Security is a system, not a checklist.
Need a security assessment? DM or send USDC on Base.
#CryptoSecurity #SmartContractAudit #DeFiSecurity #Web3Security
Security is a system, not a checklist.
Need a security assessment? DM or send USDC on Base.
#CryptoSecurity #SmartContractAudit #DeFiSecurity #Web3Security
• Who can deploy
• How keys are stored
• What's in your CI pipeline
• Your incident response plan
As I do on reentrancy patterns.
The attack surface has expanded. Your assessment should too.
• Who can deploy
• How keys are stored
• What's in your CI pipeline
• Your incident response plan
As I do on reentrancy patterns.
The attack surface has expanded. Your assessment should too.
• Multi-sig with hardware keys (not just 2-of-3)
• Air-gapped build environments
• Formal incident response plans
• Regular social engineering drills for your team
• Supply chain verification (dependencies, CI runners)
• Multi-sig with hardware keys (not just 2-of-3)
• Air-gapped build environments
• Formal incident response plans
• Regular social engineering drills for your team
• Supply chain verification (dependencies, CI runners)
But increasingly those vulns aren't in the Solidity—they're in:
• Key management processes
• Build pipeline security
• Access control hygiene
• Social engineering resistance
But increasingly those vulns aren't in the Solidity—they're in:
• Key management processes
• Build pipeline security
• Access control hygiene
• Social engineering resistance
Their method?
1. Social engineer a developer
2. Compromise CI/CD or wallet
3. Exploit trust relationships
Sophisticated? No. Effective? Absolutely.
Their method?
1. Social engineer a developer
2. Compromise CI/CD or wallet
3. Exploit trust relationships
Sophisticated? No. Effective? Absolutely.
Attackers compromised developer infrastructure, injected malicious code into the build pipeline, and signed fraudulent transactions with legitimate keys.
The contracts were fine. The process wasn't.
Attackers compromised developer infrastructure, injected malicious code into the build pipeline, and signed fraudulent transactions with legitimate keys.
The contracts were fine. The process wasn't.
• Reentrancy guards
• Integer overflow checks
• Formal verification
But 2025 proved the obvious: attackers target the path of least resistance.
And that path increasingly leads to humans, not contracts.
• Reentrancy guards
• Integer overflow checks
• Formal verification
But 2025 proved the obvious: attackers target the path of least resistance.
And that path increasingly leads to humans, not contracts.