Was für ein spannender, neuer Podcast von @sebfriedrich.bsky.social und @nschniederjann.bsky.social Nur am Ende biegt er falsch ab finde ich 1/9

Das @dezernatzukunft.bsky.social gründete sich in Kritik an "rechtlichen Verpflichtungen" durch die Schuldenbremse im GG. In ihrem neuen Fiscal Space Indikator, sind 3,5% Militärausgaben auf einmal "nicht disponibel".

So schnell kann's gehen, liebes Dezernat für Aufrüstung

while every economic recovery has become more profitable. That is the REAL problem of the U.S. economy but Trump’s agenda will increase these trends rather than curing them. 20/20

At the same time, the all-time high of uncertainty indices is choking off the investment boom of the Biden administration 12/20

...while maintaining and expanding the tax cuts for the rich under the Tax Cuts and Investment Act. Income gains for the rich and declines for the bottom 40% 11/20

In the U.S., due to strong fiscal packages, unemployment was super low and real wages did increase. The strong U.S. recovery allowed for both: Increasing profit share in value added due to full pass-through AND increasing real wages. 9/20

Capitalists have a lower propensity to consume than workers which drags aggregate demand. Foreign price shocks hence have a contractionary macroeconomic effect 7/20

There is also evidence for a behavioral interpretation according to which firms expanded profit margins in periods of supply chain disruptions, see acharya for Europe, and @franzfranzoni with a global dataset 4/20

The Sellers’ Inflation Hypothesis by @weber stated that firms took the synchronized cost shocks of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine as an implicit coordination mechanism to increase prices and profitability 2/20

At first glance, the Trump tariffs seem like the perfect setting for Sellers’ Inflation 2.0 – but two dynamics are fundamentally different, making the macroeconomic outcome… worse!

New blog with @mnikiforos.bsky.social at @ineteconomics.bsky.social 1/20