Scott Ashworth
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soashworth.bsky.social
Scott Ashworth
@soashworth.bsky.social
Professor at the University of Chicago. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, in proportions tbd. He/Him.
That has long been my thought
November 10, 2025 at 9:05 PM
I’m 80% confident we will not.
November 10, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Then you can see a story for the timing.

There is still your background question about why start only to end up here. And there I think it’s clearly coalition management from a weak Schumer.
November 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
Maybe it’s like this. Structurally, we have conflict between the parties on social insurance plus incentive for moderates to keep the fillibuster. Shutdown is a war of attrition. Mods are learning Schumer has unexpected resolve while Trump comments make fillibuster look threatened.
November 10, 2025 at 5:07 PM
It would be interesting to solve a model like this when one side is actually two players who can communicate but not sign binding agreements. That might be a useful representation of a weak party.
November 10, 2025 at 4:53 PM
That’s still a strategic decision.

web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Eco...
web.stanford.edu
November 10, 2025 at 4:48 PM
Agree limiting this to just one account would be an improvement.
November 10, 2025 at 4:41 PM
Catherine Cortez Masto, one of the senators who negotiated the deal.
November 10, 2025 at 3:32 PM
For sure. I don’t think this is definitely the explanation, just that it’s plausible.
November 10, 2025 at 4:34 AM
Thinking about payoffs after death is difference between a politician and a statesman. [tragic irony edition]
November 10, 2025 at 4:23 AM
So in the event dems take a small majority in the senate with a mandate to actually do something, whomever is the most moderate dem likes the filibuster.

Note this gives a purely structural account of Manchin and Senima, suggesting there will always be someone for that role.
November 10, 2025 at 4:21 AM
Consider a future Dem majority with a progressive agenda setter and no filibuster. The proposal will be one that makes people like CCM et al indifferent between the proposal and status quo. With the filibuster, the setter needs a few rep votes and so proposes something closer to CCM’s ideal point.
November 10, 2025 at 4:17 AM
It also makes me want to break stuff, if I might slip from descriptive to normative.
November 10, 2025 at 4:02 AM
So I think it’s reasonable to assume these eight would oppose nuking for dem priorities. And that makes Matt’s theory work.
November 10, 2025 at 4:01 AM
Think of the setter model. With no filibuster, the most moderate dems are the ones pushed to the wall next time dems have control. With the filibuster they gain because the setter has to keep proposals moderate enough for the filibuster pivot.
November 10, 2025 at 3:59 AM
His filibuster theory shows an admirable grasp of backward induction.
November 10, 2025 at 2:53 AM
Best anti-vax tract I read this year.
November 9, 2025 at 4:25 AM
The aside on Karezza was wild.
November 9, 2025 at 4:23 AM
because I always assume internet book people mean greeks and romans when they say ‘classics’?
November 8, 2025 at 4:38 PM
big talk from a guy who refused my dare to listen that podcast
November 8, 2025 at 4:21 PM
why would you show me this
November 8, 2025 at 2:58 PM