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simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Simon Columbus
@simoncolumbus.bsky.social
930 followers 410 following 460 posts
Lecturer, University of St Andrews | I work on cooperation, norms, institutions, & personality | http://simoncolumbus.com
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Simon Columbus @simoncolumbus.bsky.social · Mar 6
Some personal news: In April, I will be joining the University of St Andrews as a lecturer @standrewspsyneuro.bsky.social (~assistant professor for non-UK folks).

I work on cooperation, institutional legitimacy, and personality. If you're in the area and share some interests, I'd love to chat.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Join us in an hour for this week's Cooperation Colloquium with the excellent Terence Dores Cruz
simoncolumbus.bsky.social Simon Columbus @simoncolumbus.bsky.social · 8d
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Terence Dores Cruz (University of Amsterdam)

The costs and benefits of gossip in reputation-based cooperation

Date: Friday, November 7
Time: 15:00 UTC+1 (Vienna) / 9am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Gossip is an ever-present feature of our social interactions. We gossip to update one another about the others in our social environment. Our persistent gossip shapes perceptions and behaviors that are key to forming, keeping, and severing social relationships. These uses of gossip have given rise to the perspective that gossip has cooperative functions. This entails that people gossip to provide information about how to (not) behave and who can(not) be trusted to cooperate. This informs people about others’ reputations, which can serve to make better decisions about whom to cooperate with and whom to avoid. First, I will present research that supports this perspective based on experience sampling, scenario studies, and behavioral experiments. I find that people use reputational information provided by gossip to shape how they think about the targets of gossip. These gossip-based impressions guide receivers’ cooperative behavior toward targets: they cooperate with people they learn are likely to be cooperative and avoid people who they learn are likely to violate norms. Second, I focus on the puzzle of gossip as key for a cooperative social life while also being commonly perceived very negatively. Gossip is needed but could lead to costs for gossipers that motivate refraining from gossip. Based on ongoing research using behavioral experiments, I will present the first steps towards understanding the puzzle of the costs and benefits of gossip. Receivers of gossip support gossip systems by punishing harm to the reputation-system from not contributing gossip or spreading false information and by rewarding accurate gossip.
November 7, 2025 at 1:11 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
I've never liked that we typically teach introductory social psychology as a series of 'classic' studies (see also: Robbers' Cave, Stanford Prison) that are just bad research.

If we want evocative stories, we either need to do serious researchin the field, or look to disciplines that do.
November 6, 2025 at 6:52 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
eapp-news.bsky.social
🔔 Registration for the European Conference on Personality in Edinburgh, Scotland is now open!

Join us for #ECP22 and connect with researchers from around the world!

More information: www.ecp22edinburgh.org

Register here: www.epay.ed.ac.uk/conferences-...

#PersonalityPsychology #eapp
November 4, 2025 at 6:45 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
cgravert.bsky.social
I am looking for a post-doc working on behavioral/environmental/urban/energy economics to join my group at the University of Copenhagen. Position is 2 years (possibly 3), good salary, free health insurance, one of the most livable cities in the world. Apply here: jobportal.ku.dk/videnskabeli...
Postdoctoral Position in Behavioral and Environmental Economics
jobportal.ku.dk
November 3, 2025 at 8:23 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Terence Dores Cruz (University of Amsterdam)

The costs and benefits of gossip in reputation-based cooperation

Date: Friday, November 7
Time: 15:00 UTC+1 (Vienna) / 9am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Gossip is an ever-present feature of our social interactions. We gossip to update one another about the others in our social environment. Our persistent gossip shapes perceptions and behaviors that are key to forming, keeping, and severing social relationships. These uses of gossip have given rise to the perspective that gossip has cooperative functions. This entails that people gossip to provide information about how to (not) behave and who can(not) be trusted to cooperate. This informs people about others’ reputations, which can serve to make better decisions about whom to cooperate with and whom to avoid. First, I will present research that supports this perspective based on experience sampling, scenario studies, and behavioral experiments. I find that people use reputational information provided by gossip to shape how they think about the targets of gossip. These gossip-based impressions guide receivers’ cooperative behavior toward targets: they cooperate with people they learn are likely to be cooperative and avoid people who they learn are likely to violate norms. Second, I focus on the puzzle of gossip as key for a cooperative social life while also being commonly perceived very negatively. Gossip is needed but could lead to costs for gossipers that motivate refraining from gossip. Based on ongoing research using behavioral experiments, I will present the first steps towards understanding the puzzle of the costs and benefits of gossip. Receivers of gossip support gossip systems by punishing harm to the reputation-system from not contributing gossip or spreading false information and by rewarding accurate gossip.
November 3, 2025 at 12:39 PM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
aromano.bsky.social
We are excited for our upcoming CBEN preconference in Leiden on April 14th on “Socio-Ecological Variation in Conflict and Cooperation”.

