Bottom line: Public opinion shapes the credibility of alliance management. Leaders who ignore ally defection risk domestic backlash. This has implications for US foreign policy, especially as debates over NATO burden-sharing and alliance reliability intensify.

Exposure to ally behavior also affects support for US contributions to the alliance. Voters want reciprocity and demand cuts when partners
don’t pull their weight. Partisanship and ideology play a role too. Republicans and right-leaning voters are more supportive of restraint.

Also not all allies are equal. Americans are far less willing to punish democratic partners when they act uncooperatively. Regime type matters. Treaty status and military power? Surprisingly, not so much.

The results? Americans overwhelmingly favor action over inaction. But not all measures are equal. Coercive steps like cutting military aid or imposing sanctions are far more popular than public shaming or breaking the alliance.

Using a pre-registered survey experiment with 1,502 Americans, I tested support for different “corrective measures” against allies who underperform—like underspending on defense or buying weapons from rivals.

A similar piece on the topic. ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/... Unfortunately, the authors seem to miss it.

A similar piece on the topic. ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/... Unfortunately, the authors seem to miss it.

Which makes me think that it's not going to be as isolationist as most people expect. Including in Ukraine

Obviously, this wouldn’t be an issue if journals start publishing null results more frequently, but unfortunately we’re not there yet.

I actually think the opposite. Pre-registration, despite necessary, deepens inequality. With more funding, more pre-registrations, more experiments, more likely to find "sign." results. With less money, if your experiment does not give you what you hoped for, you are empty-handed.

Would like to be added, please

Would like to be added, please

3/ In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks, have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access.

2/ I show that higher social media use correlates with lower trust in the EU among European citizens. But more troubling finding is this: Social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections.