Nico Napolio
@nicholasnapolio.bsky.social
Assistant Professor of Political Science at UC Riverside 🏳️🌈
The full video with explanations and audio is coming soon!
September 9, 2025 at 5:22 PM
The full video with explanations and audio is coming soon!
Here's the link: www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Executive Policymaking Coalitions, Veto Activation, and Collective Action Problems | British Journal of Political Science | Cambridge Core
Executive Policymaking Coalitions, Veto Activation, and Collective Action Problems - Volume 55
www.cambridge.org
August 29, 2025 at 8:14 PM
Here's the link: www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Instead, they can amplify gridlock between electorally induced changes in partisan and ideological coalitions by collaborating with other agencies to create ideological divisions among existing overseers
August 29, 2025 at 8:14 PM
Instead, they can amplify gridlock between electorally induced changes in partisan and ideological coalitions by collaborating with other agencies to create ideological divisions among existing overseers
Existing theories of multiple principals overseeing the bureaucracy have ignored strategies agencies can use to exploit legislative collective action problems. Bureaucrats do not always have to wait for gridlock in Congress resulting from biannual elections.
August 29, 2025 at 8:14 PM
Existing theories of multiple principals overseeing the bureaucracy have ignored strategies agencies can use to exploit legislative collective action problems. Bureaucrats do not always have to wait for gridlock in Congress resulting from biannual elections.
I use a simple spatial model to show the conditions under which agency coalitions allow agencies to induce collective action problems.
I then test the implications of the model with decades of data and dozens of federal agencies.
I then test the implications of the model with decades of data and dozens of federal agencies.
August 29, 2025 at 8:14 PM
I use a simple spatial model to show the conditions under which agency coalitions allow agencies to induce collective action problems.
I then test the implications of the model with decades of data and dozens of federal agencies.
I then test the implications of the model with decades of data and dozens of federal agencies.
🚨 RESOURCE ALERT! 🚨
We have a new teaching resource for you: Animated Politics.
This video series explains the logic, math, and science behind politics.
Watch and share: goodauthority.org/news/animate...
We have a new teaching resource for you: Animated Politics.
This video series explains the logic, math, and science behind politics.
Watch and share: goodauthority.org/news/animate...
Animated Politics, a new teaching resource.
This video series explains the logic, math, and science behind politics.
goodauthority.org
August 7, 2025 at 4:46 PM
In the paper, I develop a formal theory of legislator preferences for enforcing the separation of powers, describe theoretically derived measures of those preferences, and estimate them using ~1.3 million individual legislator decisions between 1973-2024.
Please DM if you'd like to see the draft :)
Please DM if you'd like to see the draft :)
May 16, 2025 at 6:54 PM
In the paper, I develop a formal theory of legislator preferences for enforcing the separation of powers, describe theoretically derived measures of those preferences, and estimate them using ~1.3 million individual legislator decisions between 1973-2024.
Please DM if you'd like to see the draft :)
Please DM if you'd like to see the draft :)