profilli olaylar ve terörle mücadele operasyonları gündemde. Gizli Ağlar Ayakta, Türkiye Boyutu Kritik Sözde hilafet devleti toprak olarak çökmüş olsa da IŞİD sonrası Irak'a odaklanan analizler, örgütün EYP saldırıları, suikastler ve yıldırma kampanyaları yürütebilecek gizli ağlarını koruduğuna işaret ediyor. Ölçek önceki yıllara kıyasla küçülmüş olsa da tehdit sürüyor. Türkiye, güncel IŞİD tehdit haritasında kendine özgü bir yerde duruyor: Doğrudan saldırılara en az maruz kalan ülke olmasına karşın örgüt için hayati bir lojistik ve geçiş merkezi işlevi görüyor. Son dönemde Türkiye topraklarında kamuoyuna yansıyan büyük çaplı bir IŞİD saldırısı yaşanmadı. Ancak ülke, IŞİD bağlantılı transit ve lojistik faaliyetler açısından kilit önemini koruyor. ABD'de görülen yakın tarihli bir terör davası, iki kişinin Diyarbakır'da buluşarak güneydoğu Türkiye'den Suriye'ye uzanan köklü kaçakçılık güzergâhlarını kullanıp IŞİD saflarına katılmayı planladığını ortaya koydu. Dava dosyaları ve uzman yorumları, Türkiye'yi IŞİD sempatizanları için "hazırlık üssü" ve geçiş koridoru olarak tanımlıyor. Özellikle Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis ve Şanlıurfa gibi güneydoğu illeri bu ağların odak noktası. Bu örüntü, Türkiye'nin yabancı savaşçıların hilafete akını için ana kapı olduğu 2013-2017 dönemini çağrıştırıyor. Ülke içinde gösterişli saldırılar olmasa bile kolaylaştırıcı ağların varlığını sürdürdüğü anlaşılıyor. 2025'in başlarında Türk makamları çok sayıda ilde şüpheli IŞİD üyelerine yönelik geniş çaplı operasyonlar düzenledi. Bu kararlı terörle mücadele tutumunun gevşediğine dair bir işaret yok; aksine gözetim, gözaltılar ve engellenen komplolar gündemin değişmez maddeleri. Başarılı eylemlerden çok, engellenen girişimler ön plana çıkıyor. Stratejik Değerlendirme Palmira saldırısı ve bölge genelindeki IŞİD faaliyet örüntüsü birkaç önemli stratejik sonuç doğuruyor: 1. Badiye Denetimsiz Kalmaya Devam Ediyor: Yıllara yayılan askeri harekâtlara karşın Suriye'nin iç çölü, en donanımlı koalisyon birliklerine bile ölümcül darbeler vurabilen IŞİD hücrelerine sığınak olmayı sürdürüyor. 2. İstihbarat Paylaşımında Boşluklar: Suriye İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın uyarıların dikkate alınmadığı açıklaması, Suriye ve ABD güvenlik servisleri arasındaki olası sürtüşmelere ya da iletişim aksaklıklarına işaret ediyor. Bu, IŞİD'in fırsat kollayabileceği bir zafiyet. 3. Düşük Yoğunluk, Yüksek Sabır: IŞİD, toprak kaybının ardından klasik bir gerilla stratejisine yöneldi: Küçük eylemler, hedefli suikastler ve sabırla bekleme. Bu yaklaşım daha az kaynak gerektirirken örgütü oyunda tutuyor. 4. Türkiye'nin Çift Yönlü Konumu: Ankara'nın hem terörle mücadele ortağı hem de farkında olmadan IŞİD militanlarına geçiş koridoru sunması, örgütün istismar ettiği diplomatik ve operasyonel karmaşıklıklar yaratıyor. 5. Koalisyonun Kararlılığı Sınanıyor: Amerikan kayıpları kaçınılmaz olarak ABD'nin Suriye'deki varlığını sorgulatıyor ve tırmanma ya da çekilme yönünde iç baskı oluşturuyor. Her iki seçenek de ciddi riskler barındırıyor. Bazı Açık Kaynak Referansları [1] Institute for the Study of War - İddia Edilen IŞİD Saldırıları Haritası (28 Kasım - 9 Aralık 2025) [2] Rojava Information Center - Uyuyan Hücre Raporu, Kasım 2025 [3] Critical Threats Project - İran Güncellemesi, 4 Aralık 2025 [4] Nordic Monitor - Engellenen IŞİD Komplosu Türkiye'nin Kilit Rolünü Gözler Önüne Seriyor [5] Syria Weekly - Veri Güncellemesi, 2-9 Aralık 2025 [6] U.S. Central Command - IŞİD'i Zayıflatma Operasyonları Basın Bülteni [7] Security Council Report - Suriye Aylık Öngörüsü, Aralık 2025 [8] Forbes - Suriye'de Öldürülen ABD Askerleri Analizi [9] İslam Devleti Kronolojisi (2025) [10] Irak İsyanı Kronolojisi (2025) [11] PRIF Blog - DAEŞ/IŞİD Tehdit Değerlendirmesi 2025 [12] Relief Web - Küresel Terörizm Endeksi 2025 [13] CSPS George Mason University - IŞİD Sonrası Irak'ta İran Etkisi [14] Relief Web - Türkiye Terörle Mücadele Operasyonları [15] UK Government - Yasaklanmış Terör Örgütleri Listesi [16] Al Jazeera - IŞİD/DAEŞ Haberleri *Bu rapor çoklu açık kaynak istihbarat akışları, resmi hükûmet açıklamaları ve bölgesel izleme kuruluşlarından derlenerek hazırlanmıştır. Kayıp rakamları ve olay sayıları resmî doğrulama beklendiğinden yaklaşık değerler olarak değerlendirilmelidir.* 

