Orbán & Kaczyński associate culture with the ‘thick’ characteristics of religion, nationalism, and trad. values (‘roots’ ‘Christianity’ ‘countryside’ ‘spiritual’ and ‘civilization’). Babiš & Fico use a technical, managerial language (‘monuments’ ‘buildings’ ‘affairs’ ‘minister’ ‘digitization’). 4/4

Orbán & Kaczyński place great emphasis on culture. Its importance has increased for both after getting their hold on power (with a recent decrease for Orbán). Culture has never been a salient topic for Babiš. For Fico, it was only in late 2023, when his emphasis on culture increased dramatically 3/4

We show that the ‘thick ideological’, radical right populist governing parties of 🇭🇺 and 🇵🇱 abused culture as a vehicle for transmitting their nationalist narratives, their ‘thin populist’, technocratic 🇨🇿 and 🇸🇰 counterparts took a more pragmatic approach to cultural policy. 2/4

🆕📝🚨 Glad to see this one out in International Journal of Cultural Policy. With data from @authlibeu.bsky.social, we review cultural policies of 🇭🇺Orbán, 🇵🇱Kaczyński, 🇨🇿Babiš, and 🇸🇰Fico. A short thread👇 1/4

Open access: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

@schaferd.bsky.social @jsuchanek.bsky.social

Some time before the elections, it seemed that it was about how some Poles in Pennsylvania might vote. After, it’s about how the other than white and especially Latinos voted in cities and suburbia. www.nytimes.com/interactive/...

🚨New pub alert🚨 Delighted to see this out in EPSR. We show with a conjoint design in 🇪🇸 that populism attracts the young (particularly those pessimistic about their economic future) more than we tend to believe. For the old, it's immigration, for Gen Z, it's populism.
Link (OA): tinyurl.com/3knypbpr