Finding #2:
- Geographic appeals are more frequent when councils are elected via electoral districts (institutional incentives matter)

Finding #1:
- Parties talk more about districts where they’re electorally strong --> this is especially pronounced when their voter base is localized

Data & Method:
- 12 large German cities, one full term (5–6 yrs).
- We analyze 10,189 questions (aggregated to parties).
- We build 455 district dictionaries from Wikipedia + OpenStreetMap (streets, sights, buildings, etc.), matched to district shapefiles, to detect when/where questions target geo

Ask: Do neighborhoods actually receive attention & representation in local politics?

Did: Computational (geo)text on council questions with geocoded place refs

Find: Geographic representation is common; parties focus where they’re strongest with localized electorates & certain electoral rules

@martingross.bsky.social @donyhu.bsky.social @sebastianjblock.bsky.social & @jvelimsky.bsky.social deal with issue emphasis

💡Key findings:
1️⃣More attention to issues where municipalities have more legal leeway
2️⃣Effect is moderated by municipalities' financial constraints

doi.org/10.1111/spsr...

You can read the full open access article here:
🔗 doi.org/10.1017/gov....
Published in print in Government and Opposition @govandopp.
#PoliticalScience #LegislativeOversight #Governance #PublicPolicy #LocalPolitics

These dynamics matter not only for understanding local governance in Germany, but also for broader debates about the role of technocrats in democratic systems and how accountability mechanisms adapt to non-partisan actors.

Why?
Independent ministers—while often chosen for expertise—are less predictable. Parties cannot rely on shared ideology or party loyalty, which increases the risk of policy drift. Parliamentary questions help close this informational gap.

The findings are clear:
✅ All parties ask significantly more questions to independent portfolios than to partisan ones.
✅ Opposition parties exercise even more oversight than governing parties over independent portfolios

Using data from 28 German city councils (2011–2020) and over 13,000 parliamentary questions, I examine whether parties control independent portfolio heads more than partisan ones—and whether opposition and governing parties behave differently.

Despite the increasing presence of independents in both national and subnational governments, research has largely focused on partisan ministers. My article addresses this gap by studying how parties control independent portfolios.

In many governments, independent ministers are appointed to key portfolios. Unlike partisan ministers, they aren’t bound by party discipline—raising important questions about oversight: Who monitors them, and how does this shape legislative control dynamics?

Please add me to the CSS list:) thanks!

Thank you!

Thank you, Clint!