Support for the “special military operation” in Russia is also at its lowest point in a year, although it’s hard to tell if this is a new trend or an aberration.

Only about 10% (down from nearly 15% in September) say Russia should withdraw without any conditions, and >10% still say Russia should annex all of Ukraine. /END

But this doesn't mean Russians are willing to give up much. Our data show that as approval for negotiations has been going up, willingness to compromise has been going down: the % who say they want to annex part of Ukraine & achieve regime change has grown since February 2025. 4/

Approval of negotiations also reached a peak in early August, with nearly 40% of Russians expressing strong approval of negotiations and another 25% saying they somewhat approve. 3/

But uncertainty has ben increasing over the past week or two, perhaps in anticipation of the meeting between the US and Russian presidents. 2/

Meanwhile, approval of negotiations is also at an all-time high, with a sizable majority expressing support. This is probably because negotiations seem increasingly likely to occur, and also (we suspect) because Russians believe they are in a good negotiating position.

However, Trump approval is still much higher than Biden approval was; less than 10% of Russians said they approved of the former US president before Trump took office.

If anything, Russians have become less worried about the economic effects of the so-called "special military operation." This suggests that although there is considerable dissatisfaction with the economy, many people don't blame their economic troubles on the war.

At the same time, most Russians don't think that the war poses a serious threat to them personally. In fact, threat perceptions have actually decreased somewhat over the past ~1.5 months.

Note that these are unweighted 7-day moving averages (right-aligned), meaning that each daily point averages percentages from the current day and previous 6 days. /END

Meanwhile, perceptions of the success of the SMO have returned to level they were at before the new year after an increase from February to early May. 40% of Russians think the SMO is being conducted somewhat successfully, but only 20% think it's very successful. 5/

It will be interesting to see whether Ukraine's recent drone strikes on Russian air bases will affect attitudes toward the war and prospects of coming to some kind of agreement. 4/

This shows that while most Russians continue to say that they are in favor of their government's decision to fight war - which they have little control over - but they are increasingly keen to end the fighting, especially as negotiations seem more realistic. 3/

It's worth noting that nominal support for the so-called 'special military operation' has remained relatively unchanged over the same time period. Over 60% of Russians say they strongly or somewhat support the SMO, and ~20-25% oppose it (~10% say they don't know). 2/

but it seems more likely that attitudes in Russia are shifting in response to the current diplomatic environment and recent meetings and phone calls between top Russian, Ukrainian, and US officials.