Patrick Hough
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patrickhough.bsky.social
Patrick Hough
@patrickhough.bsky.social
48 followers 47 following 2 posts
Postdoctoral researcher in cryptography @ PACY Lab - UniBw, München.

Advocate for privacy-preserving technologies and collector of disco.

Homepage: patrick-hough.com
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patrickhough.bsky.social
Credit to @tjesi.bsky.social for the inspired nomenclature, great to finally get this work out there.
eprint.ing.bot ePrint Updates @eprint.ing.bot · Oct 3
Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort (Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2025/1789
Abstract. We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, non-interactive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework of Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al., Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, and apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2⁶⁰ signatures, our scheme has 2.6 KB public keys and 9.7 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 953 KB per party. Using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023), this can be further reduced to 596 KB. An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 83 KB communication per party. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
October 20, 2025 at 12:24 PM
Reposted by Patrick Hough
eprint.ing.bot
Collaborative, Segregated NIZK (CoSNIZK) and More Efficient Lattice-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation (Liqun Chen, Patrick Hough, Nada El Kassem) ia.cr/2024/864
Abstract. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) allows a (host) device with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to prove that it has a certified configuration of hardware and software whilst preserving the privacy of the device. All deployed DAA schemes are based on classical security assumptions. Despite a long line of works proposing post-quantum designs, the vast majority give only theoretical schemes and where concrete parameters are computed, their efficiency is far from practical. Our first contribution is to define collaborative, segregated, non-interactive zero knowledge (CoSNIZK). This notion generalizes the property of collaborative zero-knowledge as formalised by Ozdemir and Boneh (USENIX ’22) so that the zero-knowledge property need only apply to a subset of provers during collaborative proof generation. This if of particular interest for proxy-cryptography in which part of an expensive but sensitive computation may be delegated to another party. We give a lattice-based CoSNIZK based on the highly efficient proof framework in (Crypto ’22). Our main contribution is the construction of a DAA based on the hardness of problems over module lattices as well as the ISISf assumption recently introduced by Bootle et al. (Crypto ’23). A key component of our work is the CoSNIZK construction which allows the TPM and host to jointly create attestations whilst protecting TPM key material from a potentially corrupt host. We prove the security of our DAA scheme according to the well-established UC definition of Camenisch et al. (PKC ’16). Our design achieves DAA signatures more than 1.5 orders of magnitude smaller than previous works at only 38KB making it the first truly practical candidate for post-quantum DAA. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
June 5, 2024 at 11:28 AM
Reposted by Patrick Hough
eprint.ing.bot
Concrete NTRU Security and Advances in Practical Lattice-Based Electronic Voting (Patrick Hough, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2023/933
June 15, 2023 at 6:58 AM