This asymmetry offers a possible explanation for the limited success of climate cooperation: In polarised settings, electoral pressure compels green incumbents to weaken their climate goals, while brown incumbents can keep their low ambition with minimal electoral cost. (8/8)

This political constraint means that ambitious agreements are systematically limited by the need to appeal to a median voter. Without concessions, the green party risks losing office, not only stalling progress but also potentially reversing it. 📉 (7/8)

The model reveals a key asymmetry: a brown incumbent can secure consensus treaties under a wide range of polarisation without needing to raise their climate ambition, while a green incumbent must invariably reduce their goals to remain competitive in polarised environments. (6/8)

This results in two treaty types: consensus🤝 treaties, crafted for ratification across parties, and differentiation🙅‍♀️ treaties, supported only by one party, giving voters a clear policy choice. (5/8)

Incumbents face a trade-off between aligning treaties with their party's policy preferences or appealing to the median voter to improve reelection prospects, shaping the treaty’s ambition. (4/8)

I model a 4-stage game between two countries considering an emissions reduction agreement, with political competition between a “green” 🌿 party and a “brown”🏭 party in one of the countries. (3/8)

In this paper - which is more timely than I had hoped - I examine how elections in politically polarised settings affect climate cooperation. Electoral pressure can lead to "suboptimal" treaties, as governments make strategic concessions to enhance reelection chances. (2/8)