Steven Denney
@stevendenney86.bsky.social
🎓 Assistant Professor at Leiden University
📚 Migration & Governance, Nationalism, East Asia & the Koreas
🏠 https://scdenney.net/
📚 Migration & Governance, Nationalism, East Asia & the Koreas
🏠 https://scdenney.net/
Yesterday, we held the 1st Annual Leiden University Workshop on Immigration & Democracy.
A full day of discussion on new research covering migration, identity, and democratic attitudes. Excellent presentations and constructive feedback across all panels.
A full day of discussion on new research covering migration, identity, and democratic attitudes. Excellent presentations and constructive feedback across all panels.
November 5, 2025 at 8:49 AM
Yesterday, we held the 1st Annual Leiden University Workshop on Immigration & Democracy.
A full day of discussion on new research covering migration, identity, and democratic attitudes. Excellent presentations and constructive feedback across all panels.
A full day of discussion on new research covering migration, identity, and democratic attitudes. Excellent presentations and constructive feedback across all panels.
In Germany, supplementary analysis shows an encouraging pattern: discrimination against Easterners is concentrated among those socialized before unification. Among younger Western Germans, the intra-national discrimination is abating.
October 30, 2025 at 9:25 AM
In Germany, supplementary analysis shows an encouraging pattern: discrimination against Easterners is concentrated among those socialized before unification. Among younger Western Germans, the intra-national discrimination is abating.
Both Western Germans and South Koreans show intra-national welfare chauvinism: citizens from the other, divided region (Eastern Germany, North Korea) are less likely to be prioritized for state support.
October 30, 2025 at 9:25 AM
Both Western Germans and South Koreans show intra-national welfare chauvinism: citizens from the other, divided region (Eastern Germany, North Korea) are less likely to be prioritized for state support.
We use comparative conjoint experiments to isolate the effects of origin on welfare preferences. Respondents evaluated paired job-support candidates whose traits (age, occupation, record, and region of origin) were randomly varied to isolate bias in selection.
October 30, 2025 at 9:25 AM
We use comparative conjoint experiments to isolate the effects of origin on welfare preferences. Respondents evaluated paired job-support candidates whose traits (age, occupation, record, and region of origin) were randomly varied to isolate bias in selection.
We don't quite know *why* we see support for, say, guardianship democracy in South Korea; the observational data limits us here. But I'm in the process of designing a conjoint experiment that will test competing explanations.
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
We don't quite know *why* we see support for, say, guardianship democracy in South Korea; the observational data limits us here. But I'm in the process of designing a conjoint experiment that will test competing explanations.
Interestingly, in South Korea, younger cohorts (incl. democratic) are relatively supportive of strongman guardianship, contrary to expectations. This challenges the idea that democracy consolidates support over time. As shown in the paper, we see this in Taiwan, too.
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
Interestingly, in South Korea, younger cohorts (incl. democratic) are relatively supportive of strongman guardianship, contrary to expectations. This challenges the idea that democracy consolidates support over time. As shown in the paper, we see this in Taiwan, too.
