Tom Demeulemeester
@tdemeule.bsky.social
Interested in fairness in operations research, matching and algorithm design. Assistant professor at Maastricht University.
www.tdem.be
www.tdem.be
Everyone is assigned one object, and you know that no pair of agents wants to swap their objects.
When can you be sure that there will also not exist a group of any size (larger than two) who want to exchange their objects?
Find the answer in our WP (with Bettina Klaus): arxiv.org/abs/2508.05340
When can you be sure that there will also not exist a group of any size (larger than two) who want to exchange their objects?
Find the answer in our WP (with Bettina Klaus): arxiv.org/abs/2508.05340
Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies...
arxiv.org
August 11, 2025 at 8:49 AM
Everyone is assigned one object, and you know that no pair of agents wants to swap their objects.
When can you be sure that there will also not exist a group of any size (larger than two) who want to exchange their objects?
Find the answer in our WP (with Bettina Klaus): arxiv.org/abs/2508.05340
When can you be sure that there will also not exist a group of any size (larger than two) who want to exchange their objects?
Find the answer in our WP (with Bettina Klaus): arxiv.org/abs/2508.05340
Just read a fantastic paper by Xiang Han.
For everyone interested in matching problems, I highly recommend sitting down and reading his work, it's a fresh and unifying perspective on such a well-studied topic.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/MYZZFH...
For everyone interested in matching problems, I highly recommend sitting down and reading his work, it's a fresh and unifying perspective on such a well-studied topic.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/MYZZFH...
A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
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onlinelibrary.wiley.com
February 6, 2025 at 3:29 PM
Just read a fantastic paper by Xiang Han.
For everyone interested in matching problems, I highly recommend sitting down and reading his work, it's a fresh and unifying perspective on such a well-studied topic.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/MYZZFH...
For everyone interested in matching problems, I highly recommend sitting down and reading his work, it's a fresh and unifying perspective on such a well-studied topic.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/MYZZFH...
The core can be empty in many variants of coalition formation games. In our new working paper, we quantify the relationship between two intuitive concepts of core relaxation in hedonic games.
Find out why larger blocking coalitions might sometimes be worse off in: arxiv.org/abs/2412.01666.
Find out why larger blocking coalitions might sometimes be worse off in: arxiv.org/abs/2412.01666.
Quantifying Core Stability Relaxations in Hedonic Games
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family o...
arxiv.org
December 3, 2024 at 1:00 PM
The core can be empty in many variants of coalition formation games. In our new working paper, we quantify the relationship between two intuitive concepts of core relaxation in hedonic games.
Find out why larger blocking coalitions might sometimes be worse off in: arxiv.org/abs/2412.01666.
Find out why larger blocking coalitions might sometimes be worse off in: arxiv.org/abs/2412.01666.