Lack of enough data precludes doing the same for Ukraine. But we do find that while Russian forward movement is still slow, it is speeding up. More at link: www.economist.com/interactive/...

To estimate Russian losses, I lined up satellite data and shifts to areas of control in Ukraine with more than 200 estimates of total casualties there. This enabled me to construct a credible day-to-day range for the toll of the war since the invasion.

Just saw this. It would be possible to replicate the approach if I knew the locations of strategic sites to monitor within Israel. It is also possible to do this independently of strategic sites, as I do in Ukraine. www.economist.com/interactive/...

While tracking thermal events is not perfect either, it has some advantages: it covers all sites systematically, and data comes in regardless of access (as long as skies are clear), several times daily.

Last week, we wrote about how estimated casualties (dead+wounded) are approaching 1m on the Russian side. Those timelines may now shift forward. www.economist.com/internationa...

Read cover story by @vinjeru.bsky.social (with some numbers / projections from me), which also evidences a preference for girls emerging in parts of the rich world www.economist.com/briefing/202...

Thanks Hethan, glad you found it fascinating.

Thanks!

Happy to hear that, thank you again.

Thank you very much @gaborbekes.bsky.social

Too rare I'm afraid. If it helps, I'm also not in the data.

Some sources provide casualties (dead+wounded), some provide dead only. I collected both. More on dead-to-wounded ratios here: www.economist.com/internationa...

I cover both casualties (dead and wounded) and dead. The chart that appears with the link shows fatalities only. As you may know, this cuts both ways: a lower dead-to-wounded ratio means that for any given set of fatalities, there are more wounded and thus probably more soldiers out of action.