In the immediate aftermath of a deadly ISIS ambush that killed two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter, American-led coalition forces launched aggressive arrest operations in the ancient city of Palmyra late Saturday evening, signaling a swift and forceful response to what marks one of the deadliest attacks on American personnel in Syria this year. The Midnight Crackdown Sources speaking exclusively to Syria TV confirmed that coalition forces, operating alongside Syrian security personnel, detained at least three individuals in Palmyra during operations that stretched approximately two hours. The joint forces swept through the Al-Wadi and Al-Jumhuriya neighborhoods, districts believed to harbor ISIS sympathizers and sleeper cell operatives. The operation was preceded by a dramatic show of force: American aircraft dropped illumination flares across Palmyra's night sky, lighting up the desert city in an unmistakable display of military presence. According to the Wall Street Journal, citing a senior U.S. official, Washington dispatched two F-16 fighter jets to conduct overflights above Palmyra — a clear message that the United States would not allow the attack to go unanswered. Trump Weighs In: "The Response Will Be Strong" U.S. President Donald Trump addressed the attack publicly, stating that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa is "very angry" about the desert assault and promising that the response would be forceful. The statement underscores the strategic partnership between Washington and the new Syrian leadership in confronting the persistent ISIS threat in the country's vast eastern desert. What Happened in the Badiya? The Pentagon confirmed that two American soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed Saturday when militants launched an armed ambush against U.S. personnel operating in the Palmyra region of Syria's central desert, known locally as the Badiya. Three additional soldiers sustained injuries in the attack. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) provided additional details, confirming that American forces were ambushed by ISIS cells operating in the desert. The ensuing firefight resulted in the fatalities and wounded, representing a significant tactical success for the terrorist organization despite its diminished territorial holdings. In a revealing statement, Nour al-Din al-Baba, spokesman for Syria's Interior Ministry, disclosed that Syrian internal security command had issued advance warnings to American forces operating in the Badiya region about potential ISIS breaches or attacks. Critically, al-Baba emphasized that coalition forces "did not take the Syrian warnings into account." Describing the incident in detail, al-Baba explained that the attack occurred at the entrance to a military facility in the Palmyra desert, where an ISIS operative opened fire on personnel. The spokesman was careful to note that the attacker had no command-level connections within Syrian Internal Security and was not serving as an escort to any leadership figures — a clarification apparently aimed at dispelling any suspicion of insider involvement. The Broader Picture: ISIS Remains a Persistent Threat Across Three Nations The Palmyra ambush did not occur in isolation. Intelligence assessments and monitoring data from the past 30 days reveal that ISIS has remained active across Syria, Iraq, and Turkey — though the pattern reflects a low-intensity insurgency characterized by small bombings, ambushes, assassinations, and logistics operations rather than the large-scale territorial conquests of the caliphate era. Syria continues to experience the highest concentration of ISIS activity among the three nations, with attacks geographically dispersed but persistent. Monitoring groups tracking sleeper cell incidents in North and East Syria (NES) documented 21 ISIS attacks in November alone, predominantly concentrated in Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah governorates. These attacks resulted in multiple military fatalities and injuries, though civilian casualties remained relatively limited. Tactics employed include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted shootings, and assassinations of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) personnel and local officials. U.S. Central Command reports more than 22 partnered operations against ISIS in Syria between October 1 and November 6, killing five militants and capturing 19 others. This operational tempo has likely continued into the current period, underscoring the ongoing effort to degrade ISIS capabilities even as the group demonstrates continued lethality. Iraq presents a