Keynotes: Daniel Balliet, Elisabetta Palagi.

Submit your abstract by Nov 30.
More info can be found here:

www.cognitionbehaviorevolution.nl?p=1120
October 31, 2025 at 8:23 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
nikoletaglyn.bsky.social
🌏 #ICSD2026 is on!
Great meeting, amazing location, and an even cooler logo! 😄
Join us in Shimonoseki, Japan! 🇯🇵
icsd2026.bsky.social ICSD2026 @icsd2026.bsky.social · 15d
🎉 We're excited to announce that the #ICSD2026 (Jun 1-5, 2026)website is now live! sites.google.com/view/icsd2026
📅 Key dates
Nov 2025: Abstract submission opens
Dec 22, 2025: Submission deadline
Late Feb 2026: Acceptance notifications
Apr 3, 2026: Registration closes
Jun 1, 2026: Conference begins
ICSD 2026
Welcome TO ICSD 2026 We are delighted to announce that the International Conference on Social Dilemmas will be held in Shimonoseki, Japan, on June 1-5, 2026, at the Shimonoseki Grand Hotel. The confer...
sites.google.com
October 27, 2025 at 8:19 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Today's Cooperation Colloquium!
simoncolumbus.bsky.social Simon Columbus @simoncolumbus.bsky.social · 21d
This week's Cooperation Colloquium:

Christian Ruff @ccruff.bsky.social

Neurocomputational mechanisms of mentalizing in social interaction

When: October 24, 15:00 UTC+2 (Vienna) / 9am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Successful cooperation depends on mentalization—the ability to infer and adapt to others’ beliefs, intentions, and strategies. Yet, most existing studies and models treat mentalizing as a static trait rather than an adaptive, dynamic process unfolding within interactive contexts. In this talk, I will present a modelling framework and experimental paradigm that capture adaptive mentalization: the capacity to continuously update one’s internal model of another person’s behavioral sophistication and to adjust one’s own strategy accordingly. Using a social strategic game combined with computational modeling and fMRI, we develop and validate a Bayesian model indexing how effectively individuals can adapt their mental models in response to changing partner behavior, and we identify a multivariate neural signature that can predict this adaptiveness of mentalization. This neural pattern generalizes across individuals and closely tracks the flexibility of mental-state inference during interaction. Applying this paradigm to individuals with varying levels of autistic traits, we find that reduced adaptive mentalization —both behaviorally and neurally—correlates with higher trait expression. These results reveal how subtle alterations in the adaptiveness of mentalization can influence the dynamics of social interactions. By grounding social interaction in formal models of belief-updating and strategy adjustment, our work advances a more mechanistic understanding of how humans coordinate minds in social contexts—and how individual differences in these computations shape social behavior.
October 24, 2025 at 11:03 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Accepted a review request from Sci Rep because the abstract sounded interesting (stupid, I know).

(a) There's a rebuttal letter which reveals that this is (at least) round 3 (!) of the review process;

(b) I am reviewer #5.

None of this was clear from the invitation. Incredibly disrespectful.
October 22, 2025 at 1:46 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
This week's Cooperation Colloquium:

Christian Ruff @ccruff.bsky.social

Neurocomputational mechanisms of mentalizing in social interaction

When: October 24, 15:00 UTC+2 (Vienna) / 9am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Successful cooperation depends on mentalization—the ability to infer and adapt to others’ beliefs, intentions, and strategies. Yet, most existing studies and models treat mentalizing as a static trait rather than an adaptive, dynamic process unfolding within interactive contexts. In this talk, I will present a modelling framework and experimental paradigm that capture adaptive mentalization: the capacity to continuously update one’s internal model of another person’s behavioral sophistication and to adjust one’s own strategy accordingly. Using a social strategic game combined with computational modeling and fMRI, we develop and validate a Bayesian model indexing how effectively individuals can adapt their mental models in response to changing partner behavior, and we identify a multivariate neural signature that can predict this adaptiveness of mentalization. This neural pattern generalizes across individuals and closely tracks the flexibility of mental-state inference during interaction. Applying this paradigm to individuals with varying levels of autistic traits, we find that reduced adaptive mentalization —both behaviorally and neurally—correlates with higher trait expression. These results reveal how subtle alterations in the adaptiveness of mentalization can influence the dynamics of social interactions. By grounding social interaction in formal models of belief-updating and strategy adjustment, our work advances a more mechanistic understanding of how humans coordinate minds in social contexts—and how individual differences in these computations shape social behavior.
October 21, 2025 at 1:10 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Publishing in social psychology:

