But instead of blaming security assistance to Ukraine for longstanding issues in the DIB, let’s recognize that U.S. forces will be better equipped and prepared for future battles as a result of that assistance.

Of course, much work remains to be done, including further expanding production of key systems, reforming the FMS process, and increasing defense spending to be commensurate with the threats we face.

Perhaps the strongest counterpoint to allegations that supporting Ukraine drained our strength is U.S. assistance to Israel post-Oct 7. After supporting Ukraine for a year and a half, the U.S. was still able to rapidly provide air defenses, 155mm artillery shells, JDAMs, and various small arms.

This will take several years, with large-scale deliveries being available in 2026. Without this investment, U.S. forces might have found themselves waiting years for deliveries if production hadn’t restarted to support Ukraine’s needs.

Supporting Ukraine has been most beneficial for systems that had essentially gone out of production, such as the Stinger missile. A component of its seeker was no longer manufactured and needed to be redesigned.

In protracted high intensity conflicts, production tends to matter more than stockpiles in determining victory. Artillery fire rates in WWI are illustrative of this point.

It will take time to replenish select stockpiles which have been depleted, particularly 155mm shells. This is precisely the same situation that would face U.S. forces if they needed to confront a near-peer adversary, which is why strengthening the DIB in advance is so important.

Take HIMARS for example – the manufacturer doubled production, allowing for Taiwan to receive its expanded order ahead of schedule. AMRAAM and Javelin production ~doubled, and 155mm artillery shell production has roughly tripled, with further increases on the way. www.fdd.org/analysis/202...

And if you’re pressed for time, here’s the 2-page executive summary: www.fdd.org/wp-content/u...

To learn more about the U.S. Arsenal of Democracy, read the full FDD CMPP report: www.fdd.org/analysis/202...

Appreciate the exclusive by @pattucker.bsky.social and @defenseone.bsky.social on our report: www.defenseone.com/business/202...

The Trump administration and Congress must act quickly to address these urgent challenges to ensure our servicemembers and security partners don’t find themselves outgunned by the Axis of Aggressors – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

For the 25 systems, 7 of their respective industrial bases are strong, 14 require attention, and 4 are weak.

With smart decisions and reforms, the United States can continue to support Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel simultaneously and indefinitely. But that’s far from saying that all is well in the defense industrial base, which has atrophied since the end of the Cold War.

After carefully examining 25 major weapons systems including HIMARS, ATACMS, JDAM, and Harpoon missiles, Brad Bowman
and I conclude that none experienced a delay in delivery of more than one year to Taiwan or Israel due to the commitment of that system to Ukraine.