This structural problem is exacerbated by Russia's loss of competitive edge in the global arms market—to both NATO and China—which will inevitably erode research and development funding and accelerate the sector's decline.

Furthermore, the sector's long-term viability is undermined by a critical 'brain drain' of young talent and an aging expert workforce.

A coordinated expansion of sanctions targeting lower-tier suppliers, coupled with Ukraine's deep-strike campaign against industrial facilities, could create a compounding effect, severely impeding Russia's ability to produce and repair advanced aircraft.

It notes that these industrial weaknesses present strategic opportunities.

Our analysis reveals that the Sukhoi supply chain, particularly the second and third tiers, maintains extensive reliance on foreign imports of materials, specialised equipment, and crucial machine tooling, with Russia having limited success in import substitution efforts.

While Russian combat aircraft are technologically inferior to NATO or Chinese equivalents, they fulfil important battlefield functions for the Russian military, and their production rates have slightly increased, despite disruptions experienced since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Our new report assesses the exposure of Russia’s production of Sukhoi combat aircraft to industrial disruption and explores opportunities to displace Russia’s defence exports in the aerospace sector.

This requires Europe to assume greater security responsibility and significantly increase defence investment, allowing the US to maintain engagement in a less dominant role while focusing on its strategic priorities.

Our report concludes that the alliance can remain a pillar of global stability if it embraces a rebalanced partnership.

This divergence is sharpest concerning Russia: Europe views it as an existential threat to its security architecture, yet the second Trump administration has deprioritised Russia as a top-tier threat and pursued bilateral engagement.

This trend is not merely cyclical, as suggested by the potential return of the Trump administration but reflects longer-term structural shifts in global security.

Conversely, the Indo-Pacific and competition with China have solidified their place as the primary focus of US foreign policy.

Since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, defending against Russia has become Europe’s dominant security objective, viewing it as an existential threat to its security architecture.

While both sides acknowledge the rise of great power competition, their assessments of specific threats and corresponding national priorities are drifting apart.

The transatlantic alliance faces growing differences because the US and Europe are diverging in their perceptions of, and approaches to, national security threats.