Interesting that the US prioritised cost & foreign supply in minerals security as early as 1951. It reframes the current reshoring push: not just a backlash against the past 40 years of free trade orthodoxy but the symptom of a much bigger shift in international political economy over the past 70.

A durable rally would still need higher global battery demand growth and it remains unclear where this would come from.

China has so far been unwilling to stimulate overall consumption while the US is rolling back battery stimulus policy.

However, the sheer scale of oversupply means targeted shutdowns may not be enough to make a difference, esp to producers outside of China, who need a higher incentive price.

The NYT famously hate the liberal establishment

The KIA has said it will levy a $4,800/tonne tax on the rare earths but questions remain about how effectively it can regulate the sector over the long run.

Chinese-led projects have operated without social and environmental guardrails in Myanmar since the early 2010s.

tinyurl.com/4ds44ey4

On a basic level, Christophers’ argument accords with what energy investors on the ground actually say and do - oil majors being the obvious example.

www.bbc.co.uk/news/article...

Structural conditions mediate the impact prices and cost will have on profit (i.e. vertically integrated versus unbundled, consolidated versus competitive industries)

Critical minerals producers, for example, do not wait for a particular price so much as a price that supports profit given their particular cost structure.

One reason Christophers’ argument is compelling because he separates price and profit. This is what gives his argument so much analytic range.

Performative references to Greenland & 'raw earths' are part of the Trump admin's wider rhetorical obsessions - payback for US largesse abroad, fiscal & trade balancing. Nothing to do w/ resource security for strategic sectors that it is basically indifferent about and has no coherent policy for.