8/8 - Happy to hear objections—is there something different about future people that lets us justifiably discount their interests? #PhilSky

7/8 - Paper: “The Future is Already Here: How the Tenseless Theory of Time Grounds Our Obligations to Future Generations” (Ethics, Policy & Environment).
50 free eprints: www.tandfonline.com/eprint/VFYMB...
DOI: doi.org/10.1080/2155...

6/8 - The policy implication is that institutions should treat future persons as genuine stakeholders (e.g., conduct impact assessments, appoint guardians/commissioners for future generations, and institute long-term governance design).

5/8 - This matters for sustainability: the moral standing of future persons is not optional rhetoric. It is a demand of temporal justice, especially where harms are predictable and cumulative.

4/8 - So discounting their interests because they are “not yet” is a form of chronological chauvinism, a bias about when someone exists, not whether they matter.

3/8 On a tenseless view, past/present/future are equally real (tenselessly). Future persons aren’t “mere possibilities.” They really exist, but at different space-time coordinates.

2/8 - My new paper argues the objection weakens if we take a tenseless (B-theory) view of time seriously, especially in light of relativity’s rejection of a privileged “now.”

The caption says "classic rock," so I assume it's referring to legacy acts, although Paul McCartney's tour seems to be doing well.

I'm sure that's due to the huge number of blueberries used to make this product.