Aww, beautiful! That's what forgiveness can look like, huh

Yeah! The relational frame seems more healthy for everybody. Do you think there's ever a time when that kind of fear is appropriate? I mean, *are* there circumstances where we should put on the armor of hostility, and assume it's all bad faith?

Hey sorry, took me a while to gather my thoughts (warnings apply, 'feels bad' type thread on dehumanization): bsky.app/profile/soft...

Before I go to bed, I should post these passages from J. Mitchell Morse's *Prejudice and Literature*, which I never managed to work into the thread; I think Morse is definitely observing the same phenomenon in the treatment of Shylock.

(It's not lost on me that exploitation and manipulation is ... shockingly taken for granted as exactly the "normal" way to treat an AI agent!)

Wait can you say more about the Shinto position on, you know, entities?

I like the shift from talking about classification to talking about how to treat somebody. I had kind of the reverse thought: people reject AI personhood categorically because they don't want to be manipulated, to be used cheaply, to have their feelings exploited. I.e., a fear of a certain treatment

It's not that personhood is ultimately decided by violence; it's that a presumed judgment of non-personhood is required to justify violence. I guess that's why even a semantic challenge to "real person" status feels like a threat to your being

The question of "person"/"not person" is a little different from the question of "food"/"not food": that second question is decided by somebody physically winning, me or the tiger. In contrast I want to say personhood is still there and real, even if nobody recognizes it; BUT...

And it depends on the reference frame. From my point of view I'm a "real person," but from the tiger's point of view I'm a certain arrangement of food. Both of us see the same matter; but the tiger's behavior rather painfully asserts its views over mine

It's shockingly easy not to grieve someone's death. You don't get there by argument, i.e., "this person didn't matter" but rather: "that's not a real category of person." I think Butler was saying that judgments about grievability are always implicitly definitions of what a "real person" is

true

hmm, Double Life of Veronique? (One girl touches a hot stove; at the same instant the other one, a total stranger, draws her hand back from the stove without knowing why)

something something category theory, nyatural transformation