Simon Schnyder
@skschnyder.bsky.social
Assistant Professor at the University of Tokyo: self organized behavior during epidemics, collective cell behavior, optimal control. He/him
simonschnyder.com
simonschnyder.com
Press Release by The University of Tokyo
www.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/news/4707/
www.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/news/4707/
The math behind social distancing: the rules that influence epidemic behavior
Researchers from #UTokyo_IIS have found a surprisingly simple way of understanding social-distancing behavior during an epidemic
www.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp
March 12, 2025 at 2:40 AM
Press Release by The University of Tokyo
www.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/news/4707/
www.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/news/4707/
What’s neat is that we can distill rational behavior down to a simple formula:
the strength of social distancing is proportional to both the perceived infection cost and prevalence.
Remarkably, this gives a posteriori justification for simple heuristics developed to understand diseases like HIV.
the strength of social distancing is proportional to both the perceived infection cost and prevalence.
Remarkably, this gives a posteriori justification for simple heuristics developed to understand diseases like HIV.
March 12, 2025 at 2:40 AM
What’s neat is that we can distill rational behavior down to a simple formula:
the strength of social distancing is proportional to both the perceived infection cost and prevalence.
Remarkably, this gives a posteriori justification for simple heuristics developed to understand diseases like HIV.
the strength of social distancing is proportional to both the perceived infection cost and prevalence.
Remarkably, this gives a posteriori justification for simple heuristics developed to understand diseases like HIV.
Usually, such Nash equilibria can only be studied numerically, but we found an exact analytic solution for the self-organized social distancing behavior and the corresponding disease dynamics.
March 12, 2025 at 2:40 AM
Usually, such Nash equilibria can only be studied numerically, but we found an exact analytic solution for the self-organized social distancing behavior and the corresponding disease dynamics.
Social behavior during epidemics is a self-organized collective phenomenon:
People change their behavior based on the epidemic state, which is itself affected by the behavior.
Game theoretic analysis shows that such dynamics can give rise to Nash equilibria.
People change their behavior based on the epidemic state, which is itself affected by the behavior.
Game theoretic analysis shows that such dynamics can give rise to Nash equilibria.
March 12, 2025 at 2:40 AM
Social behavior during epidemics is a self-organized collective phenomenon:
People change their behavior based on the epidemic state, which is itself affected by the behavior.
Game theoretic analysis shows that such dynamics can give rise to Nash equilibria.
People change their behavior based on the epidemic state, which is itself affected by the behavior.
Game theoretic analysis shows that such dynamics can give rise to Nash equilibria.
It’s such a pleasure to have you. We hope you’re having a great time!
March 4, 2025 at 9:36 AM
It’s such a pleasure to have you. We hope you’re having a great time!
Hey Saverio, thanks for making this. Can I still be added? Thanks!
January 23, 2025 at 10:45 AM
Hey Saverio, thanks for making this. Can I still be added? Thanks!