Sydnee Caldwell
@sydneecaldwell.bsky.social
Labor economist at UC Berkeley.
thanks, that is so kind! Wish we had gotten time to catch up after the conference! Hope to see you again soon!
October 22, 2025 at 11:47 PM
thanks, that is so kind! Wish we had gotten time to catch up after the conference! Hope to see you again soon!
11/11 Bottom line: Workers have (some!) information about pay, and limited mobility is driven more by preferences. And in bargaining, ranges help but aren’t enough to equalize asks. Full details in VoxEU + papers linked above.
Information and the labour market
Workers often remain in their jobs even when they know they may get higher wages elsewhere, raising questions about the effectiveness of pay transparency laws. This column draws on a large German survey to examine how information frictions shape labour market outcomes. The findings suggest that workers are better informed than many policymakers assume, but prefer to stay unless an outside offer is markedly higher, citing personal ties, reluctance to change, and location as key reasons. Women are less likely than men to ask for salaries at the upper end even when presented with identical pay ranges. Information transparency alone may not lift wages or close gender gaps – measures that make firm transitions easier may be needed.
cepr.org
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
11/11 Bottom line: Workers have (some!) information about pay, and limited mobility is driven more by preferences. And in bargaining, ranges help but aren’t enough to equalize asks. Full details in VoxEU + papers linked above.
10/11 We do find some evidence women are less likely to know pay when they apply to positions. But posting a role’s pay range by itself doesn’t close the gap: asks move with the range, but a gender ask gap remains. Note, we did not tell workers what *others* asked for.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
10/11 We do find some evidence women are less likely to know pay when they apply to positions. But posting a role’s pay range by itself doesn’t close the gap: asks move with the range, but a gender ask gap remains. Note, we did not tell workers what *others* asked for.
9/11 “Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market” shows that, when firms set pay via individual firm‑worker bargaining, there’s a ≈3‑pp residual gender pay gap and that bargaining often begins with firms eliciting applicants’ salary expectations. sydneec.github.io/Website/CHH_...
sydneec.github.io
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
9/11 “Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market” shows that, when firms set pay via individual firm‑worker bargaining, there’s a ≈3‑pp residual gender pay gap and that bargaining often begins with firms eliciting applicants’ salary expectations. sydneec.github.io/Website/CHH_...
8/11 Takeaway: Models where monopsony power comes from preference heterogeneity (e.g., CCHK; BHM) fit these facts better than approaches that put overall mobility mostly on information frictions.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
8/11 Takeaway: Models where monopsony power comes from preference heterogeneity (e.g., CCHK; BHM) fit these facts better than approaches that put overall mobility mostly on information frictions.
7/11 We asked workers why people don’t switch, and they pointed to dislike of change, social ties, and location. Information matters, but our calculations imply more pay info alone won’t spur much job‑to‑job switching.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
7/11 We asked workers why people don’t switch, and they pointed to dislike of change, social ties, and location. Information matters, but our calculations imply more pay info alone won’t spur much job‑to‑job switching.
6/11 Finding #2: Yet our discrete choice experiments reveal that most would rather stay with their current employer—even holding commute constant—than take an outside offer with higher pay.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
6/11 Finding #2: Yet our discrete choice experiments reveal that most would rather stay with their current employer—even holding commute constant—than take an outside offer with higher pay.
5/11 Finding #1: Workers do have firm‑specific pay information. They expect pay to differ across outside employers, and perceived wage premia are correlated with observed premia (we fit AKM models to workers’ firm-specific beliefs!).
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
5/11 Finding #1: Workers do have firm‑specific pay information. They expect pay to differ across outside employers, and perceived wage premia are correlated with observed premia (we fit AKM models to workers’ firm-specific beliefs!).
4/11 We use data from a large survey we fielded with the IAB, in which we asked workers what they thought they would make at specific (named!) outside firms-- and in which we embedded a set of discrete choice experiments with randomized pay.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
4/11 We use data from a large survey we fielded with the IAB, in which we asked workers what they thought they would make at specific (named!) outside firms-- and in which we embedded a set of discrete choice experiments with randomized pay.
3/11 Model insight: mobility depends on: (1) misperceptions (pessimism → less search), (2) whether people believe pay varies across firms (if yes → more search), and (3) preferences.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
3/11 Model insight: mobility depends on: (1) misperceptions (pessimism → less search), (2) whether people believe pay varies across firms (if yes → more search), and (3) preferences.
2/11 (i) In "Why Workers Stay: Pay, Beliefs, and Attachment", we try to understand why workers remain with their employer even when outside firms offer higher pay (see: growing lit on monopsony). We consider two leading explanations: information frictions and preferences.
August 28, 2025 at 7:54 PM
2/11 (i) In "Why Workers Stay: Pay, Beliefs, and Attachment", we try to understand why workers remain with their employer even when outside firms offer higher pay (see: growing lit on monopsony). We consider two leading explanations: information frictions and preferences.