Then, guardianship democracy support:
-Technocratic (Dahlian): Widely accepted in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼, stable over time
-Military: Endorsed in 🇵🇭, rising in 🇰🇷, rejected in 🇯🇵
-Strongman: Rapid growth in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼; ~50% support in latest wave
-🇯🇵 again stands apart: low across all variants
-Technocratic (Dahlian): Widely accepted in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼, stable over time
-Military: Endorsed in 🇵🇭, rising in 🇰🇷, rejected in 🇯🇵
-Strongman: Rapid growth in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼; ~50% support in latest wave
-🇯🇵 again stands apart: low across all variants
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
Then, guardianship democracy support:
-Technocratic (Dahlian): Widely accepted in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼, stable over time
-Military: Endorsed in 🇵🇭, rising in 🇰🇷, rejected in 🇯🇵
-Strongman: Rapid growth in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼; ~50% support in latest wave
-🇯🇵 again stands apart: low across all variants
-Technocratic (Dahlian): Widely accepted in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼, stable over time
-Military: Endorsed in 🇵🇭, rising in 🇰🇷, rejected in 🇯🇵
-Strongman: Rapid growth in 🇰🇷 & 🇹🇼; ~50% support in latest wave
-🇯🇵 again stands apart: low across all variants
High-level summary:
-Democracy: strong support across all cases
-Technocracy: widely accepted, but stable over time
-Military rule: high in 🇵🇭 & 🇮🇩; low but rising in 🇰🇷
-Strongman rule: high & increasing in 🇰🇷 and 🇹🇼
-🇯🇵 Japan is the outlier—high democratic support, minimal elite-rule backing
-Democracy: strong support across all cases
-Technocracy: widely accepted, but stable over time
-Military rule: high in 🇵🇭 & 🇮🇩; low but rising in 🇰🇷
-Strongman rule: high & increasing in 🇰🇷 and 🇹🇼
-🇯🇵 Japan is the outlier—high democratic support, minimal elite-rule backing
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
High-level summary:
-Democracy: strong support across all cases
-Technocracy: widely accepted, but stable over time
-Military rule: high in 🇵🇭 & 🇮🇩; low but rising in 🇰🇷
-Strongman rule: high & increasing in 🇰🇷 and 🇹🇼
-🇯🇵 Japan is the outlier—high democratic support, minimal elite-rule backing
-Democracy: strong support across all cases
-Technocracy: widely accepted, but stable over time
-Military rule: high in 🇵🇭 & 🇮🇩; low but rising in 🇰🇷
-Strongman rule: high & increasing in 🇰🇷 and 🇹🇼
-🇯🇵 Japan is the outlier—high democratic support, minimal elite-rule backing
Using events like the Yoon martial law declaration and world trends as motivation, I ask: To what extent do citizens endorse both democracy and elite-led alternatives?
Using longitudinal WVS data (1995-2020), I map support for three types of "guardianship democracy" across six Asian democracies.
Using longitudinal WVS data (1995-2020), I map support for three types of "guardianship democracy" across six Asian democracies.
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
Using events like the Yoon martial law declaration and world trends as motivation, I ask: To what extent do citizens endorse both democracy and elite-led alternatives?
Using longitudinal WVS data (1995-2020), I map support for three types of "guardianship democracy" across six Asian democracies.
Using longitudinal WVS data (1995-2020), I map support for three types of "guardianship democracy" across six Asian democracies.
I am presenting and participating today at the 8th Annual Meeting of the Social Science Korean Studies Network in Europe (SoKEN), hosted by @hannes-mosler.bsky.social at the University of Duisburg-Essen. My presentation explores support for 'guardianship democracy' in East and Southeast Asia.
May 23, 2025 at 10:09 AM
I am presenting and participating today at the 8th Annual Meeting of the Social Science Korean Studies Network in Europe (SoKEN), hosted by @hannes-mosler.bsky.social at the University of Duisburg-Essen. My presentation explores support for 'guardianship democracy' in East and Southeast Asia.
Our piece connects well with Cheong and Haggard's (2023) recent article in Democratization on political polarization.
They, too, find that partisans are sorting on left/right issues, especially but not only regarding North Korea and the ROK-US alliance.
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...
They, too, find that partisans are sorting on left/right issues, especially but not only regarding North Korea and the ROK-US alliance.
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...
May 15, 2025 at 12:03 PM
Our piece connects well with Cheong and Haggard's (2023) recent article in Democratization on political polarization.
They, too, find that partisans are sorting on left/right issues, especially but not only regarding North Korea and the ROK-US alliance.
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...
They, too, find that partisans are sorting on left/right issues, especially but not only regarding North Korea and the ROK-US alliance.
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...
On housing: Conservative match with tax cuts, progressives with public housing
On labor: Flexibility (conservatives) vs shorter workweek (progressives)
Social issues: Progressives are somewhat sensitive to anti-discrimination; conservatives are not.
Foreign Policy: HUGE divide.
On labor: Flexibility (conservatives) vs shorter workweek (progressives)
Social issues: Progressives are somewhat sensitive to anti-discrimination; conservatives are not.
Foreign Policy: HUGE divide.
May 15, 2025 at 12:03 PM
On housing: Conservative match with tax cuts, progressives with public housing
On labor: Flexibility (conservatives) vs shorter workweek (progressives)
Social issues: Progressives are somewhat sensitive to anti-discrimination; conservatives are not.
Foreign Policy: HUGE divide.
On labor: Flexibility (conservatives) vs shorter workweek (progressives)
Social issues: Progressives are somewhat sensitive to anti-discrimination; conservatives are not.