picture of residual insurgency rather than active warfare, with ISIS largely confined to rural sanctuaries. Open-source event tracking for 2025 indicates a steady but significantly reduced ISIS presence in Iraq. Sporadic attacks continue alongside frequent airstrikes and security sweeps targeting small cells in areas including the Hamrin and Balkana mountain ranges, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala governorates. Recent assessments of Iraq's security environment emphasize that ISIS has been reduced to "remnants" status, with Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces focused on containment operations and periodic raids rather than high-intensity combat. Notably, there are no indications of large-scale mass-casualty ISIS attacks in Iraq during the past 30 days — only low-level incidents and counter-terrorism operations. Covert Networks Endure and the Turkish Angle While the caliphate has been territorially defeated, analytical work on post-ISIS Iraq stresses that the organization maintains covert networks capable of conducting IED attacks, assassinations, and intimidation campaigns, albeit on a significantly reduced scale compared to previous years. Turkey occupies a unique position in the current ISIS threat landscape — experiencing minimal direct attacks while serving as a crucial logistics and transit hub for the organization. The past period has seen no widely reported mass-casualty ISIS attacks on Turkish soil. However, Turkish territory remains central to ISIS-linked transit and logistics operations. A recent U.S. terrorism case revealed an alleged plot in which two individuals planned to regroup in Diyarbakır and utilize long-established smuggling routes through southeastern Turkey into Syria to join ISIS. Case materials and expert commentary describe Turkey as a continuing "staging area" and transit corridor for ISIS sympathizers, particularly via southeastern provinces including Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa. This pattern echoes the 2013-2017 period when Turkey served as the primary gateway for foreign fighters entering the caliphate, suggesting that facilitation networks persist even in the absence of spectacular attacks within Turkey itself. Earlier in 2025, Turkish authorities conducted large-scale arrest operations against suspected ISIS members across multiple provinces. There is no indication that this counter-terrorism posture has eased; rather, the environment appears characterized by ongoing surveillance, arrests, and disrupted plots rather than successful overt attacks. Strategic Implications The Palmyra attack and the broader pattern of ISIS activity across the region carry several strategic implications: 1. The Badiya Remains Ungovernable: Despite of long military operations, Syria's central desert continues to provide sanctuary for ISIS cells capable of launching lethal attacks against even well-armed coalition forces. 2. Intelligence Coordination Gaps: The Syrian Interior Ministry's revelation that warnings went unheeded suggests potential friction or communication failures between Syrian and American security services — a vulnerability ISIS may exploit. 3. Low-Intensity, High-Persistence: ISIS has adapted to its territorial defeat by adopting a classic insurgent posture: small attacks, targeted assassinations, and patience. This approach requires fewer resources while maintaining operational relevance. 4. Turkey's Dual Role: Ankara's position as both counter-terrorism partner and inadvertent transit corridor for ISIS operatives creates diplomatic and operational complexities that the organization continues to exploit. 5. Coalition Commitment Tested: American casualties inevitably raise domestic political questions about the U.S. presence in Syria, potentially creating pressure for either escalation or withdrawal — both of which carry significant risks. Some Indicative Open Sources [1] Institute for the Study of War - Claimed ISIS Attacks Map (November 28 - December 9, 2025) [2] Rojava Information Center - Sleeper Cell Report, November 2025 [3] Critical Threats Project - Iran Update, December 4, 2025 [4] Nordic Monitor - Foiled ISIS Plot Reveals Turkey's Central Role [5] Syria Weekly - Data Update, December 2-9, 2025 [6] U.S. Central Command - Press Release on ISIS Degradation Operations [7] Security Council Report - Syria Monthly Forecast, December 2025 [8] Forbes - Analysis on U.S. Troops Killed in Syria [9] Timeline of the Islamic State (2025) [10] Timeline of the Iraqi Insurgency (2025) [11] PRIF Blog - Daesh/ISIS Threat Assessment 2025 [12] Relief Web - Global Terrorism Index 2025 [13] CSPS George Mason University - Iranian Influence in Post-ISIS Iraq [14] Relief Web - Turkey Counter-Terrorism Operations [15] UK Government - Proscribed Terrorist Groups [16] Al Jazeera - ISIL/ISIS Coverage *This report was compiled from multiple open-source intelligence feeds, official government statements, and regional monitoring organizations. Casualty figures and incident counts should be considered approximate pending official verification. 

