Olle Hammar
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ollehammar.bsky.social
Olle Hammar
@ollehammar.bsky.social
Assistant Professor in Economics @linnaeus-econ.bsky.social. Researcher @futures-studies.bsky.social. Affiliate @iza.org @rfberlin.bsky.social. PhD from Uppsala University. Inequality, migration, culture, replication. http://www.ollehammar.com
En tanke på fars dag till min morfar Lennart Berggren som hade varit 98 år idag och som 25-årig filosofistudent i Lund var den sommarvikarierande visselblåsaren som avslöjade Vipeholmsexperimenten: sverigesradio.se/play/avsnitt...
November 9, 2025 at 7:58 PM
Den årliga rapporteringen 👇
November 3, 2025 at 5:59 PM
🚨 Our comment on Begum, Grossman & Islam (2018) in @readdemography.bsky.social is now available as an @i4replication.bsky.social working paper (w/ @carlbonander.bsky.social, @nikljako.bsky.social, Bensch & Brodeur). Read it here 👉 www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10...
October 10, 2025 at 1:31 PM
Awesome conference @isi-munich.bsky.social! 🤩 I had a great time presenting in the wealth measurement session this morning! #ISIWealthConference2025
October 9, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Having a good time at the @iipf.bsky.social Annual Congress in Nairobi! 🇰🇪
August 21, 2025 at 2:03 PM
Where do people in low- and middle-income countries want to migrate? www.uu.se/en/centre/im...
July 20, 2025 at 11:46 PM
Vart vill människor i låg- och medelinkomstländer migrera? www.uu.se/centrum/immi...
July 20, 2025 at 11:38 PM
Apropå svenska värderingar. 🇸🇪 Här en variant av kulturkartan uppdelad på olika partiers väljare. Mest osvenska värderingar hos Sverigedemokraterna och Kristdemokraterna. (Data från WVS/@evs-values.bsky.social 2017.)
July 12, 2025 at 7:13 PM
Next up: the World Labor Conference in Toronto! The SOLE Mentoring Program (🙏 @jrothst.bsky.social et al) started off yesterday with a great session on replication with @larsvil.bsky.social - and on Saturday I'll be presenting our work on Human Wealth Inequality (w/ @danielwaldenstrom.bsky.social)!
June 26, 2025 at 8:55 PM
June 22, 2025 at 2:08 PM
Fin text av Torbjörn Nilsson, där ni även kan läsa om min hemby Opphem (och pappa Frodo): www.svd.se/a/63gWvO/med...
March 16, 2025 at 11:39 AM
Here’s the full sample correlation from WVS and GWP (average over all years):
December 15, 2024 at 7:36 AM
Finally, can we trust these results? Our identification relies on the samples being balanced before vs after the events. At least in observable characteristics and non-responses this seems to be the case. Moreover, the results are supported by a large set of robustness and placebo tests (see paper).
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
Looking at the longer time trends, we see similar jumps in Putin’s support both with Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The only difference this time is among the Russians abroad, whose attitudes have now aligned with the rest of the World.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
Also, with the invasion, Russians abroad have now turned against Putin. Both in pro- and anti-Putin countries.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
Looking outside of Russia, except for a handful of countries, the invasion has had negative effects on the support for Putin.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
A possible story for this is a recruitment strategy where 1) the invasion has most positive effects in regions with the lowest pre-war support, 2) the recruitment is focused particularly on these regions, and 3) the deaths are financially compensated for in order to keep the support high.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
The Wagner Group rebellion did not affect the Russians’ sentiments at all.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
During the mobilization, especially young women became worried about the future, and old women unhappy.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
While Russians’ mood was not affected by the invasion, with the announcement of the mobilization their feelings of fear and tension increased. After its completion, however, they went back to normal.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
The mobilization of young men, on the other hand, lowered the support for Putin. But only until it was completed.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
After the invasion, Russians also wanted to leave the country to a lesser extent than before.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
The invasion also spurred negative attitudes against the West.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
Similarly, following the invasion, Russians became much more optimistic about the future.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM
This increase in the support for Putin is found across all possible demographics, except for people in Moscow.
November 17, 2024 at 10:13 PM