Foreign Policy: HUGE divide.
Key findings:
- Conservatives prefer prosecutors, men, and Busan-based candidates.
- Progressives prefer civil society activists and are more penalty-sensitive to scandals.
But overall: policy > personality.
- Conservatives prefer prosecutors, men, and Busan-based candidates.
- Progressives prefer civil society activists and are more penalty-sensitive to scandals.
But overall: policy > personality.
May 15, 2025 at 12:03 PM
Key findings:
- Conservatives prefer prosecutors, men, and Busan-based candidates.
- Progressives prefer civil society activists and are more penalty-sensitive to scandals.
But overall: policy > personality.
- Conservatives prefer prosecutors, men, and Busan-based candidates.
- Progressives prefer civil society activists and are more penalty-sensitive to scandals.
But overall: policy > personality.
How do voters behave in democracies with unstable parties? In a newly published article in Party Politics, @pward89.bsky.social and I examine South Korea, a textbook case of an “ephemeral party system.” The article is Open Access.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
May 15, 2025 at 12:03 PM
How do voters behave in democracies with unstable parties? In a newly published article in Party Politics, @pward89.bsky.social and I examine South Korea, a textbook case of an “ephemeral party system.” The article is Open Access.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
With Yoon's impeachment ruling due this Friday, here's Gallup Korea polling data from the 4th week of March.
Support/oppose impeachment-ALL: 60/34 (+26)
-progressives: 93/5 (+88)
-conservatives: 27/69 (-42)
-18-29: 62/26 (+36)
-70+: 35/58 (-23)
-18-29 males: 52/36 (+16)
-18-29 females: 72/15 (+57)
Support/oppose impeachment-ALL: 60/34 (+26)
-progressives: 93/5 (+88)
-conservatives: 27/69 (-42)
-18-29: 62/26 (+36)
-70+: 35/58 (-23)
-18-29 males: 52/36 (+16)
-18-29 females: 72/15 (+57)
April 1, 2025 at 8:40 AM
With Yoon's impeachment ruling due this Friday, here's Gallup Korea polling data from the 4th week of March.
Support/oppose impeachment-ALL: 60/34 (+26)
-progressives: 93/5 (+88)
-conservatives: 27/69 (-42)
-18-29: 62/26 (+36)
-70+: 35/58 (-23)
-18-29 males: 52/36 (+16)
-18-29 females: 72/15 (+57)
Support/oppose impeachment-ALL: 60/34 (+26)
-progressives: 93/5 (+88)
-conservatives: 27/69 (-42)
-18-29: 62/26 (+36)
-70+: 35/58 (-23)
-18-29 males: 52/36 (+16)
-18-29 females: 72/15 (+57)
Notably, the status quo bias is present among groups predisposed to either view immigration as good or bad for the nation (sociotropic optimists vs. pessimists).
It will likely be challenging to motivate greater popular support for immigration in South Korea, but there has been no backlash (yet).
It will likely be challenging to motivate greater popular support for immigration in South Korea, but there has been no backlash (yet).
January 15, 2025 at 10:03 AM
Notably, the status quo bias is present among groups predisposed to either view immigration as good or bad for the nation (sociotropic optimists vs. pessimists).
It will likely be challenging to motivate greater popular support for immigration in South Korea, but there has been no backlash (yet).
It will likely be challenging to motivate greater popular support for immigration in South Korea, but there has been no backlash (yet).
Varying pro-immigration messages tied to economic growth concerns or the fertility crisis do not increase support for more immigration. However, growth cues increase support for the status quo (implications mixed), and fertility cues slightly decrease origins-based discrimination (encouraging).
January 15, 2025 at 10:03 AM
Varying pro-immigration messages tied to economic growth concerns or the fertility crisis do not increase support for more immigration. However, growth cues increase support for the status quo (implications mixed), and fertility cues slightly decrease origins-based discrimination (encouraging).
After a brief pandemic-induced drop, South Korea’s foreign-born population has returned to its upward trajectory (current 4%+ of total pop). Most come from China (incl. Joseonjok) at ~900k, followed by Vietnam (270k), Thailand (202k), USA (160k), Uzbekistan (87k), and the Philippines (64k).
