Institutions get the behaviour they reward.

Wrong terms imply right terms, which in turn imply that you can define them (correctly).

We have yet to see that done in a meaningful manner, aside from the fact that some things in war tend to recur while others tend to change quickly.

If it's a caution against sensationalism, I am all for it.

I agree, and that is an important insight. In the Times article, there is no argument as to what war *is* or how it has changed, merely that this particular war is fought with different means, and these means will probably change again in the next war.

Is that distinction even meaningful? In an article we did a few years back on nature vs character, we found the debate echoed across academia, doctrine, and practice. Yet when it came to defining their actual content, there was no agreement.

(OA version in Ch5 here: www.fak.dk/globalassets... )

I suppose 'enraged' is also a form of engagement.

Grateful for the dialogue today; reminded that contributing to critical understanding of military institutions requires both courage and careful judgment.

Learn more in our 2024 article: sjms.nu/articles/10....

Thanks to Krigsskolen and @sjms.bsky.social for organising.

3️⃣ Your identity (insider, outsider), institutional affiliation, and relationship with gatekeepers all influence what is permissible and what ethical responsibility entails in practice.

2️⃣ Researchers must balance principles like openness, consent, and data integrity against security concerns. This balancing act isn’t theoretical; it shows up in design, access negotiation, data handling, and publication.

Getting logistics right is one of the operation's overlooked successes. The book also describes this well.

I don't see how planning doctrine is rejected. I point out that there is a stark difference between the world described in doctrine and the empirical reality.

And often when officers describe how the world “actually works”, I have found that they tend to revert to the doctrinal world.

I would love to see it! The last three NATO HQs (one DIV, two JFCs) where I conducted fieldwork all had this issue. In one of them, the lead planner (six months in) had never engaged with COM.

This was not a 3/3-5/5 issue, but a matter of COM getting bogged down in other tasks.

I suspect there might be a self-image issue as well. We all grew up on the tactical bit. It feels safe. And troops in contact rightly have priority.

But at higher levels, this is not where the staff or COM should make their money and not at the expense of PLANS

"It is a planner's job to think about the 'How' and 'What if' of unfolding plans, but planners are not empowered to make decisions. That privilege is reserved for commanders."

But planners shape those decisions. Things may not be clear-cut in (the empirical) reality.

OA: 2-5.dk/wp-content/u...

4️⃣ While planning in doctrine is disinterested and rational, the book highlights individuals' influence (or lack of) on the process, including commanders and other staff officers, as well as those who attended specific war colleges and those who did not.

3️⃣ Current OPS draws attention; G5 was cut off from engaging with the CMD. Rank plays a part, plans were led by a COL, and OPS by a MG

So, commanders say that it is vital to engage with planners regularly. In the empirical reality, few manage to prioritise it because current ops take precedence.

2️⃣ Simple questions are sent into the organisation instead of being dealt with by higher staff (why can't we invade Iraq with a brigade?). Technology (email) makes it possible, easy and perhaps convenient to pass simple things on. This tendency overloads lower HQs.