Reviewer 2 (me): please spell out your causal assumptions

Authors: lol, we'd rather stop claiming we're doing causal inference

Editor: *crickets*
October 16, 2025 at 11:09 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
rensec.bsky.social
WORK! At Utrecht University (@utrechtuniversity.bsky.social) We're recruiting a PhD student in experimental sociology! More info: www.uu.nl/en/organisat...
PhD Position in Experimental Sociology
Do you want to apply innovative methods to study fundamental sociological questions?
www.uu.nl
October 10, 2025 at 2:45 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Today's Cooperation Colloquium!
simoncolumbus.bsky.social Simon Columbus @simoncolumbus.bsky.social · Oct 6
This week's Cooperation Colloquium:

Setayesh Radkani @setayeshradkani.bsky.social:

What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model

Date: Friday, Oct 10
Time: 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. However, punishment is often interpreted in contrasting ways: at times it teaches and enforces norms, but at other times it fails or even backfires, undermining the authority’s legitimacy. We show that these seemingly contradictory effects of punishment can only be understood by considering the cognitive processes in the minds of human observers of punishment. In a series of experiments, we showed the systematic variability in how adults and children interpret punishment. We developed a formal cognitive model, derived from a standard model of how people make sense of each others’ actions (Inverse Planning), that captures and explains these inferences quantitatively and parsimoniously. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment, and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.
October 10, 2025 at 5:41 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
This week's Cooperation Colloquium:

Setayesh Radkani @setayeshradkani.bsky.social:

What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model

Date: Friday, Oct 10
Time: 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. However, punishment is often interpreted in contrasting ways: at times it teaches and enforces norms, but at other times it fails or even backfires, undermining the authority’s legitimacy. We show that these seemingly contradictory effects of punishment can only be understood by considering the cognitive processes in the minds of human observers of punishment. In a series of experiments, we showed the systematic variability in how adults and children interpret punishment. We developed a formal cognitive model, derived from a standard model of how people make sense of each others’ actions (Inverse Planning), that captures and explains these inferences quantitatively and parsimoniously. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment, and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.
October 6, 2025 at 9:33 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
nathumbehav.nature.com
In an online study with 3,371 participants from 13 societies, Jin et al. found that perceived societal honour norms predicted both greater competition and cooperation.
@shuxianjin.bsky.social
@ayseuskul.bsky.social
www.nature.com/articles/s41...
Honour, competition and cooperation across 13 societies - Nature Human Behaviour
This online study with 3,371 participants from 13 societies found that perceived societal honour norms predicted both greater competition and greater cooperation at both societal and individual levels.
www.nature.com
September 26, 2025 at 3:25 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Join us in three hours for this week's Cooperation Colloquium!
simoncolumbus.bsky.social Simon Columbus @simoncolumbus.bsky.social · Sep 22
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Talbot M. Andrews @talbotmandrews.bsky.social (Cornell):

Overcoming the social dilemma of climate change

Friday, Sep 26, 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Mitigating the increasing threat of climate change poses a uniquely challenging cooperative problem. Multiple strategic features of climate change impede coordinating around successful action. For example, there is uncertainty about the timing and dynamics of climate change impacts. Different actors vary in their historic contribution to the problem and vulnerability now. There are many solutions available to mitigate climate change, but they differ in their effectiveness and probability of success. And, compounding all of this, there are asymmetries in information between elite decision-makers and the publics that they govern. In this talk, I argue economic games are well-suited to understand both how these strategic features delay successful climate action and provide insights into how to overcome these problems through public policy. Focusing on the case of governing emerging mitigation technologies, I will present the empirical evidence that people are willing to pay costs to avert climate disaster. While mistrust between the public and policymakers erodes cooperation, I will also present solutions that emerge from these experiments. I conclude by discussing how insights from the lab can inform real-world messaging and policymaking to encourage successful climate change mitigation.
September 26, 2025 at 10:07 AM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
robertboehm.bsky.social
My PhD student @qinyuxiao.bsky.social has written a wonderful tribute to Gary Bornstein’s influential paper on team games (doi.org/10.1207/S153...) — a paper that remains as relevant today as it was over 20 years ago. You can read Qinyu’s short piece here: doi.org/10.1038/s441...
The multi-level social dilemmas of intergroup interactions - Nature Reviews Psychology
Nature Reviews Psychology - The multi-level social dilemmas of intergroup interactions
doi.org
September 25, 2025 at 2:40 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
The US government continues to abduct and disappear people in my former hometown.
September 22, 2025 at 9:00 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Talbot M. Andrews @talbotmandrews.bsky.social (Cornell):