Two US Army soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed in an Islamic State attack on Saturday in Palmyra, Syria, where they were suppor...

Latest Update Two US Army soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed in an Islamic State attack on Saturday in Palmyra, Syria, where th...

Latest Update Two US Army soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed in an Islamic State attack on Saturday in Palmyra, Syria, where th...

A joint patrol comprising United States military personnel and Syrian security forces came under fire near the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria on Friday, leaving one person dead and multiple casualties on both sides, according to multiple reports. The attack occurred in the Tadmur district of Homs province while the forces were conducting a routine security patrol as part of ongoing counter-ISIS operations in the region. According to reports from T24 and Syria TV, the armed assault targeted a convoy consisting of US-led coalition forces and Syrian army elements operating in the area. Syria TV, citing an exclusive source, reported that one member of Syria's internal security forces was killed in the attack, while three American soldiers sustained injuries. T24 reported that Syrian soldiers were also among the wounded, with Reuters confirming at least one fatality in the incident. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) provided additional details through an official security source, stating that both Syrian security forces and American troops were targeted while executing a joint field mission near Palmyra. The security source confirmed that two Syrian security personnel were wounded alongside several US military members. Crucially, the source also revealed that the gunman responsible for the attack was killed, though no further information regarding the assailant's identity, motives, or the circumstances surrounding the incident has been released. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, US military helicopters were rapidly deployed to the scene to conduct emergency evacuation operations. The wounded personnel were airlifted to the Al-Tanf military base, a strategic American outpost located near Syria's border with Iraq and Jordan. The base has served as a key hub for US operations against ISIS remnants in the Syrian desert. The incident triggered a significant security response across the region. Sources indicated that coalition military helicopters and fighter aircraft began conducting intensive sorties over Tadmur airspace following the attack. Security measures in the surrounding area were substantially heightened as authorities worked to assess the situation and prevent any further incidents. The attack also caused considerable disruption to civilian movement in the area. Traffic along the international highway connecting Deir Ezzor to Damascus was temporarily halted as security forces responded to the incident and secured the vicinity. The joint patrol operations between American and Syrian forces represent part of broader efforts to maintain security and combat the persistent threat posed by ISIS cells operating in Syria's central desert region. Despite the territorial defeat of the Islamic State's self-declared caliphate in 2019, remnants of the extremist group continue to conduct guerrilla-style attacks throughout the Syrian desert. US forces have maintained a presence in Syria primarily focused on the counter-ISIS mission, operating alongside various local partners. The Al-Tanf base, where the wounded were evacuated, has been a focal point of American military activity in the region. Authorities have not yet disclosed whether the attack was carried out by ISIS affiliates or other armed elements. An investigation into the incident is expected to be conducted to determine the full circumstances and motivations behind the deadly assault.