January 15, 2025 at 10:03 AM
After a brief pandemic-induced drop, South Korea’s foreign-born population has returned to its upward trajectory (current 4%+ of total pop). Most come from China (incl. Joseonjok) at ~900k, followed by Vietnam (270k), Thailand (202k), USA (160k), Uzbekistan (87k), and the Philippines (64k).
I will present new research on South Korean immigration attitudes tomorrow at the conference "Recalibrating ‘Skill’ in Changing Immigration Regimes", hosted by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. A snippet of the main findings 🧵🔻.
January 15, 2025 at 10:03 AM
I will present new research on South Korean immigration attitudes tomorrow at the conference "Recalibrating ‘Skill’ in Changing Immigration Regimes", hosted by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. A snippet of the main findings 🧵🔻.
As Gallup notes, approval of a president's administrative duties (직무) is not the same as support for the person. No data for 'duties' in 2025, but at the end of 2024, evaluation was trending downward and at a historic low relative to other presidents. There could be a divergence between the two.
January 13, 2025 at 5:50 PM
As Gallup notes, approval of a president's administrative duties (직무) is not the same as support for the person. No data for 'duties' in 2025, but at the end of 2024, evaluation was trending downward and at a historic low relative to other presidents. There could be a divergence between the two.
Is impeached President Yoon being buoyed by a revival in support for his party? Perhaps.
Polling agency Gongjung found that 34% of respondents polled in the first week of January support Yoon [wording: 윤석열 대통령을 어느 정도 지지하십니까?].
www.thepublic.kr/news/article...
Polling agency Gongjung found that 34% of respondents polled in the first week of January support Yoon [wording: 윤석열 대통령을 어느 정도 지지하십니까?].
www.thepublic.kr/news/article...
January 13, 2025 at 5:50 PM
Is impeached President Yoon being buoyed by a revival in support for his party? Perhaps.
Polling agency Gongjung found that 34% of respondents polled in the first week of January support Yoon [wording: 윤석열 대통령을 어느 정도 지지하십니까?].
www.thepublic.kr/news/article...
Polling agency Gongjung found that 34% of respondents polled in the first week of January support Yoon [wording: 윤석열 대통령을 어느 정도 지지하십니까?].
www.thepublic.kr/news/article...
As per Gallup Korea, support for the country's two main parties—left-leaning Minjoo Party (blue) and right-leaning People Power Party (red)—has reverted to pre-martial law levels. This follows a brief high for Minjoo at the time of President Yoon's impeachment.
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/rep...
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/rep...
January 13, 2025 at 5:50 PM
As per Gallup Korea, support for the country's two main parties—left-leaning Minjoo Party (blue) and right-leaning People Power Party (red)—has reverted to pre-martial law levels. This follows a brief high for Minjoo at the time of President Yoon's impeachment.
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/rep...
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/rep...
A bullish case for South Korean democracy might be hard to make *right now*, but if the ever-optimistic Christian Wezel is correct that "the future is democratic" due to a rise in "emancipative values," younger democrats give reason to buy in. 끝
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why...
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why...
January 6, 2025 at 11:26 AM
A bullish case for South Korean democracy might be hard to make *right now*, but if the ever-optimistic Christian Wezel is correct that "the future is democratic" due to a rise in "emancipative values," younger democrats give reason to buy in. 끝
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why...
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why...
However, instead of year-to-year variations, if we examine attitudes by age at the time of the survey across political generations, we observe a "democratic generation." Democrats support expert rule and show a modest preference for guardianship democracy, similar to Taiwan but different from Japan.
January 6, 2025 at 11:26 AM
However, instead of year-to-year variations, if we examine attitudes by age at the time of the survey across political generations, we observe a "democratic generation." Democrats support expert rule and show a modest preference for guardianship democracy, similar to Taiwan but different from Japan.
The trends in South Korea are consistent across partisan and sex subgroups, although "strongman" support is higher among conservatives (>10pp compared to progressives).
Further, at ~20%, support for military rule in South Korea is, within its peer group, the upper bound.
Further, at ~20%, support for military rule in South Korea is, within its peer group, the upper bound.
January 6, 2025 at 11:26 AM
The trends in South Korea are consistent across partisan and sex subgroups, although "strongman" support is higher among conservatives (>10pp compared to progressives).
Further, at ~20%, support for military rule in South Korea is, within its peer group, the upper bound.
Further, at ~20%, support for military rule in South Korea is, within its peer group, the upper bound.