Sun, July 27th, 10-11 am at Bella Center Hub (Orange), Poster 101.

In that case, the subtle problem could be revealed in a comment.

Good point. In the second paper, he considers both types of beneficial MH, including the one you model.

Given these considerations and given that you model med expenses as perfectly divisible, i think that your paper models a de Meza-type of beneficial MH rather than a Nyman type.

For, if expenses are perfectly divisible, you can always afford to spend a little more on meds by reducing other consumption (ruling out corner solutions). Then it's not lack of affordability that prevents you from getting more meds but that you prefer to spend your money on other consumption.

I think a crucial difference between de Meza's and Nyman's ideas of beneficial MH is that the latter relates it to unaffordable medical expenses becoming affordable through insurance. That again requires indivisibility of such expenses.

That being said: The idea that limited savings possibilities (liqu constraints) increase beneficial MH is a cool idea, though.

I agree on its importance. Less on it being surprising given that the idea of beneficial moral hazard is around for several decades now (de Meza 1983, Nyman 1999). There is also already a literature on how it affects the evaluation of public insurance schemes like Medicaid.

For Bluesky-Curious Econ Lovers, a Quick Start guide to plugging into the economics community here.

It aims to lower the costs & boost the benefits for folks to engage here.

If it seems useful, please share it here & especially on X.
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aaronsojourner.org/for-bluesky-...

Hello. I have some work on insurance decision-making and would love to be added. Thank you!

I would love to be added, too. Thank you!