Overcoming the social dilemma of climate change

Friday, Sep 26, 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Mitigating the increasing threat of climate change poses a uniquely challenging cooperative problem. Multiple strategic features of climate change impede coordinating around successful action. For example, there is uncertainty about the timing and dynamics of climate change impacts. Different actors vary in their historic contribution to the problem and vulnerability now. There are many solutions available to mitigate climate change, but they differ in their effectiveness and probability of success. And, compounding all of this, there are asymmetries in information between elite decision-makers and the publics that they govern. In this talk, I argue economic games are well-suited to understand both how these strategic features delay successful climate action and provide insights into how to overcome these problems through public policy. Focusing on the case of governing emerging mitigation technologies, I will present the empirical evidence that people are willing to pay costs to avert climate disaster. While mistrust between the public and policymakers erodes cooperation, I will also present solutions that emerge from these experiments. I conclude by discussing how insights from the lab can inform real-world messaging and policymaking to encourage successful climate change mitigation.
September 22, 2025 at 2:26 PM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
jorgeapenas.bsky.social
📢 Apply to our (2-year) research fellowships at @iast.fr

Join a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and indisciplinary group of scholars in Toulouse, walkable/cyclable pink city of chocolatines in the South of France.

Deadline: November 15, 2025.

www.iast.fr/research-fel...
Research Fellowships
Each year, IAST invites applications for post-doctoral Research Fellowships, which offer candidates an opportunity to devote themselves full-time to their research at the start of their careers. Fello...
www.iast.fr
September 22, 2025 at 7:44 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Spent a few lovely days at the Matterhorn Symposium in Brig 🇨🇭, where I presented joint work with @mkasper.bsky.social and others on biased institutions. Next stop: Kassel for #DPPD25 and a talk on our new scale for HEXACO personality states.
A view from a Swiss alp near the Aletsch Glacier towards the Matterhorn.
September 21, 2025 at 11:38 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Come to Scotland, everybody!
renemottus.bsky.social René Mõttus @renemottus.bsky.social · Sep 18
Submissions are now open for 22nd European Conference on Personality (Edinburgh, 2026); deadline 7/12/25.
Keynote speakers and pre-conference workshops have also been confirmed.
www.ecp22edinburgh.org/submission
European Conference on Personality, Edinburgh, 2026
September 18, 2025 at 9:18 PM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Buonasera Milano
A photo of a table. On it lays Banu Mushtaq's collection of short stories, Heart Lamp, next to an Aperol spritz.
September 17, 2025 at 5:30 PM
Reposted by Simon Columbus
debruine.bsky.social
This fall I will have a blind student in my coding class for the first time. Do any other instructors or visually impaired coders have advice beyond making sure my book has useful alt-text for the images? #rstats #accessibility

Class book: psyteachr.github.io/reprores-v5/
September 16, 2025 at 9:54 AM
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
First Cooperation Colloquium of the semester!

Doruk İriş @dorukiris.bsky.social:
Normative expectations of reciprocal negotiators

Friday Sep 12, 14:00 UTC+2 (Vienna) / 8 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework to examine how normative expectations--what one considers others should do based on their fairness perceptions--in shaping the behavior of players with reciprocal preferences in a public goods game. Standard reciprocity models typically assume uniform, exogenously determined, and moderate expectations. By contrast, I allow players to (i) vary in how demanding they are of others, (ii) disagree about what counts as fair, and (iii) form self-centered normative expectations endogenously. In noncooperative play, strong reciprocal concerns transform the payoff structure from a material payoff dilemma into a coordination game in utilities, with one exception. In coalition formation, three central results emerge: (i) the empty coalition is always stable, (ii) the grand coalition becomes stable once reciprocal concerns are sufficiently strong, and (iii) partial coalitions can be stable under specific conditions. Exogenous expectations create distinct effects on cooperation: lower expectations facilitate the stability of the grand coalition, whereas higher expectations increase the size of partial coalitions, potentially leading to a majority coalition. This latter finding is more consistent with empirical observation.
September 8, 2025 at 10:37 AM