Computationalism and functionalism seem to me to be logically independent: to get computational functionalism you have to add the extra point that the very nature of mental states is entirely computational.
And that is a philosophical stand as far as I understand…

That being said, proposing a computational function for consciousness does not automatically make a theory a version of functionalism…correct?

“GNWT … holds that what we call consciousness is a computational property, characteristic of a certain type of information processing … the architecture underlying conscious processing could be implemented in machines.”
I guess that’s pretty clear, GNWT treats consciousness as a computational feat.

Hey Boki, check Mudrik et al. (2025)’s multi-theory debate paper, notably the GNWT section ;)

doi.org/10.1016/j.ne...

Greener than green 😍😆

Look at this sexyyyy